Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . . beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity ." Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision belongs to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk. 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.

I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. "Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and "consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration." But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander."

Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss of Augustine on this passage, "beholding" denotes "seeing in a mirror , not from a watch-tower ." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to meditation.

Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (Article 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs "hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and "reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires "meditation."

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineant diversi actus.

Richardus enim de sancto victore distinguit inter contemplationem, meditationem et cogitationem.

Sed omnia ista videntur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere.

Ergo videtur quod vitae contemplativae sint diversi actus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, apostolus, II ad Cor. III, dicit, nos autem, revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, transformamur in eandem claritatem.

Sed hoc pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo, praeter tria praedicta, etiam speculatio ad vitam contemplativam pertinet.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, bernardus dicit, in libro de consid., quod prima et maxima contemplatio est admiratio maiestatis.

Sed admiratio, secundum Damascenum, ponitur species timoris. Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, ad vitam contemplativam pertinere dicuntur oratio, lectio et meditatio. Pertinet etiam ad vitam contemplativam auditus, nam de maria, per quam vita contemplativa significatur, dicitur, Luc. X, quod sedens secus pedes domini, audiebat verba illius.

Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod vita hic dicitur operatio cui homo principaliter intendit. Si igitur sunt plures operationes vitae contemplativae, non erit una vita contemplativa, sed plures.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod de vita contemplativa nunc loquimur secundum quod ad hominem pertinet.

Haec est autem differentia inter hominem et Angelum, ut patet per dionysium, VII cap. De div. Nom., quod Angelus simplici apprehensione veritatem intuetur, homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad intuitum simplicis veritatis. Sic igitur vita contemplativa unum quidem actum habet in quo finaliter perficitur, scilicet contemplationem veritatis, a quo habet unitatem, habet autem multos actus quibus pervenit ad hunc actum finalem. Quorum quidam pertinent ad acceptionem principiorum, ex quibus procedit ad contemplationem veritatis; alii autem pertinent ad deductionem principiorum in veritatem cuius cognitio inquiritur; ultimus autem completivus actus est ipsa contemplatio veritatis.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cogitatio, secundum Richardum de sancto victore, pertinere videtur ad multorum inspectionem, ex quibus aliquis colligere intendit unam simplicem veritatem. Unde sub cogitatione comprehendi possunt et perceptiones sensuum, ad cognoscendum aliquos effectus; et imaginationes; et discursus rationis circa diversa signa, vel quaecumque perducentia in cognitionem veritatis intentae.

Quamvis secundum Augustinum, XIV de Trin., cogitatio dici possit omnis actualis operatio intellectus.

Meditatio vero pertinere videtur ad processum rationis ex principiis aliquibus pertingentis ad veritatis alicuius contemplationem. Et ad idem pertinet consideratio, secundum bernardum. Quamvis secundum philosophum, in II de anima, omnis operatio intellectus consideratio dicatur. Sed contemplatio pertinet ad ipsum simplicem intuitum veritatis.

Unde idem Richardus dicit quod contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas; meditatio autem est intuitus animi in veritatis inquisitione occupatus; cogitatio autem est animi respectus ad evagationem pronus.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Augustini ibidem, speculantes dicit a speculo, non a specula.

Videre autem aliquid per speculum est videre causam per effectum, in quo eius similitudo relucet. Unde speculatio ad meditationem reduci videtur.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis.

Dictum est enim quod contemplatio in affectu terminatur.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ad cognitionem veritatis pertingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per ea quae ab alio accipit.

Et sic quidem, quantum ad ea quae homo a deo accipit, necessaria est oratio, secundum illud Sap. VII, invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae.

Quantum vero ad ea quae accipit ab homine, necessarius est auditus, secundum quod accipit ex voce loquentis; et lectio, secundum quod accipit ex eo quod per Scripturam est traditum. Alio modo, necessarium est quod adhibeat proprium studium.

Et sic requiritur meditatio.