Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.

Objection 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to restitution.

Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.

On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:32): "They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:

"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."

It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.

In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.

Reply to Objection 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

Reply to Objection 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.

Reply to Objection 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.

Articulus 7

Argumentum 1

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod illi qui non acceperunt non teneantur restituere. Restitutio enim quaedam poena est accipientis. Sed nullus debet puniri nisi qui peccavit.

Ergo nullus debet restituere nisi qui accepit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, iustitia non obligat aliquem ad hoc quod rem alterius augeat. Sed si ad restitutionem teneretur non solum ille qui accepit, sed etiam illi qui qualitercumque cooperantur, augeretur ex hoc res illius cui est aliquid subtractum, tum quia sibi multoties restitutio fieret; tum etiam quia quandoque aliqui operam dant ad hoc quod aliqua res alicui auferatur, quae tamen ei non aufertur. Ergo non tenentur alii ad restitutionem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, nullus tenetur se periculo exponere ad hoc quod rem alterius salvet. Sed aliquando, manifestando latronem vel ei resistendo, aliquis periculo mortis se exponeret. Non ergo tenetur aliquis ad restitutionem propter hoc quod non manifestat latronem, vel non ei resistit.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. I, digni sunt morte non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus.

Ergo, pari ratione, etiam consentientes debent restituere.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad restitutionem tenetur aliquis non solum ratione rei alienae quam accepit, sed etiam ratione iniuriosae acceptionis. Et ideo quicumque est causa iniustae acceptionis tenetur ad restitutionem quod quidem contingit dupliciter, directe scilicet, et indirecte.

Directe quidem, quando inducit aliquis alium ad accipiendum.

Et hoc quidem tripliciter. Primo quidem, movendo ad ipsam acceptionem, quod quidem fit praecipiendo, consulendo, consentiendo expresse, et laudando aliquem quasi strenuum de hoc quod aliena accipit. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius accipientis, quia scilicet eum receptat, vel qualitercumque ei auxilium fert. Tertio modo, ex parte rei acceptae, quia scilicet est particeps furti vel rapinae, quasi socius maleficii. Indirecte vero, quando aliquis non impedit, cum possit et debeat impedire, vel quia subtrahit praeceptum sive consilium impediens furtum sive rapinam; vel quia subtrahit suum auxilium, quo posset obsistere; vel quia occultat post factum. Quae his versibus comprehenduntur, iussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans.

Sciendum tamen quod quinque praemissorum semper obligant ad restitutionem. Primo, iussio, quia scilicet ille qui iubet est principaliter movens; unde ipse principaliter tenetur ad restituendum. Secundo, consensus, in eo scilicet sine quo rapina fieri non potest. Tertio, recursus, quando scilicet aliquis est receptator latronum et eis patrocinium praestat. Quarto, participatio, quando scilicet aliquis participat in crimine latrocinii et in praeda. Quinto, tenetur ille qui non obstat, cum obstare teneatur, sicut principes, qui tenentur custodire iustitiam in terra, si per eorum defectum latrones increscant, ad restitutionem tenentur; quia redditus quos habent sunt quasi stipendia ad hoc instituta ut iustitiam conservent in terra.

In aliis autem casibus enumeratis non semper obligatur aliquis ad restituendum. Non enim semper consilium vel adulatio, vel aliquid huiusmodi, est efficax causa rapinae. Unde tunc solum tenetur consiliator aut palpo, idest adulator, ad restitutionem, quando probabiliter aestimari potest quod ex huiusmodi causis fuerit iniusta acceptio subsecuta.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non solum peccat ille qui peccatum exequitur, sed etiam qui quocumque modo peccati est causa sive consiliando, sive praecipiendo, sive quovis alio modo.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod principaliter tenetur restituere ille qui est principalis in facto, principaliter quidem praecipiens, secundario exequens, et consequenter alii per ordinem. Uno tamen restituente illi qui passus est damnum, alius eidem restituere non tenetur, sed illi qui sunt principales in facto, et ad quos res pervenit, tenentur aliis restituere qui restituerunt. Quando autem aliquis praecipit iniustam acceptionem quae non subsequitur, non est restitutio facienda, cum restitutio principaliter ordinetur ad reintegrandam rem eius qui iniuste est damnificatus.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod non semper ille qui non manifestat latronem tenetur ad restitutionem, aut qui non obstat, vel qui non reprehendit, sed solum quando incumbit alicui ex officio, sicut principibus terrae. Quibus ex hoc non multum imminet periculum, propter hoc enim potestate publica potiuntur, ut sint iustitiae custodes.