Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully reckons six, viz. "religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Question 61, Article 4). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.

Objection 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. "obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

Objection 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge, commonsense, piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration.

Objection 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above (Question 58, Article 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above (Question 58, Article 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" In this respect "religion" is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus "piety" is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done---sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have "gratitude" which "consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."

There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.

Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which "innocence" belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, "friendship" in the external conduct and "concord" internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, "piety" to parents, and "religion" to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, "condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and "humanity," whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another." In this sense "friendship" is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called "affection"; "concord," and "beneficence" which is here called "humanity." These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words" , is contained in "truthfulness" as to the observance of one's promises: yet "truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on (Question 109, Articles 1,3). "Discipline" is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Mt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship."

Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes "legislative justice," which he describes as "the science of political commutations relating to the community." As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions "common sense" or "good judgment*," which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above (Question 51, Article 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. {Eusebeia} means "good worship" and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') : and "holiness" comes to the same, as we shall state further on (Question 81, Article 8). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means "good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that "kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would seem to pertain to "humanity."

Reply to Objection 5: Epieikeia is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of eugnomosyne .

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur virtutes iustitiae annexae.

Tullius enim enumerat sex, scilicet religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem.

Vindicatio autem videtur species esse commutativae iustitiae, secundum quam illatis iniuriis vindicta rependitur, ut ex supradictis patet.

Non ergo debet poni inter virtutes iustitiae annexas.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Macrobius, super somnium scipionis, ponit septem, scilicet innocentiam, amicitiam, concordiam, pietatem, religionem, affectum, humanitatem; quarum plures a tullio praetermittuntur.

Ergo videtur insufficienter enumeratas esse virtutes iustitiae adiunctas.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, a quibusdam aliis ponuntur quinque partes iustitiae, scilicet obedientia respectu superioris, disciplina respectu inferioris, aequitas respectu aequalium, fides et veritas respectu omnium; de quibus a tullio non ponitur nisi veritas.

Ergo videtur insufficienter numerasse virtutes iustitiae annexas.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, Andronicus Peripateticus ponit novem partes iustitiae annexas, scilicet liberalitatem, benignitatem, vindicativam, eugnomosynam, eusebiam, eucharistiam, sanctitatem, bonam commutationem, legispositivam; ex quibus etiam tullius manifeste non ponit nisi vindicativam.

Ergo videtur insufficienter enumerasse.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, Aristoteles, in V ethic., ponit epieikeiam iustitiae adiunctam, de qua in nulla praemissarum assignationum videtur mentio esse facta. Ergo insufficienter sunt enumeratae virtutes iustitiae annexae.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod in virtutibus quae adiunguntur alicui principali virtuti duo sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quod virtutes illae in aliquo cum principali virtute conveniant; secundo, quod in aliquo deficiant a perfecta ratione ipsius.

Quia vero iustitia ad alterum est, ut ex supradictis patet, omnes virtutes quae ad alterum sunt possunt ratione convenientiae iustitiae annecti. Ratio vero iustitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem, ut ex supradictis patet.

Dupliciter igitur aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione iustitiae deficit, uno quidem modo, inquantum deficit a ratione aequalis; alio modo, inquantum deficit a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt, sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo quidem, quidquid ab homine deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse aequale, ut scilicet tantum ei homo reddat quantum debet; secundum illud psalm., quid retribuam domino pro omnibus quae retribuit mihi? et secundum hoc adiungitur iustitiae religio, quae, ut tullius dicit, superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeremoniamque vel cultum affert.

Secundo, parentibus non potest secundum aequalitatem recompensari quod eis debetur, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII ethic..

Et sic adiungitur iustitiae pietas, per quam, ut tullius dicit, sanguine iunctis patriaeque benevolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus.

Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recompensari ab homine virtuti, ut patet per philosophum, in IV ethic..

Et sic adiungitur iustitiae observantia, per quam, ut tullius dicit, homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu et honore dignantur.

A ratione vero debiti iustitiae defectus potest attendi secundum quod est duplex debitum, scilicet morale et legale, unde et philosophus, in VIII ethic., secundum hoc duplex iustum assignat.

Debitum quidem legale est ad quod reddendum aliquis lege adstringitur, et tale debitum proprie attendit iustitia quae est principalis virtus. Debitum autem morale est quod aliquis debet ex honestate virtutis. Et quia debitum necessitatem importat, ideo tale debitum habet duplicem gradum. Quoddam enim est sic necessarium ut sine eo honestas morum conservari non possit, et hoc habet plus de ratione debiti. Et potest hoc debitum attendi ex parte ipsius debentis. Et sic ad hoc debitum pertinet quod homo talem se exhibeat alteri in verbis et factis qualis est. Et ita adiungitur iustitiae veritas, per quam, ut tullius dicit, immutata ea quae sunt aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur.

Potest etiam attendi ex parte eius cui debetur, prout scilicet aliquis recompensat alicui secundum ea quae fecit.

Quandoque quidem in bonis. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae gratia, in qua, ut tullius dicit, amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria, remunerandi voluntas continetur alterius.

Quandoque vero in malis. Et sic adiungitur iustitiae vindicatio, per quam, ut tullius dicit, vis aut iniuria, et omnino quidquid obscurum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur.

Aliud vero debitum est necessarium sicut conferens ad maiorem honestatem, sine quo tamen honestas conservari potest. Quod quidem debitum attendit liberalitas, affabilitas sive amicitia, et alia huiusmodi.

Quae tullius praetermittit in praedicta enumeratione, quia parum habent de ratione debiti.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vindicta quae fit auctoritate publicae potestatis secundum sententiam iudicis, pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam. Sed vindicta quam quis facit proprio motu, non tamen contra legem, vel quam quis a iudice requirit, pertinet ad virtutem iustitiae adiunctam.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod Macrobius videtur attendisse ad duas partes integrales iustitiae, scilicet declinare a malo, ad quod pertinet innocentia; et facere bonum, ad quod pertinent sex alia.

Quorum duo videntur pertinere ad aequales, scilicet amicitia in exteriori convictu, et concordia interius. Duo vero pertinent ad superiores, pietas ad parentes, et religio ad deum.

Duo vero ad inferiores, scilicet affectus, inquantum placent bona eorum; et humanitas, per quam subvenitur eorum defectibus.

Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro etymol., quod humanus dicitur aliquis quia habeat circa hominem amorem et miserationis affectum, unde humanitas dicta est qua nos invicem tuemur.

Et secundum hoc amicitia sumitur prout ordinat exteriorem convictum, sicut de ea philosophus tractat in IV ethic..

Potest etiam amicitia sumi secundum quod proprie respicit affectum, prout determinatur a philosopho in VIII et in IX ethic..

Et sic ad amicitiam pertinent tria, scilicet benevolentia, quae hic dicitur affectus; et concordia; et beneficentia, quae hic vocatur humanitas.

Haec autem tullius praetermisit, quia parum habent de ratione debiti, ut dictum est.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod obedientia includitur in observantia, quam tullius ponit, nam praecellentibus personis debetur et reverentia honoris et obedientia. Fides autem, per quam fiunt dicta, includitur in veritate, quantum ad observantiam promissorum.

Veritas autem in plus se habet, ut infra patebit.

Disciplina autem non debetur ex debito necessitatis, quia inferiori non est aliquis obligatus, inquantum est inferior (potest tamen aliquis superiori obligari ut inferioribus provideat, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam)p et ideo a tullio praetermittitur.

Potest autem contineri sub humanitate, quam Macrobius ponit.

Aequitas vero sub epieikeia, vel amicitia.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod in illa enumeratione ponuntur quaedam pertinentia ad veram iustitiam. Ad particularem quidem, bona commutatio, de qua dicit quod est habitus in commutationibus aequalitatem custodiens.

Ad legalem autem iustitiam, quantum ad ea quae communiter sunt observanda, ponitur legispositiva, quae, ut ipse dicit, est scientia commutationum politicarum ad communitatem relatarum.

Quantum vero ad ea quae quandoque particulariter agenda occurrunt praeter communes leges, ponitur eugnomosyna, quasi bona gnome, quae est in talibus directiva, ut supra habitum est in tractatu de prudentia.

Et ideo dicit de ea quod est voluntaria iustificatio, quia scilicet ex proprio arbitrio id quod iustum est homo secundum eam servat, non secundum legem scriptam. Attribuuntur autem haec duo prudentiae secundum directionem, iustitiae vero secundum executionem.

Eusebia vero dicitur quasi bonus cultus.

Unde est idem quod religio. Ideo de ea dicit quod est scientia dei famulatus (et loquitur secundum modum quo socrates dicebat omnes virtutes esse scientias)p et ad idem reducitur sanctitas, ut post dicetur.

Eucharistia autem est idem quod bona gratia, quam tullius ponit, sicut et vindicativam. Benignitas autem videtur esse idem cum affectu, quem ponit Macrobius.

Unde et Isidorus dicit, in libro etymol., quod benignus est vir sponte ad benefaciendum paratus, et dulcis ad eloquium.

Et ipse Andronicus dicit quod benignitas est habitus voluntarie benefactivus.

Liberalitas autem videtur ad humanitatem pertinere.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod epieikeia non adiungitur iustitiae particulari, sed legali.

Et videtur esse idem cum ea quae dicta est eugnomosyna.