Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): "That which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mt. 11:29), where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and Hilary declares that "Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's "throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that "the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above (Question 141, Article 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth."

Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils.

Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Question 30, Article 2): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod clementia et mansuetudo sint potissimae virtutes. Laus enim virtutis praecipue consistit ex hoc quod ordinat hominem ad beatitudinem, quae in dei cognitione consistit. Sed mansuetudo maxime ordinat hominem ad dei cognitionem, dicitur enim Iac. I, in mansuetudine suscipite insitum verbum; et Eccli. V, esto mansuetus ad audiendum verbum dei; et dionysius dicit, in epistola ad demophil., Moysen propter multam mansuetudinem dei apparitione dignum habitum.

Ergo mansuetudo est potissima virtutum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, tanto virtus aliqua potior esse videtur, quanto magis acceptatur a deo et ab hominibus. Sed mansuetudo maxime videtur acceptari a deo, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod beneplacitum est deo fides et mansuetudo.

Unde et specialiter ad suae mansuetudinis imitationem christus nos invitat, dicens, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, et Hilarius dicit quod per mansuetudinem mentis nostrae habitat christus in nobis.

Est etiam hominibus acceptissima, unde dicitur Eccli. III, fili, in mansuetudine perfice opera tua, et super hominum gloria diligeris.

Propter quod et Proverb. XX dicitur quod clementia thronus regius roboratur.

Ergo mansuetudo et clementia sunt potissimae virtutes.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de serm. Domini in monte, quod mites sunt qui cedunt improbitatibus, et non resistunt in malo, sed vincunt in bono malum.

Hoc autem videtur pertinere ad misericordiam vel pietatem, quae videtur esse potissima virtutum, quia super illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, dicit Glossa Ambrosii quod omnis summa religionis christianae in pietate consistit.

Ergo mansuetudo et clementia sunt maximae virtutes.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est, quia non ponuntur virtutes principales, sed adiunguntur alteri virtuti quasi principaliori.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquas virtutes non esse potissimas simpliciter nec quoad omnia, sed secundum quid et in aliquo genere. Non est autem possibile quod clementia et mansuetudo sint potissimae virtutes simpliciter. Quia laus earum attenditur in hoc quod retrahunt a malo, inquantum scilicet diminuunt iram vel poenam. Perfectius autem est consequi bonum quam carere malo. Et ideo virtutes quae simpliciter ordinant in bonum, sicut fides, spes, caritas, et etiam prudentia et iustitia, sunt simpliciter maiores virtutes quam clementia et mansuetudo.

Sed secundum quid, nihil prohibet mansuetudinem et clementiam habere quandam excellentiam inter virtutes quae resistunt affectionibus pravis. Nam ira, quam mitigat mansuetudo, propter suum impetum maxime impedit animum hominis ne libere iudicet veritatem. Et propter hoc, mansuetudo maxime facit hominem esse compotem sui, unde dicitur Eccli. X, fili, in mansuetudine serva animam tuam.

Quamvis concupiscentiae delectationum tactus sint turpiores, et magis continue infestent, propter quod temperantia magis ponitur virtus principalis, ut ex dictis patet.

Clementia vero, in hoc quod diminuit poenas, maxime videtur accedere ad caritatem, quae est potissima virtutum, per quam bona operamur ad proximos et eorum mala impedimus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mansuetudo praeparat hominem ad dei cognitionem removendo impedimentum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem faciendo hominem compotem sui per diminutionem irae, ut dictum est.

Alio modo, quia ad mansuetudinem pertinet quod homo non contradicat verbis veritatis, quod plerumque aliqui faciunt ex commotione irae.

Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in II de doct. Christ., quod mitescere est non contradicere divinae Scripturae, sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra percutit; sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius et verius sapere et praecipere possemus.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod mansuetudo et clementia reddunt hominem deo et hominibus acceptum, secundum quod concurrunt in eundem effectum cum caritate, quae est maxima virtutum, scilicet in subtrahendo mala proximorum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod misericordia et pietas conveniunt quidem cum mansuetudine et clementia, inquantum concurrunt in eundem effectum, qui est prohibere mala proximorum. Differunt tamen quantum ad motivum. Nam pietas removet mala proximorum ex reverentia quam habet ad aliquem superiorem, puta deum vel parentem. Misericordia vero removet mala proximorum ex hoc quod in eis aliquis contristatur inquantum aestimat eas ad se pertinere, ut supra dictum est, quod provenit ex amicitia, quae facit amicos de eisdem gaudere et tristari. Mansuetudo vero hoc facit inquantum removet iram incitantem ad vindictam.

Clementia vero hoc facit ex animi lenitate, inquantum iudicat esse aequum ut aliquis non amplius puniatur.