Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above (1.2, Question 68, Article 8). Now virtue is directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Question 4, Article 5; 1.2, Question 62, Article 3). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding." And in this passage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride."

Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right judgment about Divine things.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non debeat inter dona spiritus sancti computari. Dona enim sunt perfectiora virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.

Sed virtus se habet solum ad bonum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod nullus virtutibus male utitur.

Ergo multo magis dona spiritus sancti se habent solum ad bonum.

Sed sapientia se habet etiam ad malum, dicitur enim Iac. III quaedam sapientia esse terrena, animalis, diabolica.

Ergo sapientia non debet poni inter dona spiritus sancti.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., sapientia est divinarum rerum cognitio.

Sed cognitio divinarum rerum quam homo potest per sua naturalia habere, pertinet ad sapientiam quae est virtus intellectualis, cognitio autem divinorum supernaturalis pertinet ad fidem quae est virtus theologica, ut ex supradictis patet.

Ergo sapientia magis debet dici virtus quam donum.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, iob XXVIII dicitur, ecce timor domini ipsa est sapientia, habetur, ecce, pietas ipsa est sapientia.

Ubi secundum litteram septuaginta, qua utitur Augustinus, habetur, ecce, pietas ipsa est sapientia.

Sed tam timor quam pietas ponuntur dona spiritus sancti.

Ergo sapientia non debet numerari inter dona spiritus sancti quasi donum ab aliis distinctum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI dicitur, requiescet super eum spiritus domini, sapientiae et intellectus, etc..

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod secundum philosophum, in principio metaphys., ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis certissime iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet.

Causa autem altissima dupliciter accipi potest, vel simpliciter, vel in aliquo genere. Ille igitur qui cognoscit causam altissimam in aliquo genere et per eam potest de omnibus quae sunt illius generis iudicare et ordinare, dicitur esse sapiens in illo genere, ut in medicina vel architectura, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, ut sapiens architectus fundamentum posui.

Ille autem qui cognoscit causam altissimam simpliciter, quae est deus, dicitur sapiens simpliciter, inquantum per regulas divinas omnia potest iudicare et ordinare. Huiusmodi autem iudicium consequitur homo per spiritum sanctum, secundum illud I ad Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia; quia, sicut ibidem dicitur, spiritus omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda dei.

Unde manifestum est quod sapientia est donum spiritus sancti.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, quod vere est bonum et simpliciter perfectum. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse bonum, secundum quandam similitudinem, quod est in malitia perfectum, sicut dicitur bonus latro vel perfectus latro, ut patet per philosophum, in V metaphys..

Et sicut circa ea quae sunt vere bona invenitur aliqua altissima causa, quae est summum bonum, quod est ultimus finis, per cuius cognitionem homo dicitur vere sapiens; ita etiam in malis est invenire aliquid ad quod alia referuntur sicut ad ultimum finem, per cuius cognitionem homo dicitur esse sapiens ad male agendum; secundum illud Ierem. IV, sapientes sunt ut faciant mala, bene autem facere nescierunt.

Quicumque enim avertitur a fine debito, necesse est quod aliquem finem indebitum sibi praestituat, quia omne agens agit propter finem.

Unde si praestituat sibi finem in bonis exterioribus terrenis, vocatur sapientia terrena; si autem in bonis corporalibus, vocatur sapientia animalis; si autem in aliqua excellentia, vocatur sapientia diabolica, propter imitationem superbiae diaboli, de quo dicitur iob XLI, ipse est rex super universos filios superbiae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia quae ponitur donum differt ab ea quae ponitur virtus intellectualis acquisita.

Nam illa acquiritur studio humano, haec autem est de sursum descendens, ut dicitur Iac. III.

Similiter et differt a fide. Nam fides assentit veritati divinae secundum seipsam, sed iudicium quod est secundum veritatem divinam pertinet ad donum sapientiae.

Et ideo donum sapientiae praesupponit fidem, quia unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, ut dicitur in I ethic..

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut pietas, quae pertinet ad cultum dei, est manifestativa fidei, inquantum per cultum dei protestamur fidem; ita etiam pietas manifestat sapientiam. Et propter hoc dicitur quod pietas est sapientia. Et eadem ratione timor.

Per hoc enim ostenditur quod homo rectum habet iudicium de divinis, quod deum timet et colit.