Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible." Therefore pride is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from wickedness ," says that "a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose , "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is pride.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; and Isidore says (Etym. ) that it is "the downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Objection 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.

I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as stated (Article 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss which are not done through pride."

Reply to Objection 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply to Objection 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit speciale peccatum.

Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Nat. Et gratia, quod sine superbiae appellatione, nullum peccatum invenies.

Et prosper dicit, in libro de vita contemplat., nullum peccatum absque superbia potest, vel potuit esse, aut poterit.

Ergo superbia est generale peccatum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, iob XXXIII, ut avertat hominem ab iniquitate, dicit Glossa quod contra conditorem superbire est eius praecepta peccando transcendere.

Sed secundum Ambrosium, omne peccatum est transgressio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum.

Ergo omne peccatum est superbia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, omne peccatum speciale alicui speciali virtuti opponitur. Sed superbia opponitur omnibus virtutibus, dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., superbia nequaquam est unius virtutis extinctione contenta, per cuncta animae membra se erigit, et quasi generalis ac pestifer morbus, corpus omne corrumpit.

Et Isidorus dicit, in libro etymol., quod est ruina omnium virtutum ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, omne peccatum speciale habet specialem materiam. Sed superbia habet generalem materiam, dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod alter intumescit auro, alter eloquio, alter infimis et terrenis rebus, alter summis caelestibusque virtutibus.

Ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum, sed generale.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. Et gratia, quaerat, et inveniet, secundum legem dei, superbiam esse peccatum multum discretum ab aliis vitiis.

Genus autem non distinguitur a suis speciebus. Ergo superbia non est generale peccatum, sed speciale.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum superbiae dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum propriam speciem, quam habet ex ratione proprii obiecti. Et hoc modo superbia est speciale peccatum, quia habet speciale obiectum, est enim inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut dictum est.

Alio modo potest considerari secundum redundantiam quandam in alia peccata. Et secundum hoc, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum scilicet ex superbia oriri possunt omnia peccata, duplici ratione. Uno modo, per se, inquantum scilicet alia peccata ordinantur ad finem superbiae, qui est propria excellentia, ad quam potest ordinari omne id quod quis inordinate appetit. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, inquantum scilicet per superbiam homo contemnit divinam legem, per quam prohibetur a peccando; secundum illud Ierem. II, confregisti iugum, rupisti vincula, dixisti, non serviam.

Sciendum tamen quod ad hanc generalitatem superbiae pertinet quod omnia vitia ex superbia interdum oriri possunt, non autem ad eam pertinet quod omnia vitia semper ex superbia oriantur. Quamvis enim omnia praecepta legis possit aliquis transgredi qualicumque peccato ex contemptu, qui pertinet ad superbiam; non tamen semper ex contemptu aliquis praecepta divina transgreditur, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque ex infirmitate. Et inde est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. Et gratia, multa perperam fiunt, quae non fiunt superbe.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus illa verba inducit, in libro de Nat. Et gratia, non ex persona sua, sed ex persona alterius, contra quem disputat.

Unde et postmodum improbat ea, ostendens quod non semper ex superbia peccatur.

Potest tamen dici quod auctoritates illae intelliguntur quantum ad exteriorem effectum superbiae, qui est transgredi praecepta, quod invenitur in quolibet peccato, non autem quantum ad interiorem actum superbiae, qui est contemptus praecepti. Non enim semper peccatum fit ex contemptu, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque ex infirmitate, ut dictum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod quandoque aliquis committit aliquod peccatum secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum, sicut ille qui ignoranter occidit patrem, committit parricidium secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum, quia hoc non intendebat. Et secundum hoc, transgredi praeceptum dei dicitur esse contra deum superbire, secundum effectum quidem semper, non autem semper secundum affectum.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum aliquod potest corrumpere virtutem dupliciter. Uno modo, per directam contrarietatem ad virtutem. Et hoc modo superbia non corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, sed solam humilitatem, sicut et quodlibet aliud speciale peccatum corrumpit specialem virtutem sibi oppositam, contrarium agendo. Alio modo peccatum aliquod corrumpit virtutem abutendo ipsa virtute. Et sic superbia corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, inquantum scilicet ex ipsis virtutibus sumit occasionem superbiendi, sicut et quibuslibet aliis rebus ad excellentiam pertinentibus. Unde non sequitur quod sit generale peccatum.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia attendit specialem rationem obiecti, quae tamen inveniri potest in diversis materiis.

Est enim inordinatus amor propriae excellentiae, excellentia autem potest in diversis rebus inveniri.