Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above (1.2, Question 57, Article 6). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands."

I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above (Article 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (1.2, Question 14, Article 1). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.

In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which takes good counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated above (1.2, Question 17, Article 1).

Articulus 8

Argumentum 1

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecipere non sit principalis actus prudentiae. Praecipere enim pertinet ad bona quae sunt fienda.

Sed Augustinus, XIV de Trin., ponit actum prudentiae praecavere insidias.

Ergo praecipere non est principalis actus prudentiae.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI ethic., quod prudentis videtur esse bene consiliari.

Sed alius actus videtur esse consiliari et praecipere, ut ex supradictis patet.

Ergo prudentiae principalis actus non est praecipere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, praecipere, vel imperare, videtur pertinere ad voluntatem, cuius obiectum est finis et quae movet alias potentias animae.

Sed prudentia non est in voluntate, sed in ratione.

Ergo prudentiae actus non est praecipere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI ethic., quod prudentia praeceptiva est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod ille sit praecipuus actus prudentiae qui est praecipuus actus rationis agibilium. Cuius quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consiliari, quod pertinet ad inventionem, nam consiliari est quaerere, ut supra habitum est.

Secundus actus est iudicare de inventis, et hic sistit speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quae ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterius et est tertius actus eius praecipere, qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et iudicatorum ad operandum.

Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicae, inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicae, et per consequens prudentiae. Et huius signum est quod perfectio artis consistit in iudicando, non autem in praecipiendo. Ideo reputatur melior artifex qui volens peccat in arte, quasi habens rectum iudicium, quam qui peccat nolens, quod videtur esse ex defectu iudicii.

Sed in prudentia est e converso, ut dicitur in VI ethic., imprudentior enim est qui volens peccat, quasi deficiens in principali actu prudentiae, qui est praecipere, quam qui peccat nolens.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus praecipiendi se extendit et ad bona prosequenda et ad mala cavenda.

Et tamen praecavere insidias non attribuit Augustinus prudentiae quasi principalem actum ipsius, sed quia iste actus prudentiae non manet in patria.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod bonitas consilii requiritur ut ea quae sunt bene inventa applicentur ad opus. Et ideo praecipere pertinet ad prudentiam, quae est bene consiliativa.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod movere absolute pertinet ad voluntatem.

Sed praecipere importat motionem cum quadam ordinatione.

Et ideo est actus rationis, ut supra dictum est.