Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk. 14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.

Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe. Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the preference to those who are most closely united to us.

Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.

Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his children, as stated above (Question 26, Article 9). Yet a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us."

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent man.

Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down.

Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit magis benefaciendum his qui sunt nobis magis coniuncti.

Dicitur enim Luc. XIV, cum facis prandium aut cenam, noli vocare amicos tuos neque fratres neque cognatos.

Sed isti sunt maxime coniuncti. Ergo non est magis benefaciendum coniunctis, sed potius extraneis indigentibus, sequitur enim, sed cum facis convivium, voca pauperes et debiles, etc..

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, maximum beneficium est quod homo aliquem in bello adiuvet. Sed miles in bello magis debet iuvare extraneum commilitonem quam consanguineum hostem.

Ergo beneficia non sunt magis exhibenda magis coniunctis.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, prius sunt debita restituenda quam gratuita beneficia impendenda. Sed debitum est quod aliquis impendat beneficium ei a quo accepit. Ergo benefactoribus magis est benefaciendum quam propinquis.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, magis sunt diligendi parentes quam filii, ut supra dictum est.

Sed magis est benefaciendum filiis, quia non debent filii thesaurizare parentibus, ut dicitur II ad Cor. XII.

Ergo non est magis benefaciendum magis coniunctis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de doct. Christ., cum omnibus prodesse non possis, his potissimum consulendum est qui, pro locorum et temporum vel quarumlibet rerum opportunitatibus, constrictius tibi, quasi quadam sorte, iunguntur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod gratia et virtus imitantur naturae ordinem, qui est ex divina sapientia institutus. Est autem talis ordo naturae ut unumquodque agens naturale per prius magis diffundat suam actionem ad ea quae sunt sibi propinquiora, sicut ignis magis calefacit rem sibi magis propinquam. Et similiter deus in substantias sibi propinquiores per prius et copiosius dona suae bonitatis diffundit; ut patet per dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier..

Exhibitio autem beneficiorum est quaedam actio caritatis in alios. Et ideo oportet quod ad magis propinquos simus magis benefici. Sed propinquitas unius hominis ad alium potest attendi secundum diversa in quibus sibi ad invicem homines communicant, ut consanguinei naturali communicatione, concives in civili, fideles in spirituali, et sic de aliis. Et secundum diversas coniunctiones sunt diversimode diversa beneficia dispensanda, nam unicuique est magis exhibendum beneficium pertinens ad illam rem secundum quam est magis nobis coniunctus, simpliciter loquendo. Tamen hoc potest variari secundum diversitatem locorum et temporum et negotiorum, nam in aliquo casu est magis subveniendum extraneo, puta si sit in extrema necessitate, quam etiam patri non tantam necessitatem patienti.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non prohibet simpliciter vocare amicos aut consanguineos ad convivium, sed vocare eos ea intentione quod te ipsi reinvitent.

Hoc enim non erit caritatis, sed cupiditatis. Potest tamen contingere quod extranei sint magis invitandi in aliquo casu, propter maiorem indigentiam.

Intelligendum est enim quod magis coniunctis magis est, ceteris paribus, benefaciendum. Si autem duorum unus sit magis coniunctus et alter magis indigens, non potest universali regula determinari cui sit magis subveniendum, quia sunt diversi gradus et indigentiae et propinquitatis, sed hoc requirit prudentis iudicium.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum commune multorum divinius est quam bonum unius. Unde pro bono communi reipublicae vel spiritualis vel temporalis virtuosum est quod aliquis etiam propriam vitam exponat periculo. Et ideo, cum communicatio in bellicis ordinetur ad conservationem reipublicae, in hoc miles impendens commilitoni auxilium, non impendit ei tanquam privatae personae, sed sicut totam rempublicam iuvans. Et ideo non est mirum si in hoc praefertur extraneus coniuncto secundum carnem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est debitum. Unum quidem quod non est numerandum in bonis eius qui debet, sed potius in bonis eius cui debetur. Puta si aliquis habet pecuniam aut rem aliam alterius vel furto sublatam vel mutuo acceptam sive depositam, vel aliquo alio simili modo, quantum ad hoc plus debet homo reddere debitum quam ex eo benefacere coniunctis.

Nisi forte esset tantae necessitatis articulus in quo etiam liceret rem alienam accipere ad subveniendum necessitatem patienti. Nisi forte et ille cui res debetur in simili necessitate esset. In quo tamen casu pensanda esset utriusque conditio secundum alias conditiones, prudentis iudicio, quia in talibus non potest universalis regula dari, propter varietatem singulorum casuum, ut philosophus dicit, in IX ethic..

Aliud autem est debitum quod computatur in bonis eius qui debet, et non eius cui debetur, puta si debeatur non ex necessitate iustitiae, sed ex quadam morali aequitate, ut contingit in beneficiis gratis susceptis. Nullius autem benefactoris beneficium est tantum sicut parentum, et ideo parentes in recompensandis beneficiis sunt omnibus aliis praeferendi; nisi necessitas ex alia parte praeponderaret, vel aliqua alia conditio, puta communis utilitas ecclesiae vel reipublicae.

In aliis autem est aestimatio habenda et coniunctionis et beneficii suscepti. Quae similiter non potest communi regula determinari.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod parentes sunt sicut superiores, et ideo amor parentum est ad benefaciendum, amor autem filiorum ad honorandum parentes. Et tamen in necessitatis extremae articulo magis liceret deserere filios quam parentes; quos nullo modo deserere licet, propter obligationem beneficiorum susceptorum; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII ethic..