Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Lk. 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) . Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice

I answer that, A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" , and this can be applied to justice. For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

Reply to Objection 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life."

Reply to Objection 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me."

Reply to Objection 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit virtus.

Dicitur enim Luc. XVII, cum feceritis omnia quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite, servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere fecimus.

Sed non est inutile facere opus virtutis, dicit enim Ambrosius, in II de offic., utilitatem non pecuniarii lucri aestimationem dicimus, sed acquisitionem pietatis.

Ergo facere quod quis debet facere non est opus virtutis.

Est autem opus iustitiae. Ergo iustitia non est virtus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quod fit ex necessitate non est meritorium. Sed reddere alicui quod suum est, quod pertinet ad iustitiam, est necessitatis. Ergo non est meritorium.

Actibus autem virtutum meremur. Ergo iustitia non est virtus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis virtus moralis est circa agibilia. Ea autem quae exterius constituuntur non sunt agibilia, sed factibilia, ut patet per philosophum, in IX metaphys..

Cum igitur ad iustitiam pertineat exterius facere aliquod opus secundum se iustum, videtur quod iustitia non sit virtus moralis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod in quatuor virtutibus, scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudine et iustitia, tota boni operis structura consurgit.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod virtus humana est quae bonum reddit actum humanum, et ipsum hominem bonum facit.

Quod quidem convenit iustitiae. Actus enim hominis bonus redditur ex hoc quod attingit regulam rationis, secundum quam humani actus rectificantur. Unde cum iustitia operationes humanas rectificet, manifestum est quod opus hominis bonum reddit.

Et ut tullius dicit, in I de offic., ex iustitia praecipue viri boni nominantur.

Unde, sicut ibidem dicit, in ea virtutis splendor est maximus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum aliquis facit quod debet, non affert utilitatem lucri ei cui facit quod debet, sed solum abstinet a damno eius. Sibi tamen facit utilitatem, inquantum spontanea et prompta voluntate facit illud quod debet, quod est virtuose agere.

Unde dicitur Sap. VIII quod sapientia dei sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem; quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus, scilicet virtuosis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est necessitas. Una coactionis, et haec, quia repugnat voluntati, tollit rationem meriti. Alia autem est necessitas ex obligatione praecepti, sive ex necessitate finis, quando scilicet aliquis non potest consequi finem virtutis nisi hoc faciat. Et talis necessitas non excludit rationem meriti, inquantum aliquis hoc quod sic est necessarium voluntarie agit. Excludit tamen gloriam supererogationis, secundum illud I ad Cor. IX, si evangelizavero, non est mihi gloria, necessitas enim mihi incumbit.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod iustitia non consistit circa exteriores res quantum ad facere, quod pertinet ad artem, sed quantum ad hoc quod utitur eis ad alterum.