Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (1.2, Questions 57,58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 4) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Question 1, Articles 1,2,4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.

Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance.

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio sit virtus theologica.

Dicit enim Augustinus, in enchirid., quod deus colitur fide, spe et caritate, quae sunt virtutes theologicae. Sed cultum deo afferre pertinet ad religionem. Ergo religio est virtus theologica.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtus theologica dicitur quae habet deum pro obiecto. Religio autem habet deum pro obiecto, quia ad solum deum ordinat, ut dictum est.

Ergo religio est virtus theologica.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omnis virtus vel est theologica, vel intellectualis, vel moralis, ut ex supradictis patet.

Manifestum est autem quod religio non est virtus intellectualis, quia eius perfectio non attenditur secundum considerationem veri. Similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, cuius proprium est tenere medium inter superfluum et diminutum, non enim aliquis potest superflue deum colere, secundum illud Eccli. XLIII, benedicentes dominum, exaltate illum quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude.

Ergo relinquitur quod sit virtus theologica.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod ponitur pars iustitiae, quae est virtus moralis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio est quae deo debitum cultum affert. Duo igitur in religione considerantur. Unum quidem quod religio deo affert, cultus scilicet, et hoc se habet per modum materiae et obiecti ad religionem. Aliud autem est id cui affertur, scilicet deus.

Cui cultus exhibetur non quasi actus quibus deus colitur ipsum deum attingunt, sicut cum credimus deo, credendo deum attingimus (propter quod supra dictum est quod deus est fidei obiectum non solum inquantum credimus deum, sed inquantum credimus deo), affertur autem deo debitus cultus inquantum actus quidam, quibus deus colitur, in dei reverentiam fiunt, puta sacrificiorum oblationes et alia huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod deus non comparatur ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel obiectum, sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cuius obiectum est ultimus finis, sed est virtus moralis, cuius est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod semper potentia vel virtus quae operatur circa finem, per imperium movet potentiam vel virtutem operantem ea quae ordinantur in finem illum. Virtutes autem theologicae, scilicet fides, spes et caritas, habent actum circa deum sicut circa proprium obiectum. Et ideo suo imperio causant actum religionis, quae operatur quaedam in ordine ad deum.

Et ideo Augustinus dicit quod deus colitur fide, spe et caritate.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod religio ordinat hominem in deum non sicut in obiectum, sed sicut in finem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod religio non est virtus theologica neque intellectualis, sed moralis, cum sit pars iustitiae.

Et medium in ipsa accipitur non quidem inter passiones, sed secundum quandam aequalitatem inter operationes quae sunt ad deum. Dico autem aequalitatem non absolute, quia deo non potest tantum exhiberi quantum ei debetur, sed secundum considerationem humanae facultatis et divinae acceptationis. Superfluum autem in his quae ad divinum cultum pertinent esse potest, non secundum circumstantiam quanti, sed secundum alias circumstantias, puta quia cultus divinus exhibetur cui non debet exhiberi, vel quando non debet, vel secundum alias circumstantias prout non debet.