Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 , "Then did I restore that which I took not away," says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness."

I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality : and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man---of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man "to His image and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's." Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia primi hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem. Nullus enim peccat appetendo id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam. Sed similitudo dei competit homini secundum suam naturam, dicitur enim Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.

Ergo non peccavit divinam similitudinem appetendo.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, in hoc videtur primus homo divinam similitudinem appetiisse, ut scientia boni et mali potiretur, hoc enim ei a serpente suggerebatur, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum.

Sed appetitus scientiae est homini naturalis, secundum illud philosophi, in principio metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant.

Ergo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, nullus sapiens eligit id quod est impossibile.

Primus autem homo sapientia praeditus erat, secundum illud Eccli. XVII, disciplina intellectus replevit illos.

Cum ergo omne peccatum consistat in appetitu deliberato, qui est electio, videtur quod primus homo non peccaverit appetendo aliquid impossibile. Sed impossibile est esse hominem similem deo, secundum illud exodi XV, quis similis tui in fortibus, domine? ergo primus homo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam, dicit Augustinus, Adam et eva rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae. Et hanc similitudinem ad deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturae ad deum, inquantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum.

Unde dionysius dicit, in IX cap. De div. Nom., eadem similia sunt deo, et dissimilia, hoc quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa.

Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est, consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate. Considerandum tamen est quod appetitus proprie est rei non habitae. Bonum autem spirituale secundum quod creatura rationalis participat divinam similitudinem, potest secundum tria attendi. Primo quidem, secundum ipsum esse naturae. Et talis similitudo ab ipso creationis principio fuit impressa et homini, de quo dicitur, Gen. I, quod fecit deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam; et Angelo, de quo dicitur, Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis.

Secundo vero, quantum ad cognitionem. Et hanc etiam similitudinem in sui creatione Angelus accepit, unde in praemissis verbis, cum dictum esset, tu signaculum similitudinis, statim subditur, plenus sapientia.

Sed primus homo in sua creatione istam similitudinem nondum actu adeptus erat, sed solum in potentia. Tertio, quantum ad potestatem operandi. Et hanc similitudinem nondum erant in actu assecuti neque Angelus neque homo in ipso creationis principio, quia utrique restabat aliquid agendum quo ad beatitudinem perveniret. Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierint, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem naturae. Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam, unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. Ad litt., quod menti mulieris inhaesit amor propriae potestatis.

Sed diabolus peccavit appetendo similitudinem dei quantum ad potestatem, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera relig., quod magis voluit sua potentia frui quam dei.

Veruntamen quantum ad aliquid uterque deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine naturae, ex cuius appetitu homo non peccavit, ut dictum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod appetere similitudinem dei absolute quantum ad scientiam, non est peccatum. Sed appetere huiusmodi similitudinem inordinate, idest supra suam mensuram, peccatum est.

Unde super illud Psalmi, deus quis similis erit tibi, dicit Augustinus, qui per se vult esse deus, perverse vult esse similis deo, ut diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse; et homo, qui ut servus noluit tenere praecepta.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine aequiparantiae.