Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached against a certain individual (2 Paralip 19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord." But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth his brother . . . detracteth the law," and consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above (Question 20, Article 3; 1.2, Question 73, Article 3). On the other hand the sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer hatred, and enmity, and reproach."

I answer that, As stated above (Question 73, Article 3; 1.2, Question 73, Article 8), sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since "no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse things.

Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to enmity.

Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against God, because "God is charity" (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason it is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren."

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod detractio sit gravius peccatum quam susurratio. Peccata enim oris consistunt in hoc quod aliquis mala dicit. Sed detractor dicit de proximo ea quae sunt mala simpliciter, quia ex talibus oritur infamia vel diminuitur fama, susurro autem non curat dicere nisi mala apparentia, quae scilicet displiceant audienti.

Ergo gravius peccatum est detractio quam susurratio.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quicumque aufert alicui famam, aufert ei non solum unum amicum, sed multos, quia unusquisque refugit amicitiam infamium personarum; unde contra quendam dicitur, II Paralip. XIX, his qui oderunt dominum amicitia iungeris.

Susurratio autem aufert unum solum amicum.

Gravius ergo peccatum est detractio quam susurratio.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Iac. IV dicitur, qui detrahit fratri suo, detrahit legi; et per consequens deo, qui est legislator, et sic peccatum detractionis videtur esse peccatum in deum, quod est gravissimum, ut supra habitum est.

Peccatum autem susurrationis est in proximum. Ergo peccatum detractionis est gravius quam peccatum susurrationis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. V, denotatio pessima super bilinguem, susurratori autem odium et inimicitia et contumelia.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum in proximum tanto est gravius quanto per ipsum maius nocumentum proximo infertur, nocumentum autem tanto maius est quanto maius est bonum quod tollitur. Inter cetera vero exteriora bona praeeminet amicus, quia sine amicis nullus vivere posset, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII ethic..

Unde dicitur Eccli. VI, amico fideli nulla est comparatio, quia et optima fama, quae per detractionem tollitur, ad hoc maxime necessaria est ut homo idoneus ad amicitiam habeatur. Et ideo susurratio est maius peccatum quam detractio, et etiam quam contumelia, quia amicus est melior quam honor, et amari quam honorari, ut in VIII ethic. Philosophus dicit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species et gravitas peccati magis attenditur ex fine quam ex materiali obiecto.

Et ideo ratione finis susurratio est gravior, quamvis detractor quandoque peiora dicat.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod fama est dispositio ad amicitiam, et infamia ad inimicitiam. Dispositio autem deficit ab eo ad quod disponit. Et ideo ille qui operatur ad aliquid quod est dispositio ad inimicitiam, minus peccat quam ille qui directe operatur ad inimicitiam inducendam.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui detrahit fratri intantum videtur detrahere legi inquantum contemnit praeceptum de dilectione proximi. Contra quod directius agit qui amicitiam disrumpere nititur. Unde hoc peccatum maxime contra deum est, quia deus dilectio est, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV. Et propter hoc dicitur Prov. VI, sex sunt quae odit dominus, et septimum detestatur anima eius, et hoc septimum ponit eum qui seminat inter fratres discordiam.