Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mt. 7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to Rm. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment."

I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (Article 1, ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Mt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom , He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on (Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom says on the words of Mt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit licitum iudicare. Non enim infligitur poena nisi pro illicito.

Sed iudicantibus imminet poena, quam non iudicantes effugiunt, secundum illud Matth. VII, nolite iudicare, ut non iudicemini.

Ergo iudicare est illicitum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Rom. XIV dicitur, tu quis es, qui iudicas alienum servum? suo domino stat aut cadit.

Dominus autem omnium deus est. Ergo nulli homini licet iudicare.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, nullus homo est sine peccato, secundum illud I Ioan. I, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus.

Sed peccanti non licet iudicare, secundum illud Rom. II, inexcusabilis es, o homo omnis qui iudicas, in quo enim alterum iudicas, teipsum condemnas; eadem enim agis quae iudicas.

Ergo nulli est licitum iudicare.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVI, iudices et magistros constitues in omnibus portis tuis, ut iudicent populum iusto iudicio.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod iudicium intantum est licitum inquantum est iustitiae actus.

Sicut autem ex praedictis patet, ad hoc quod iudicium sit actus iustitiae tria requiruntur, primo quidem, ut procedat ex inclinatione iustitiae; secundo, quod procedat ex auctoritate praesidentis; tertio, quod proferatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae. Quodcumque autem horum defuerit, est iudicium vitiosum et illicitum. Uno quidem modo, quando est contra rectitudinem iustitiae, et sic dicitur iudicium perversum vel iniustum. Alio modo, quando homo iudicat in his in quibus non habet auctoritatem, et sic dicitur iudicium usurpatum.

Tertio modo, quando deest certitudo rationis, puta cum aliquis de his iudicat quae sunt dubia vel occulta per aliquas leves coniecturas, et sic dicitur iudicium suspiciosum vel temerarium.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus ibi prohibet iudicium temerarium, quod est de intentione cordis vel de aliis incertis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de serm. Dom. In monte.

Vel prohibet ibi iudicium de rebus divinis, de quibus, cum sint supra nos, non debemus iudicare, sed simpliciter ea credere, ut Hilarius dicit, super Matth..

Vel prohibet iudicium quod non sit ex benevolentia, sed ex animi amaritudine, ut chrysostomus dicit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod iudex constituitur ut minister dei.

Unde dicitur Deut. I, quod iustum est iudicate; et postea subdit, quia dei est iudicium.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt in gravibus peccatis non debent iudicare eos qui sunt in eisdem peccatis vel minoribus, ut chrysostomus dicit, super illud Matth. VII, nolite iudicare.

Et praecipue est hoc intelligendum quando illa peccata sunt publica, quia ex hoc generatur scandalum in cordibus aliorum.

Si autem non sunt publica, sed occulta, et necessitas iudicandi immineat propter officium, potest cum humilitate et timore vel arguere vel iudicare.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de serm. Dom. In monte, si invenerimus nos in eodem vitio esse, congemiscamus, et ad pariter conandum invitemus.

Nec tamen propter hoc homo sic seipsum condemnat ut novum condemnationis meritum sibi acquirat, sed quia, condemnans alium, ostendit se similiter condemnabilem esse, propter idem peccatum vel simile.