Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

I answer that, According to Augustine sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright" . Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle ," to wit, the right estimate of the end.

Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Question 142, Article 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?"

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinens plus peccet quam intemperatus. Tanto enim aliquis videtur gravius peccare, quanto magis contra conscientiam agit, secundum illud Luc. XII, servus sciens voluntatem domini sui et faciens digna plagis, vapulabit multis.

Sed incontinens magis videtur agere contra conscientiam quam intemperatus, quia, ut dicitur in VII ethic., incontinens, sciens quoniam prava sunt quae concupiscit, nihilominus agit, propter passionem; intemperatus autem iudicat ea quae concupiscit esse bona.

Ergo incontinens gravius peccat quam intemperatus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quanto aliquod peccatum gravius est, tanto videtur esse minus sanabile, unde et peccata in spiritum sanctum, quae sunt gravissima, dicuntur esse irremissibilia. Sed peccatum incontinentiae videtur esse insanabilius quam peccatum intemperantiae. Sanatur enim peccatum alicuius per admonitionem et correctionem, quae nihil videtur conferre incontinenti, qui scit se male agere, et nihilominus male agit, intemperato autem videtur quod bene agat, et sic aliquid ei conferre posset admonitio. Ergo videtur quod incontinens gravius peccet quam intemperatus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quanto aliquis ex maiori libidine peccat, tanto gravius peccat. Sed incontinens peccat ex maiori libidine quam intemperatus, quia incontinens habet vehementes concupiscentias, quas non semper habet intemperatus. Ergo incontinens magis peccat quam intemperatus.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod impoenitentia aggravat omne peccatum, unde Augustinus, in libro de verb. Dom., dicit quod impoenitentia est peccatum in spiritum sanctum.

Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in VII ethic., intemperatus non est poenitivus, immanet enim electioni, incontinens autem omnis est poenitivus.

Ergo intemperatus gravius peccat quam incontinens.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum, secundum Augustinum, praecipue in voluntate consistit, voluntas enim est qua peccatur et recte vivitur.

Et ideo ubi est maior inclinatio voluntatis ad peccandum, ibi est gravius peccatum. In eo autem qui est intemperatus, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex propria electione, quae procedit ex habitu per consuetudinem acquisito. In eo autem qui est incontinens, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex aliqua passione. Et quia passio cito transit, habitus autem est qualitas difficile mobilis, inde est quod incontinens statim poenitet, transeunte passione, quod non accidit de intemperato, quinimmo gaudet se peccasse, eo quod operatio peccati est sibi facta connaturalis secundum habitum.

Unde de his dicitur Proverb. II, quod laetantur cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis.

Unde patet quod intemperatus est multo peior quam incontinens, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VII ethic..

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia intellectus quandoque quidem praecedit inclinationem appetitus, et causat eam. Et sic, quanto est maior ignorantia, tanto magis peccatum diminuit, vel totaliter excusat, inquantum causat involuntarium. Alio modo e converso ignorantia rationis sequitur inclinationem appetitus. Et talis ignorantia quanto est maior, tanto peccatum est gravius, quia ostenditur inclinatio appetitus esse maior.

Ignorantia autem tam incontinentis quam intemperati provenit ex eo quod appetitus est in aliquid inclinatus, sive per passionem, sicut in incontinente; sive per habitum, sicut in intemperato.

Maior autem ignorantia causatur ex hoc in intemperato quam in incontinente. Et uno quidem modo, quantum ad durationem. Quia in incontinente durat illa ignorantia solum passione durante, sicut accessio febris tertianae durat, durante commotione humoris. Ignorantia autem intemperati durat assidue, propter permanentiam habitus, unde assimilatur phthisicae, vel cuicumque morbo continuo, ut philosophus dicit, in VII ethic..

Alio autem modo est maior ignorantia intemperati, quantum ad id quod ignoratur. Nam ignorantia incontinentis attenditur quantum ad aliquod particulare eligibile, prout scilicet aestimat hoc nunc esse eligendum, sed intemperatus habet ignorantiam circa ipsum finem, inquantum scilicet iudicat hoc esse bonum, ut irrefrenate concupiscentias sequatur.

Unde philosophus, in VII ethic., dicit quod incontinens est melior intemperato, quia salvatur in eo optimum principium, scilicet recta existimatio de fine.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ad sanationem incontinentis non sufficit sola cognitio, sed requiritur interius auxilium gratiae concupiscentiam mitigantis, et adhibetur etiam exterius remedium admonitionis et correctionis, ex quibus aliquis incipit concupiscentiis resistere, ex quo concupiscentia debilitatur, ut supra dictum est.

Et iisdem etiam modis potest sanari intemperatus, sed difficilior est eius sanatio, propter duo.

Quorum primum est ex parte rationis, quae corrupta est circa aestimationem ultimi finis, quod se habet sicut principium in demonstrativis, difficilius autem reducitur ad veritatem ille qui errat circa principium, et similiter in operativis ille qui errat circa finem. Aliud autem est ex parte inclinationis appetitus, quae in intemperato est ex habitu, qui difficile tollitur, inclinatio autem incontinentis est ex passione, quae facilius reprimi potest.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod libido voluntatis, quae auget peccatum, maior est in intemperato quam in incontinente, ut ex dictis patet.

Sed libido concupiscentiae appetitus sensitivi quandoque maior est in incontinente, quia incontinens non peccat nisi a gravi concupiscentia; sed intemperatus etiam ex levi concupiscentia peccat, et quandoque eam praevenit.

Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII ethic., quod magis intemperatum vituperamus, quia non concupiscens, vel quiete, idest remisse concupiscens, persequitur delectationes.

Quid enim faceret si adesset concupiscentia iuvenilis?