Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honor God.

Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him." Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God."

I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Question 101, Article 3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dulia non sit specialis virtus a latria distincta. Quia super illud psalm., domine deus meus, in te speravi, dicit Glossa, domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia, deus per creationem, cui debetur latria.

Sed non est distincta virtus quae ordinatur in deum secundum quod est dominus, et secundum quod est deus.

Ergo dulia non est virtus distincta a latria.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VIII ethic., amari simile est ei quod est honorari.

Sed eadem est virtus caritatis qua amatur deus, et qua amatur proximus. Ergo dulia, qua honoratur proximus, non est alia virtus a latria, qua honoratur deus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, idem est motus quo aliquis movetur in imaginem, et in rem cuius est imago. Sed per duliam honoratur homo inquantum est ad dei imaginem, dicitur enim Sap. II, de impiis quod non iudicaverunt honorem animarum sanctarum, quoniam deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem suae similitudinis fecit illum.

Ergo dulia non est alia virtus a latria, qua honoratur deus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de CIV. Dei, quod alia est servitus quae debetur hominibus, secundum quam praecepit apostolus servos dominis suis subditos esse, quae scilicet Graece dulia dicitur, alia vero latria, quae dicitur servitus pertinens ad colendum deum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum ea quae supra dicta sunt, ubi est alia ratio debiti, ibi necesse est quod sit alia virtus quae debitum reddat. Alia autem ratione debetur servitus deo, et homini, sicut alia ratione dominum esse competit deo, et homini. Nam deus plenarium et principale dominium habet respectu totius et cuiuslibet creaturae, quae totaliter eius subiicitur potestati, homo autem participat quandam similitudinem divini dominii, secundum quod habet particularem potestatem super aliquem hominem vel super aliquam creaturam. Et ideo dulia, quae debitam servitutem exhibet homini dominanti, alia virtus est a latria, quae exhibet debitam servitutem divino dominio. Et est quaedam observantiae species. Quia per observantiam honoramus quascumque personas dignitate praecellentes, per duliam autem proprie sumptam servi suos dominos venerantur; dulia enim Graece servitus dicitur.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio per excellentiam dicitur pietas, inquantum deus est per excellentiam pater; ita etiam latria per excellentiam dicitur dulia, inquantum deus excellenter est dominus. Non autem creatura participat potentiam creandi, ratione cuius deo debetur latria.

Et ideo Glossa illa distinxit, attribuens latriam deo secundum creationem, quae creaturae non communicatur; duliam vero secundum dominium, quod creaturae communicatur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio diligendi proximum deus est, non enim diligimus per caritatem in proximo nisi deum, et ideo eadem caritas est qua diligitur deus, et proximus. Sunt tamen aliae amicitiae, differentes a caritate, secundum alias rationes quibus homines amantur. Et similiter, cum sit alia ratio serviendi deo et homini, aut honorandi utrumque, non est eadem virtus latria et dulia.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod motus qui est in imaginem inquantum est imago, refertur in rem cuius est imago, non tamen omnis motus qui est in imaginem est in eam inquantum est imago. Et ideo quandoque est alius specie motus in imaginem, et motus in rem. Sic ergo dicendum est quod honor vel subiectio duliae respicit absolute quandam hominis dignitatem. Licet enim secundum illam dignitatem sit homo ad imaginem vel similitudinem dei, non tamen semper homo, quando reverentiam alteri exhibet, refert hoc actu in deum. Vel dicendum quod motus qui est in imaginem quodammodo est in rem, non tamen motus qui est in rem oportet quod sit in imaginem. Et ideo reverentia quae exhibetur alicui inquantum est ad imaginem, redundat quodammodo in deum, alia tamen est reverentia quae ipsi deo exhibetur, quae nullo modo pertinet ad eius imaginem.