Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated above (Article 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Question 129, Article 5). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called {metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 137, Article 2, ad 1; Question 157, Article 3, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (Question 160, Article 2), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pt. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."

Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (Question 137, Article 2, ad 1; Question 157, Article 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humilitas non sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae. Humilitas enim praecipue respicit reverentiam qua quis subiicitur deo, ut dictum est.

Sed ad virtutem theologicam pertinet quod habeat deum pro obiecto. Ergo humilitas magis debet poni virtus theologica quam pars temperantiae seu modestiae.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, temperantia est in concupiscibili. Humilitas autem videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et superbia, quae ei opponitur, cuius obiectum est arduum. Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit pars temperantiae vel modestiae.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, humilitas et magnanimitas circa eadem sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Sed magnanimitas non ponitur pars temperantiae, sed magis fortitudinis, ut supra habitum est.

Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit pars temperantiae vel modestiae.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, super Lucam, si vis nomen huius audire virtutis, quomodo etiam a philosophis appelletur, ausculta eandem esse humilitatem quam respicit deus, quae ab illis metriotes dicitur, idest mensuratio sive moderatio, quae manifeste pertinet ad modestiam et temperantiam.

Ergo humilitas est pars modestiae et temperantiae.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in assignando partes virtutibus praecipue attenditur similitudo quantum ad modum virtutis. Modus autem temperantiae, ex quo maxime laudem habet, est refrenatio vel repressio impetus alicuius passionis. Et ideo omnes virtutes refrenantes sive reprimentes impetus aliquarum affectionum, vel actiones moderantes, ponuntur partes temperantiae. Sicut autem mansuetudo reprimit motum irae, ita etiam humilitas reprimit motum spei, qui est motus spiritus in magna tendentis. Et ideo, sicut mansuetudo ponitur pars temperantiae, ita etiam humilitas.

Unde et philosophus, in IV ethic., eum qui tendit in parva secundum suum modum, dicit non esse magnanimum, sed temperatum, quem nos humilem dicere possumus.

Et inter alias partes temperantiae, ratione superius dicta, continetur sub modestia, prout tullius de ea loquitur, inquantum scilicet humilitas nihil est aliud quam quaedam moderatio spiritus.

Unde et I Pet. III dicitur, in incorruptibilitate quieti ac modesti spiritus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes theologicae, quae sunt circa ultimum finem, qui est primum principium in appetibilibus, sunt causae omnium aliarum virtutum. Unde ex hoc quod humilitas causatur ex reverentia divina, non excluditur quin humilitas sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod partes principalibus virtutibus assignantur, non secundum convenientiam in subiecto vel in materia, sed secundum convenientiam in modo formali, ut dictum est.

Et ideo, licet humilitas sit in irascibili sicut in subiecto, ponitur tamen pars modestiae et temperantiae propter modum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet magnanimitas et humilitas in materia conveniant, differunt tamen in modo, ratione cuius magnanimitas ponitur pars fortitudinis, humilitas autem pars temperantiae.