Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the jurist Celsus says that "right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Objection 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philosopher reckons "legislative" as one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Objection 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to man." Now right does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'fas' is the Divine law, and 'jus,' the human law." Therefore right is not the object of justice.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus' is so called because it is just." Now the "just" is the object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions."

I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as "right." Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.

Reply to Objection 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word "medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like manner the word "jus" was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear "in jure" , and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right.

Reply to Objection 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called "jus" but "fas," because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ius non sit obiectum iustitiae.

Dicit enim celsus iurisconsultus quod ius est ars boni et aequi.

Ars autem non est obiectum iustitiae, sed est per se virtus intellectualis. Ergo ius non est obiectum iustitiae.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, lex, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro etymol., iuris est species.

Lex autem non est obiectum iustitiae, sed magis prudentiae, unde et philosophus legispositivam partem prudentiae ponit.

Ergo ius non est obiectum iustitiae.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, iustitia principaliter subiicit hominem deo, dicit enim Augustinus, libro de moribus eccles., quod iustitia est amor deo tantum serviens, et ob hoc bene imperans ceteris, quae homini subiecta sunt.

Sed ius non pertinet ad divina, sed solum ad humana, dicit enim Isidorus, in libro etymol., quod fas lex divina est, ius autem lex humana.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in eodem, quod ius dictum est quia est iustum.

Sed iustum est obiectum iustitiae, dicit enim philosophus, in V ethic., quod omnes talem habitum volunt dicere iustitiam a quo operativi iustorum sunt.

Ergo ius est obiectum iustitiae.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod iustitiae proprium est inter alias virtutes ut ordinet hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum.

Importat enim aequalitatem quandam, ut ipsum nomen demonstrat, dicuntur enim vulgariter ea quae adaequantur iustari.

Aequalitas autem ad alterum est. Aliae autem virtutes perficiunt hominem solum in his quae ei conveniunt secundum seipsum.

Sic igitur illud quod est rectum in operibus aliarum virtutum, ad quod tendit intentio virtutis quasi in proprium obiectum, non accipitur nisi per comparationem ad agentem.

Rectum vero quod est in opere iustitiae, etiam praeter comparationem ad agentem, constituitur per comparationem ad alium, illud enim in opere nostro dicitur esse iustum quod respondet secundum aliquam aequalitatem alteri, puta recompensatio mercedis debitae pro servitio impenso.

Sic igitur iustum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae, ad quod terminatur actio iustitiae, etiam non considerato qualiter ab agente fiat. Sed in aliis virtutibus non determinatur aliquid rectum nisi secundum quod aliqualiter fit ab agente. Et propter hoc specialiter iustitiae prae aliis virtutibus determinatur secundum se obiectum, quod vocatur iustum. Et hoc quidem est ius.

Unde manifestum est quod ius est obiectum iustitiae.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consuetum est quod nomina a sui prima impositione detorqueantur ad alia significanda, sicut nomen medicinae impositum est primo ad significandum remedium quod praestatur infirmo ad sanandum, deinde tractum est ad significandum artem qua hoc fit. Ita etiam hoc nomen ius primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem iustam; postmodum autem derivatum est ad artem qua cognoscitur quid sit iustum; et ulterius ad significandum locum in quo ius redditur, sicut dicitur aliquis comparere in iure; et ulterius dicitur etiam ius quod redditur ab eo ad cuius officium pertinet iustitiam facere, licet etiam id quod decernit sit iniquum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut eorum quae per artem exterius fiunt quaedam ratio in mente artificis praeexistit, quae dicitur regula artis; ita etiam illius operis iusti quod ratio determinat quaedam ratio praeexistit in mente, quasi quaedam prudentiae regula.

Et hoc si in scriptum redigatur, vocatur lex, est enim lex, secundum Isidorum, constitutio scripta.

Et ideo lex non est ipsum ius, proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio iuris.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod quia iustitia aequalitatem importat, deo autem non possumus aequivalens recompensare, inde est quod iustum, secundum perfectam rationem, non possumus reddere deo.

Et propter hoc non dicitur proprie ius lex divina, sed fas, quia videlicet sufficit deo ut impleamus quod possumus.

Iustitia tamen ad hoc tendit ut homo, quantum potest, deo recompenset, totaliter animam ei subiiciens.