Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let all things be done decently and according to order" among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death are from God" . But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Question 144, Article 2, ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches . For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated above (Question 103, Articles 1,2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non sit idem virtuti.

Dicit enim tullius, in sua rhetorica honestum esse quod propter se petitur.

Virtus autem non petitur propter seipsam, sed propter felicitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in I ethic., quod felicitas est praemium virtutis et finis.

Ergo honestum non est idem virtuti.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status.

Sed multis aliis debetur honor quam virtuti, nam virtuti proprie debetur laus, ut dicitur in I ethic..

Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, principale virtutis consistit in interiori electione, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII ethic..

Honestas autem magis videtur ad exteriorem conversationem pertinere, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, omnia honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis.

Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, honestas videtur consistere in exterioribus divitiis, secundum illud Eccli. XI, bona et mala, vita et mors, utraque a deo sunt.

Sed in exterioribus divitiis non consistit virtus.

Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod tullius, in I de offic. Et in II rhet., dividit honestum in quatuor virtutes principales, in quas etiam dividitur virtus. Ergo honestum est idem virtuti.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status.

Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum.

Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII physic..

Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I ethic., eorum quae propter se appetuntur, quaedam appetuntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis. Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiam si nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, inquantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius.

Et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se appetendae.

Unde tullius dicit, in II rhet., quod quiddam est quod sua VI nos allicit, et sua dignitate trahit, ut virtus, veritas, scientia. Et hoc sufficit ad rationem honesti.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae honorantur praeter virtutem, aliquid est virtute excellentius, scilicet deus et beatitudo. Et huiusmodi non sunt ita nobis per experientiam nota sicut virtutes, secundum quas quotidie operamur. Et ideo virtus magis sibi vindicat nomen honesti. Alia vero, quae sunt infra virtutem, honorantur inquantum coadiuvant ad operationem virtutis, sicut nobilitas, potentia et divitiae.

Ut enim philosophus dicit, in IV ethic., huiusmodi honorantur a quibusdam, sed secundum veritatem, solus bonus est honorandus.

Bonus autem est aliquis secundum virtutem. Et ideo virtuti quidem debetur laus, secundum quod est appetibilis propter aliud, honor autem, prout est appetibilis propter seipsam.

Et secundum hoc habet rationem honesti.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, honestum importat debitum honoris. Honor autem est contestatio quaedam de excellentia alicuius, ut supra dictum est.

Testimonium autem non profertur nisi de rebus notis. Interior autem electio non innotescit homini nisi per exteriores actus. Et ideo exterior conversatio habet rationem honesti secundum quod est demonstrativa interioris rectitudinis. Et propter hoc, radicaliter honestas consistit in interiori electione, significative autem in exteriori conversatione.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod quia secundum vulgarem opinionem excellentia divitiarum facit hominem dignum honore, inde est quod quandoque nomen honestatis ad exteriorem prosperitatem transfertur.