Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (Article 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus . Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

Objection 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.

Objection 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Question 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to religion, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3; Article 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity.

I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rm. 8:38,39): "I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me from the love of God."

Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God

Reply to Objection 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."

Reply to Objection 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.

Articulus 8

Argumentum 1

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit idem sanctitati. Religio enim est quaedam specialis virtus, ut habitum est.

Sanctitas autem dicitur esse generalis virtus, est enim faciens fideles et servantes ea quae ad deum sunt iusta, ut Andronicus dicit.

Ergo sanctitas non est idem religioni.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sanctitas munditiam importare videtur, dicit enim dionysius, XII cap. De div. Nom., quod sanctitas est ab omni immunditia libera et perfecta et omnino immaculata munditia.

Munditia autem maxime videtur pertinere ad temperantiam, quae turpitudines corporales excludit. Cum igitur religio ad iustitiam pertineat, videtur quod sanctitas non sit idem religioni.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ea quae dividuntur ex opposito non sunt idem. Sed in quadam enumeratione partium iustitiae sanctitas condividitur religioni, ut supra habitum est.

Ergo sanctitas non est idem quod religio.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, serviamus illi in sanctitate et iustitia.

Sed servire deo pertinet ad religionem, ut supra habitum est.

Ergo religio est idem sanctitati.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sanctitatis duo videtur importare. Uno quidem modo, munditiam, et huic significationi competit nomen Graecum, dicitur enim agios quasi sine terra.

Alio modo importat firmitatem, unde apud antiquos sancta dicebantur quae legibus erant munita ut violari non deberent; unde et dicitur esse aliquid sancitum quia est lege firmatum.

Potest etiam secundum Latinos hoc nomen sanctus ad munditiam pertinere, ut intelligatur sanctus quasi sanguine tinctus, eo quod antiquitus illi qui purificari volebant sanguine hostiae tingebantur, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro etymol..

Et utraque significatio competit, ut sanctitas attribuatur his quae divino cultui applicantur, ita quod non solum homines, sed etiam templum et vasa et alia huiusmodi sanctificari dicantur ex hoc quod cultui divino applicantur. Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens deo applicetur. Quia mens humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus immergitur, sicut quaelibet res ex immixtione peioris sordescit, ut argentum ex immixtione plumbi. Oportet autem quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit coniungi. Et ideo mens sine munditia deo applicari non potest.

Unde ad Heb. Ult. Dicitur, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit deum.

Firmitas etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens deo applicetur.

Applicatur enim ei sicut ultimo fini et primo principio, huiusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse.

Unde dicebat apostolus, Rom. VIII, certus sum quod neque mors neque vita separabit me a caritate dei.

Sic igitur sanctitas dicitur per quam mens hominis seipsam et suos actus applicat deo. Unde non differt a religione secundum essentiam, sed solum ratione. Nam religio dicitur secundum quod exhibet deo debitum famulatum in his quae pertinent specialiter ad cultum divinum, sicut in sacrificiis, oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi, sanctitas autem dicitur secundum quod homo non solum haec, sed aliarum virtutum opera refert in deum, vel secundum quod homo se disponit per bona opera ad cultum divinum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctitas est quaedam specialis virtus secundum essentiam, et secundum hoc est quodammodo eadem religioni. Habet autem quandam generalitatem, secundum quod omnes virtutum actus per imperium ordinat in bonum divinum, sicut et iustitia legalis dicitur generalis virtus, inquantum ordinat omnium virtutum actus in bonum commune.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia munditiam quidem operatur, non tamen ita quod habeat rationem sanctitatis nisi referatur in deum. Unde de ipsa virginitate dicit Augustinus, in libro de virginitate, quod non quia virginitas est, sed quia deo dicata est, honoratur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod sanctitas distincta est a religione propter differentiam praedictam, non quia differat re, sed ratione tantum, ut dictum est.