Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."

I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.

The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.

Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.

Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.

Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod docere non sit actus vitae activae, sed contemplativae.

Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod viri perfecti bona caelestia quae contemplari potuerunt, fratribus denuntiant, eorumque animos in amorem intimae claritatis accendunt.

Sed hoc pertinet ad doctrinam.

Ergo docere est actus vitae contemplativae.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, ad idem genus vitae videtur reduci actus et habitus.

Sed docere est actus sapientiae, dicit enim philosophus, in principio metaphys., quod signum scientis est posse docere.

Cum ergo sapientia vel scientia pertineat ad vitam contemplativam, videtur quod etiam doctrina ad vitam contemplativam pertineat.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sicut contemplatio est actus vitae contemplativae, ita et oratio. Sed oratio qua quis orat pro alio, nihilominus pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo quod aliquis veritatem meditatam in alterius notitiam per doctrinam deducat, videtur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, verbo sapientiae nescientem docere.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod actus doctrinae habet duplex obiectum, fit enim doctrina per locutionem; locutio autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est igitur unum obiectum doctrinae id quod est materia sive obiectum interioris conceptionis. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, quandoque doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, quandoque ad contemplativam, ad activam quidem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem ut per eam in exteriori actione dirigatur; ad contemplativam autem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem intelligibilem in cuius consideratione et amore delectatur.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis dom., eligant sibi partem meliorem, scilicet vitae contemplativae; vacent verbo, inhient doctrinae dulcedini, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem, ubi manifeste dicit doctrinam ad vitam contemplativam pertinere.

Aliud vero obiectum doctrinae est ex parte sermonis audibilis.

Et sic obiectum doctrinae est ipse audiens. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent exteriores actiones.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de doctrina quantum ad materiam, prout versatur circa considerationem et amorem veritatis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus et actus communicant in obiecto. Et ideo manifeste illa ratio procedit ex parte materiae interioris conceptus. In tantum enim ad sapientem vel scientem pertinet posse docere, in quantum potest interiorem conceptum verbis exprimere, ad hoc quod possit alium adducere ad intellectum veritatis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui orat pro alio, nihil agit erga illum pro quo orat, sed solum erga deum, qui est intelligibilis veritas. Sed ille qui alium docet, aliquid circa eum agit exteriori actione.

Unde non est similis ratio de utroque.