Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mt. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Question 14, Article 2). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against God.

Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's worst sin.

I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above (Question 10, Article 3): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God.

Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it."

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium dei non sit maximum peccatorum. Gravissimum enim peccatum est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quod est irremissibile, ut dicitur Matth. XII.

Sed odium dei non computatur inter species peccati in spiritum sanctum; ut ex supradictis patet.

Ergo odium dei non est gravissimum peccatorum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, peccatum consistit in elongatione a deo. Sed magis videtur esse elongatus a deo infidelis, qui nec dei cognitionem habet, quam fidelis, qui saltem, quamvis deum odio habet, eum tamen cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod gravius sit peccatum infidelitatis quam peccatum odii in deum.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, deus habetur odio solum ratione suorum effectuum qui repugnant voluntati, inter quos praecipuum est poena.

Sed odire poenam non est maximum peccatorum. Ergo odium dei non est maximum peccatorum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod optimo opponitur pessimum; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII ethic..

Sed odium dei opponitur dilectioni dei, in qua consistit optimum hominis. Ergo odium dei est pessimum peccatum hominis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod defectus peccati consistit in aversione a deo, ut supra dictum est.

Huiusmodi autem aversio rationem culpae non haberet nisi voluntaria esset. Unde ratio culpae consistit in voluntaria aversione a deo. Haec autem voluntaria aversio a deo per se quidem importatur in odio dei, in aliis autem peccatis quasi participative et secundum aliud. Sicut enim voluntas per se inhaeret ei quod amat, ita secundum se refugit id quod odit, unde quando aliquis odit deum, voluntas eius secundum se ab eo avertitur. Sed in aliis peccatis, puta cum aliquis fornicatur, non avertitur a deo secundum se, sed secundum aliud, inquantum scilicet appetit inordinatam delectationem, quae habet annexam aversionem a deo. Semper autem id quod est per se est potius eo quod est secundum aliud.

Unde odium dei inter alia peccata est gravius.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, XXV Moral., aliud est bona non facere, aliud est bonorum odisse datorem, sicut aliud est ex praecipitatione, aliud ex deliberatione peccare ex quo datur intelligi quod odire deum, omnium bonorum datorem, sit ex deliberatione peccare, quod est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Unde manifestum est quod odium dei maxime est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, secundum quod peccatum in spiritum sanctum nominat aliquod genus speciale peccati.

Ideo tamen non computatur inter species peccati in spiritum sanctum, quia generaliter invenitur in omni specie peccati in spiritum sanctum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa infidelitas non habet rationem culpae nisi inquantum est voluntaria. Et ideo tanto est gravior quanto est magis voluntaria. Quod autem sit voluntaria provenit ex hoc quod aliquis odio habet veritatem quae proponitur.

Unde patet quod ratio peccati in infidelitate sit ex odio dei, circa cuius veritatem est fides. Et ideo, sicut causa est potior effectu, ita odium dei est maius peccatum quam infidelitas.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod non quicumque odit poenas odit deum, poenarum auctorem, nam multi odiunt poenas qui tamen patienter eas ferunt ex reverentia divinae iustitiae.

Unde et Augustinus dicit, X confess., quod mala poenalia deus tolerare iubet, non amari.

Sed prorumpere in odium dei punientis, hoc est habere odio ipsam dei iustitiam, quod est gravissimum peccatum.

Unde Gregorius dicit, XXV Moral., sicut nonnunquam gravius est peccatum diligere quam perpetrare, ita nequius est odisse iustitiam quam non fecisse.