Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things." Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away."

Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want."

Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Question 184, Question 186, Article 3).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (1.2, Question 65, Article 1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value."

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberalitas non sit virtus.

Nulla enim virtus contrariatur inclinationi naturali. Inclinatio autem naturalis est ad hoc ut aliquis plus sibi quam aliis provideat. Cuius contrarium pertinet ad liberalem, quia, ut philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., liberalis est non respicere ad seipsum, ita quod sibi minora derelinquit.

Ergo liberalitas non est virtus.

Argumentum 2

Item, per divitias homo suam vitam sustentat, et ad felicitatem divitiae organice deserviunt, ut dicitur in I ethic..

Cum igitur omnis virtus ordinetur ad felicitatem, videtur quod liberalis non est virtuosus, de quo philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., quod non est acceptivus pecuniae neque custoditivus, sed emissivus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem. Sed liberalitas non videtur connexa aliis virtutibus, multi enim sunt virtuosi qui non possunt esse liberales, quia non habent quod dent; multique liberaliter dant vel expendunt qui tamen alias sunt vitiosi.

Ergo liberalitas non est virtus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., quod in evangelio multas disciplinas accipimus iustae liberalitatis.

Sed in evangelio non docentur nisi ea quae ad virtutem pertinent.

Ergo liberalitas est virtus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., bene uti his quibus male uti possumus, pertinet ad virtutem.

Possumus autem bene et male uti non solum his quae intra nos sunt, puta potentiis et passionibus animae, sed etiam his quae extra nos sunt, scilicet rebus huius mundi concessis nobis ad sustentationem vitae. Et ideo, cum bene uti his rebus pertineat ad liberalitatem, consequens est quod liberalitas virtus sit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius et basilius dicunt, superabundantia divitiarum datur aliquibus a deo ut meritum bonae dispensationis acquirant. Pauca autem uni sufficiunt. Et ideo liberalis plura laudabiliter in alios expendit quam in seipsum. Debet autem homo semper magis sibi providere in spiritualibus bonis, in quibus unusquisque sibi praecipue subvenire potest. Et tamen etiam in temporalibus rebus non pertinet ad liberalem ut sic aliis intendat quod omnino se et suos despiciat.

Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., est illa probanda liberalitas ut proximos seminis tui non despicias, si egere cognoscas.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ad liberalem non pertinet sic divitias emittere ut non sibi remaneat unde sustentetur, et unde virtutis opera exequatur, quibus ad felicitatem pervenitur.

Unde philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., quod liberalis curat propria, volens per hoc quibusdam sufficere.

Et Ambrosius dicit, in libro de offic., quod dominus non vult simul effundi opes, sed dispensari. Nisi forte ut elisaeus boves suos occidit et pavit pauperes ex eo quod habuit, ut nulla cura teneretur domestica, quod pertinet ad statum perfectionis spiritualis vitae, de quo infra dicetur.

Et tamen sciendum quod hoc ipsum quod est sua liberaliter largiri, inquantum est actus virtutis, ad beatitudinem ordinatur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., illi qui consumunt multa in intemperantias, non sunt liberales, sed prodigi.

Et similiter quicumque effundit quae habet propter quaecumque alia peccata.

Unde et Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., si adiuves eum qui possessiones aliorum eripere conatur, non probatur largitas. Nec illa perfecta est liberalitas, si iactantiae causa, magis quam misericordiae, largiaris.

Et ideo illi qui carent aliis virtutibus, licet in aliqua mala opera multa expendant, non sunt liberales. Nihil etiam prohibet aliquos multa in bonos usus expendentes habitum liberalitatis non habere, sicut et aliarum virtutum opera faciunt homines antequam habitum virtutis habeant, licet non eo modo quo virtuosi, ut supra dictum est.

Similiter etiam nihil prohibet aliquos virtuosos, licet sint pauperes, esse liberales.

Unde philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., secundum substantiam, idest facultatem divitiarum, liberalitas dicitur, non enim consistit in multitudine datorum, sed in dantis habitu.

Et Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., quod effectus divitem collationem aut pauperem facit, et pretium rebus imponit.