Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.

Objection 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God."

I answer that, As stated above (Articles 1,2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things."

Reply to Objection 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment."

Reply to Objection 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.

The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non expediat aliquid vovere. Non enim alicui expedit ut privet se bono quod ei deus donavit. Sed libertas est unum de maximis bonis quae homini deus dedit, qua videtur privari per necessitatem quam votum imponit.

Ergo non videtur expediens homini quod aliquid voveat.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, nullus debet se periculis iniicere. Sed quicumque vovet se periculo iniicit, quia quod ante votum sine periculo poterat praeteriri, si non servetur post votum, periculosum est.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad armentarium et Paulinam, quia iam vovisti, iam te obstrinxisti, aliud tibi facere non licet.

Non talis eris si non feceris quod vovisti, qualis mansisses si nihil tale vovisses. Minor enim tunc esses, non peior. Modo autem, tanto, quod absit, miserior si fidem deo fregeris, quanto beatior si persolveris.

Ergo non expedit aliquid vovere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IV, imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego christi.

Sed non legitur neque christum aliquid vovisse, nec apostolos.

Ergo videtur quod non expediat aliquid vovere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur in psalm., vovete et reddite domino deo vestro.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, votum est promissio deo facta. Alia autem ratione promittitur aliquid homini, et alia ratione deo. Homini quidem promittimus aliquid propter eius utilitatem, cui utile est et quod ei aliquid exhibeamus, et quod eum de futura exhibitione prius certificemus. Sed promissionem deo facimus non propter eius utilitatem, sed propter nostram.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in praedicta epistola, benignus exactor est, non egenus, et qui non crescat ex redditis, sed in se crescere faciat redditores.

Et sicut id quod damus deo non est ei utile, sed nobis, quia quod ei redditur reddenti additur, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit; ita etiam promissio qua deo aliquid vovemus, non cedit in eius utilitatem, qui a nobis certificari non indiget; sed ad utilitatem nostram, inquantum vovendo voluntatem nostram immobiliter firmamus ad id quod expedit facere. Et ideo expediens est vovere.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut non posse peccare non diminuit libertatem, ita etiam necessitas firmatae voluntatis in bonum non diminuit libertatem, ut patet in deo et in beatis.

Et talis est necessitas voti, similitudinem quandam habens cum confirmatione beatorum.

Unde Augustinus in eadem epistola dicit quod felix necessitas est quae in meliora compellit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quando periculum nascitur ex ipso facto, tunc illud factum non est expediens, puta quod aliquis per pontem ruinosum transeat fluvium. Sed si periculum immineat ex hoc quod homo deficit ab illo facto, non desinit propter hoc esse expediens, sicut expediens est ascendere equum, quamvis periculum immineat cadenti de equo. Alioquin oporteret ab omnibus bonis cessare quae per accidens ex aliquo eventu possunt esse periculosa.

Unde dicitur Eccle. XI, qui observat ventum non seminat, et qui considerat nubes nunquam metet.

Periculum autem voventi non imminet ex ipso voto, sed ex culpa hominis, qui voluntatem mutat transgrediens votum.

Unde Augustinus dicit in eadem epistola, non te vovisse poeniteat. Immo gaude iam tibi sic non licere quod cum tuo detrimento licuisset.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod christo secundum se non competebat vovere. Tum quia deus erat. Tum etiam quia, inquantum homo, habebat firmatam voluntatem in bono, quasi comprehensor existens.

Quamvis per quandam similitudinem ex persona eius dicatur in psalm., secundum Glossam, vota mea reddam in conspectu timentium eum, loquitur autem pro corpore suo, quod est ecclesia. Apostoli autem intelliguntur vovisse pertinentia ad perfectionis statum quando christum, relictis omnibus, sunt secuti.