Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.

Objection 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and (Rm. 12:2): "That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

Objection 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to him: "Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also?" (Is. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham (Gn. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

On the contrary, It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written (Dt. 6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God's power.

On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above (Question 87, Article 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted---"that there may be meat in God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open the flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them.

Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that "he learnt divine thing through experience of them." It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His sweetness.

Reply to Objection 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Lk. 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that he was punished for his unbelief.

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentare deum non sit peccatum. Deus enim non praecipit aliquod peccatum. Praecipit autem ut homines eum probent, quod est eum tentare, dicitur enim Malach. III, inferte omnem decimam in horreum meum, ut sit cibus in domo mea, et probate me super hoc, dicit dominus, si non aperuero vobis cataractas caeli.

Ergo videtur quod tentare deum non sit peccatum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut aliquis tentatur ad hoc quod experientia sumatur de scientia vel potentia eius, ita etiam et de bonitate vel voluntate ipsius. Sed licitum est quod aliquis experimentum sumat divinae bonitatis, seu etiam voluntatis, dicitur enim in psalm., gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est dominus; et Rom. XII, ut probetis quae sit voluntas dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta.

Ergo tentare deum non est peccatum.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, nullus vituperatur in Scriptura ex eo quod a peccato cessat, sed magis si peccatum committat. Vituperatur autem Achaz quia domino dicenti, pete tibi signum a domino deo tuo, respondit, non petam, et non tentabo dominum, dictum est enim ei, numquid parum vobis est molestos esse hominibus, quia molesti estis et deo meo? ut dicitur Isaiae VII. De Abraham autem legitur Gen. XV, quod dixit ad dominum, unde scire possum quod possessurus sim eam, scilicet terram repromissam a deo? similiter etiam Gedeon signum a domino petiit de victoria repromissa, ut legitur iudic. VI.

Qui tamen ex hoc non reprehenduntur.

Ergo tentare deum non est peccatum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod prohibetur lege dei.

Dicitur enim Deut. VI, non tentabis dominum deum tuum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, tentare est experimentum sumere. Nullus autem experimentum sumit de eo de quo est certus. Et ideo omnis tentatio ex aliqua ignorantia vel dubitatione procedit, vel eius qui tentat, sicut cum quis experimentum de re aliqua sumit ut eius qualitatem cognoscat; sive aliorum, sicut cum quis experimentum de aliquo sumit ut aliis ostendat, per quem modum deus dicitur nos tentare.

Ignorare autem vel dubitare de his quae pertinent ad dei perfectionem est peccatum. Unde manifestum est quod tentare deum ad hoc quod ipse tentans cognoscat dei virtutem, est peccatum.

Si quis autem ad hoc experimentum sumat eorum quae ad divinam perfectionem pertinent, non ut ipse cognoscat, sed ut aliis demonstret, hoc non est tentare deum, cum subsit iusta necessitas seu pia utilitas, et alia quae ad hoc concurrere debent. Sic enim apostoli petiverunt a domino ut in nomine iesu christi fierent signa, ut dicitur Act. IV, ad hoc scilicet quod virtus christi infidelibus manifestaretur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod solutio decimarum praecepta erat in lege, ut supra habitum est.

Unde habebat necessitatem ex obligatione praecepti; et utilitatem quae ibi dicitur, ut sit cibus in domo dei. Unde solvendo decimas non tentabant deum.

Quod autem ibi subditur, et probate me, non est intelligendum causaliter, quasi ad hoc solvere deberent decimas ut probarent si deus non aperiret eis cataractas caeli, sed consecutive, quia scilicet, si decimas solverent, experimento probaturi erant beneficia quae eis deus conferret.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est cognitio divinae bonitatis vel voluntatis. Una quidem speculativa. Et quantum ad hanc, non licet dubitare nec probare utrum dei voluntas sit bona, vel utrum deus sit suavis. Alia autem est cognitio divinae bonitatis seu voluntatis affectiva seu experimentalis, dum quis experitur in seipso gustum divinae dulcedinis et complacentiam divinae voluntatis, sicut de Hierotheo dicit dionysius, II cap. De div. Nom., quod didicit divina ex compassione ad ipsa.

Et hoc modo monemur ut probemus dei voluntatem et gustemus eius suavitatem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod deus volebat signum dare regi Achaz non pro ipso solum, sed pro totius populi instructione. Et ideo reprehenditur, quasi impeditor communis salutis, quod signum petere nolebat. Nec petendo tentasset deum. Tum quia ex mandato dei petiisset. Tum quia hoc pertinebat ad utilitatem communem.

Abraham vero signum petiit ex instinctu divino. Et ideo non peccavit. Gedeon vero signum ex debilitate fidei petiisse videtur, et ideo a peccato non excusatur, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit.

Sicut et zacharias peccavit dicens, Luc. I, ad Angelum, unde hoc sciam? unde et propter incredulitatem punitus fuit. Sciendum tamen quod dupliciter aliquis signum petit a deo. Uno modo, ad explorandum divinam potestatem, aut veritatem dicti eius. Et hoc de se pertinet ad dei tentationem. Alio modo, ad hoc quod instruatur quid sit circa aliquod factum placitum deo. Et hoc nullo modo pertinet ad dei tentationem.