Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.

I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. . Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (Articles 4,5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (Articles 4,5; Question 142, Article 4), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Question 142, Article 4).

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit specialis virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod ad temperantiam pertinet deo sese integrum incorruptumque servare. Sed hoc convenit omni virtuti. Ergo temperantia est virtus generalis.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de offic., quod in temperantia maxime tranquillitas animi spectatur et quaeritur.

Sed hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem.

Ergo temperantia est generalis virtus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, tullius dicit, in I de offic., quod decorum ab honesto nequit separari, et quod iusta omnia decora sunt.

Sed decorum proprie consideratur in temperantia, ut ibidem dicitur.

Ergo temperantia non est specialis virtus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III ethic., ponit eam specialem virtutem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum consuetudinem humanae locutionis, aliqua nomina communia restringuntur ad ea quae sunt praecipua inter illa quae sub tali communitate continentur, sicut nomen urbis accipitur antonomastice pro Roma. Sic igitur nomen temperantiae dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum communitatem suae significationis. Et sic temperantia non est virtus specialis, sed generalis, quia nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest moderationem, quam ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus; quod est commune in omni virtute morali. Differt tamen ratione temperantia a fortitudine etiam secundum quod utraque sumitur ut virtus communis. Nam temperantia retrahit ab his quae contra rationem appetitum alliciunt, fortitudo autem impellit ad ea sustinenda vel aggredienda propter quae homo refugit bonum rationis. Si vero consideretur antonomastice temperantia, secundum quod refrenat appetitum ab his quae maxime alliciunt hominem, sic est specialis virtus, utpote habens specialem materiam, sicut et fortitudo.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus hominis maxime corrumpitur per ea quibus allicitur homo ad recedendum a regula rationis et legis divinae. Et ideo, sicut ipsum temperantiae nomen dupliciter potest sumi, uno modo communiter, alio modo excellenter; ita et integritas, quam temperantiae Augustinus attribuit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ea circa quae est temperantia maxime possunt animum inquietare, propter hoc quod sunt homini essentialia, ut infra dicetur.

Et ideo tranquillitas animi per quandam excellentiam attribuitur temperantiae, quamvis communiter conveniat omnibus virtutibus.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis pulchritudo conveniat cuilibet virtuti, excellenter tamen attribuitur temperantiae, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, secundum communem rationem temperantiae, ad quam pertinet quaedam moderata et conveniens proportio, in qua consistit ratio pulchritudinis, ut patet per dionysium, IV cap. De div. Nom..

Alio modo, quia ea a quibus refrenat temperantia sunt infima in homine, convenientia sibi secundum naturam bestialem, ut infra dicetur, et ideo ex eis maxime natus est homo deturpari. Et per consequens pulchritudo maxime attribuitur temperantiae, quae praecipue turpitudinem hominis tollit. Et ex eadem etiam ratione honestum maxime attribuitur temperantiae.

Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro etymol., honestus dicitur quod nihil habeat turpitudinis, nam honestas dicitur quasi honoris status, qui maxime consideratur in temperantia, quae repellit vitia maxime opprobriosa, ut infra dicetur.