Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes.

Objection 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above (Questions 48,49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice.

I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.

If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above (Question 48; Question 50, Article 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which {euboulia} (deliberating well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which {synesis} (judging well according to common law) and {gnome} (judging well according to general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in "thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers generality by participation.

Reply to Objection 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.

Reply to Objection 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imprudentia non sit speciale peccatum. Quicumque enim peccat agit contra rationem rectam, quae est prudentia. Sed imprudentia consistit in hoc quod aliquis agit contra prudentiam, ut dictum est.

Ergo imprudentia non est speciale peccatum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, prudentia magis est affinis moralibus actibus quam scientia. Sed ignorantia, quae opponitur scientiae, ponitur inter generales causas peccati. Ergo multo magis imprudentia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, peccata contingunt ex hoc quod virtutum circumstantiae corrumpuntur, unde et dionysius dicit, IV cap. De div. Nom., quod malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus.

Sed multa requiruntur ad prudentiam, sicut ratio, intellectus, docilitas, et cetera quae supra posita sunt.

Ergo multae sunt imprudentiae species. Ergo non est peccatum speciale.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, imprudentia est contrarium prudentiae, ut dictum est.

Sed prudentia est una virtus specialis.

Ergo imprudentia est unum vitium speciale.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod vitium vel peccatum potest dici generale dupliciter, uno modo, absolute, quia scilicet est generale respectu omnium peccatorum; alio modo, quia est generale respectu quorundam vitiorum quae sunt species eius. Primo autem modo potest dici aliquod vitium generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per essentiam, quia scilicet praedicatur de omnibus peccatis.

Et hoc modo imprudentia non est generale peccatum, sicut nec prudentia generalis virtus, cum sint circa actus speciales, scilicet circa ipsos actus rationis. Alio modo, per participationem. Et hoc modo imprudentia est generale peccatum.

Sicut enim prudentia participatur quodammodo in omnibus virtutibus, inquantum est directiva earum, ita et imprudentia in omnibus vitiis et peccatis, nullum enim peccatum accidere potest nisi sit defectus in aliquo actu rationis dirigentis, quod pertinet ad imprudentiam.

Si vero dicatur peccatum generale non simpliciter, sed secundum aliquod genus, quia scilicet continet sub se multas species; sic imprudentia est generale peccatum. Continet enim sub se diversas species tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, per oppositum ad diversas partes subiectivas prudentiae. Sicut enim distinguitur prudentia in monasticam, quae est regitiva unius, et in alias species prudentiae quae sunt multitudinis regitivae, ut supra habitum est; ita etiam imprudentia. Alio modo, secundum partes quasi potentiales prudentiae, quae sunt virtutes adiunctae, et accipiuntur secundum diversos actus rationis. Et hoc modo, quantum ad defectum consilii, circa quod est eubulia, est praecipitatio, sive temeritas, imprudentiae species. Quantum vero ad defectum iudicii, circa quod sunt synesis et gnome, est inconsideratio. Quantum vero ad ipsum praeceptum, quod est proprius actus prudentiae, est inconstantia et negligentia.

Tertio modo possunt sumi per oppositum ad ea quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, quae sunt quasi partes integrales prudentiae.

Sed quia omnia illa ordinantur ad dirigendum praedictos tres rationis actus, inde est quod omnes defectus oppositi reducuntur ad quatuor praedictas partes. Sicut incautela et incircumspectio includitur sub inconsideratione. Quod autem aliquis deficiat a docilitate vel memoria vel ratione, pertinet ad praecipitationem. Improvidentia vero et defectus intelligentiae et solertiae pertinent ad negligentiam et inconstantiam.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de generalitate quae est secundum participationem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quia scientia est magis remota a moralibus quam prudentia secundum propriam rationem utriusque, inde est quod ignorantia non habet de se rationem peccati moralis, sed solum ratione negligentiae praecedentis vel effectus sequentis. Et propter hoc ponitur inter generales causas peccati. Sed imprudentia secundum propriam rationem importat vitium morale.

Et ideo magis potest poni speciale peccatum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod quando corruptio diversarum circumstantiarum habet idem motivum, non diversificatur peccati species, sicut eiusdem speciei est peccatum ut aliquis accipiat non sua ubi non debet, et quando non debet. Sed si sint diversa motiva, tunc essent diversae species, puta si unus acciperet unde non deberet ut faceret iniuriam loco sacro, quod faceret speciem sacrilegii; alius quando non debet propter solum superfluum appetitum habendi, quod esset simplex avaritia.

Et ideo defectus eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam non diversificant species nisi quatenus ordinantur ad diversos actus rationis, ut dictum est.