Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Mt. 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God.

Objection 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kgs. 15:29, "But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.

Objection 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint."

I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): "You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in the 1, Question 19, Articles 7,8; 1, Question 22, Articles 2,4; 1, Question 115, Article 6; 1, Question 116. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)

Reply to Objection 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.

Reply to Objection 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [*Implicitly ; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Lk. 18]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens orare. Oratio enim videtur esse necessaria ad hoc quod intimemus ei a quo petimus id quo indigemus.

Sed, sicut dicitur Matth. VI, scit pater vester quia his indigetis.

Ergo non est conveniens deum orare.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, per orationem flectitur animus eius qui oratur ut faciat quod ab eo petitur. Sed animus dei est immutabilis et inflexibilis, secundum illud I Reg. XV, porro triumphator in Israel non parcet, nec poenitudine flectetur.

Ergo non est conveniens quod deum oremus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, liberalius est dare aliquid non petenti quam dare petenti, quia, sicut Seneca dicit, nulla res carius emitur quam quae precibus empta est.

Sed deus est liberalissimus.

Ergo non videtur esse conveniens quod deum oremus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XVIII, oportet orare, et non deficere.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod triplex fuit circa orationem antiquorum error. Quidam enim posuerunt quod res humanae non reguntur divina providentia.

Ex quo sequitur quod vanum sit orare, et omnino deum colere.

Et de his dicitur Malach. III, dixistis, vanus est qui servit deo.

Secunda fuit opinio ponentium omnia, etiam in rebus humanis, ex necessitate contingere, sive ex immutabilitate divinae providentiae, sive ex necessitate stellarum, sive ex connexione causarum. Et secundum hos etiam excluditur orationis utilitas.

Tertia fuit opinio ponentium quidem res humanas divina providentia regi, et quod res humanae non proveniunt ex necessitate, sed dicebant similiter dispositionem divinae providentiae variabilem esse, et quod orationibus et aliis quae ad divinum cultum pertinent dispositio divinae providentiae immutatur.

Haec autem omnia in primo libro improbata sunt.

Et ideo oportet sic inducere orationis utilitatem ut neque rebus humanis, divinae providentiae subiectis, necessitatem imponamus; neque etiam divinam dispositionem mutabilem aestimemus. Ad huius ergo evidentiam, considerandum est quod ex divina providentia non solum disponitur qui effectus fiant, sed etiam ex quibus causis et quo ordine proveniant. Inter alias autem causas sunt etiam quorundam causae actus humani. Unde oportet homines agere aliqua, non ut per suos actus divinam dispositionem immutent, sed ut per actus suos impleant quosdam effectus secundum ordinem a deo dispositum. Et idem etiam est in naturalibus causis. Et simile est etiam de oratione. Non enim propter hoc oramus ut divinam dispositionem immutemus, sed ut id impetremus quod deus disposuit per orationes sanctorum esse implendum; ut scilicet homines postulando mereantur accipere quod eis omnipotens deus ante saecula disposuit donare, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro dialogorum.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est necessarium nos deo preces porrigere ut ei nostras indigentias vel desideria manifestemus, sed ut nosipsi consideremus in his ad divinum auxilium esse recurrendum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oratio nostra non ordinatur ad immutationem divinae dispositionis, sed ut obtineatur nostris precibus quod deus disposuit.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod deus multa nobis praestat ex sua liberalitate etiam non petita. Sed quod aliqua vult praestare nobis petentibus, hoc est propter nostram utilitatem, ut scilicet fiduciam quandam accipiamus recurrendi ad deum, et ut recognoscamus eum esse bonorum nostrorum auctorem.

Unde chrysostomus dicit, considera quanta est tibi concessa felicitas, quanta gloria attributa, orationibus fabulari cum deo, cum christo miscere colloquia, optare quod velis, quod desideras postulare.