Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some , "a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

Objection 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from "voluntas" , for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.

I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kgs. 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer (Question 83, Article 12), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.

Reply to Objection 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.

Reply to Objection 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.

Reply to Objection 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod votum consistat in solo proposito voluntatis.

Quia secundum quosdam, votum est conceptio boni propositi, animi deliberatione firmata, qua quis ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum se deo obligat.

Sed conceptio boni propositi, cum omnibus quae adduntur, potest in solo motu voluntatis consistere.

Ergo votum in solo proposito voluntatis consistit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, ipsum nomen voti videtur a voluntate assumptum, dicitur enim aliquis proprio voto facere quae voluntarie facit.

Sed propositum est actus voluntatis, promissio autem rationis.

Ergo votum in solo actu voluntatis consistit.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, dominus dicit, Luc. IX, nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro aptus est regno dei.

Sed aliquis ex hoc ipso quod habet propositum bene faciendi mittit manum ad aratrum. Ergo, si aspiciat retro, desistens a bono proposito, non est aptus regno dei. Ex solo igitur bono proposito aliquis obligatur apud deum, etiam nulla promissione facta. Et ita videtur quod in solo proposito voluntatis votum consistat.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. V, si quid vovisti deo, ne moreris reddere, displicet enim ei infidelis et stulta promissio.

Ergo vovere est promittere, et votum est promissio.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod votum quandam obligationem importat ad aliquid faciendum vel dimittendum. Obligat autem homo se homini ad aliquid per modum promissionis, quae est rationis actus, ad quam pertinet ordinare, sicut enim homo imperando vel deprecando ordinat quodammodo quid sibi ab aliis fiat, ita promittendo ordinat quid ipse pro alio facere debeat.

Sed promissio quae ab homine fit homini, non potest fieri nisi per verba vel quaecumque exteriora signa. Deo autem potest fieri promissio per solam interiorem cogitationem, quia ut dicitur I Reg. XVI, homines vident ea quae parent, sed deus intuetur cor.

Exprimuntur tamen quandoque verba exteriora vel ad sui ipsius excitationem, sicut circa orationem dictum est, vel ad alios contestandum, ut non solum desistat a fractione voti propter timorem dei, sed etiam propter reverentiam hominum. Promissio autem procedit ex proposito faciendi. Propositum autem aliquam deliberationem praeexigit, cum sit actus voluntatis deliberatae.

Sic igitur ad votum tria ex necessitate requiruntur, primo quidem, deliberatio; secundo, propositum voluntatis; tertio, promissio, in qua perficitur ratio voti. Superadduntur vero quandoque et alia duo, ad quandam voti confirmationem, scilicet pronuntiatio oris, secundum illud psalm., reddam tibi vota mea, quae distinxerunt labia mea; et iterum testimonium aliorum.

Unde magister dicit, XXXVIII dist. IV Lib. Sent., quod votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae deo et de his quae sunt dei fieri debet, quamvis testificatio possit ad interiorem testificationem proprie referri.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod conceptio boni propositi non firmatur ex animi deliberatione nisi promissione deliberationem consequente.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas movet rationem ad promittendum aliquid circa ea quae eius voluntati subduntur.

Et pro tanto votum a voluntate accepit nomen quasi a primo movente.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui mittit manum ad aratrum iam facit aliquid.

Sed ille qui solum proponit nondum aliquid facit.

Sed quando promittit, iam incipit se exhibere ad faciendum, licet nondum impleat quod promittit, sicut ille qui ponit manum ad aratrum nondum arat, iam tamen apponit manum ad arandum.