Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above (1.2, Question 68, Article 8). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.

Objection 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above (Question 9, Article 3). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Question 47, Article 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another.

I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.

Reply to Objection 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above (Article 1; 1.2, Question 68, Article 1), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.

Reply to Objection 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.

Reply to Objection 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum consilii non respondeat convenienter virtuti prudentiae. Inferius enim in suo supremo attingit id quod est superius, ut patet per dionysium, VII cap. De div. Nom., sicut homo attingit Angelum secundum intellectum. Sed virtus cardinalis est inferior dono, ut supra habitum est.

Cum ergo consilium sit primus et infimus actus prudentiae, supremus autem actus eius est praecipere, medius autem iudicare; videtur quod donum respondens prudentiae non sit consilium, sed magis iudicium vel praeceptum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, uni virtuti sufficienter auxilium praebetur per unum donum, quia quanto aliquid est superius tanto est magis unitum, ut probatur in libro de causis.

Sed prudentiae auxilium praebetur per donum scientiae, quae non solum est speculativa, sed etiam practica, ergo donum consilii non respondet virtuti prudentiae.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ad prudentiam proprie pertinet dirigere, ut supra habitum est.

Sed ad donum consilii pertinet quod homo dirigatur a deo, sicut dictum est.

Ergo donum consilii non pertinet ad virtutem prudentiae.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod donum consilii est circa ea quae sunt agenda propter finem. Sed circa haec etiam est prudentia.

Ergo sibi invicem correspondent.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod principium motivum inferius praecipue adiuvatur et perficitur per hoc quod movetur a superiori motivo principio, sicut corpus in hoc quod movetur a spiritu. Manifestum est autem quod rectitudo rationis humanae comparatur ad rationem divinam sicut principium motivum inferius ad superius, ratio enim aeterna est suprema regula omnis humanae rectitudinis. Et ideo prudentia, quae importat rectitudinem rationis, maxime perficitur et iuvatur secundum quod regulatur et movetur a spiritu sancto.

Quod pertinet ad donum consilii, ut dictum est.

Unde donum consilii respondet prudentiae, sicut ipsam adiuvans et perficiens.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicare et praecipere non est moti, sed moventis. Et quia in donis spiritus sancti mens humana non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota, ut supra dictum est; inde est quod non fuit conveniens quod donum correspondens prudentiae praeceptum diceretur vel iudicium, sed consilium, per quod potest significari motio mentis consiliatae ab alio consiliante.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae donum non directe respondet prudentiae, cum sit in speculativa, sed secundum quandam extensionem eam adiuvat. Donum autem consilii directe respondet prudentiae, sicut circa eadem existens.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod movens motum ex hoc quod movetur movet.

Unde mens humana ex hoc ipso quod dirigitur a spiritu sancto, fit potens dirigere se et alios.