Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, "So I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative."

I answer that, As stated above (1.2, Question 114, Article 4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Question 27, Article 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Question 181, Article 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God.

Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle says (Rm. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 ): "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."

Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.

Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa sit maioris meriti quam contemplativa.

Meritum enim dicitur respectu mercedis.

Merces autem debetur labori, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suum laborem.

Sed vitae activae attribuitur labor, contemplativae vero quies, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., omnis qui ad deum convertitur, prius necesse est ut desudet in labore, idest Liam accipiat, ut post ad videndum principium in Rachel amplexibus requiescat.

Ergo vita activa est maioris meriti quam contemplativa.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, vita contemplativa est quaedam inchoatio futurae felicitatis.

Unde super illud Ioan. Ult., sic eum volo manere donec veniam, dicit Augustinus, hoc apertius dici potest, perfecta me sequatur actio, informata meae passionis exemplo, inchoata vero contemplatio maneat donec venio, perficienda cum venero.

Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita hic incipitur, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur.

Sed in illa futura vita non erit status merendi, sed recipiendi pro meritis. Ergo vita contemplativa minus videtur habere de ratione meriti quam vita activa, sed plus habet de ratione praemii.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod nullum sacrificium est deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum.

Sed per zelum animarum aliquis se convertit ad studia activae vitae. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit maioris meriti quam activa.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., magna sunt activae vitae merita, sed contemplativae potiora.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod radix merendi est caritas, sicut supra habitum est.

Cum autem caritas consistat in dilectione dei et proximi, sicut supra habitum est, diligere deum secundum se est magis meritorium quam diligere proximum, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Et ideo illud quod directius pertinet ad dilectionem dei, magis est meritorium ex suo genere quam id quod directe pertinet ad dilectionem proximi propter deum. Vita autem contemplativa directe et immediate pertinet ad dilectionem dei, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de CIV. Dei, quod otium sanctum, scilicet contemplativae vitae, quaerit caritas veritatis, scilicet divinae; cui potissime vita contemplativa insistit, sicut dictum est.

Vita autem activa ordinatur directius ad dilectionem proximi, quia satagit circa frequens ministerium, ut dicitur Luc. X.

Et ideo ex suo genere contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa.

Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, in III homil. Ezech., contemplativa est maior merito quam activa, quia haec in usu praesentis operis laborat, in quo scilicet necesse est proximis subvenire; illa vero sapore intimo venturam iam requiem degustat, scilicet in contemplatione dei. Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus meretur quam alius in operibus vitae contemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amoris, ut eius voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a dulcedine divinae contemplationis ad tempus separari.

Sicut apostolus dicebat, Rom. IX, optabam ego ipse anathema esse a christo pro fratribus meis, quod exponens chrysostomus, in libro de compunct., dicit, ita totam mentem eius demerserat amor christi, ut etiam hoc quod ei prae ceteris omnibus amabilius erat, esse cum christo, rursus idipsum, quia ita placeret christo, contemneret.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod labor exterior operatur ad augmentum praemii accidentalis, sed augmentum meriti respectu praemii essentialis consistit principaliter in caritate. Cuius quoddam signum est labor exterior toleratus propter christum, sed multo expressius eius signum est quod aliquis, praetermissis omnibus quae ad hanc vitam pertinent, soli divinae contemplationi vacare delectetur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod in statu felicitatis futurae homo pervenit ad perfectum, et ideo non relinquitur locus proficiendi per meritum. Si tamen relinqueretur, esset efficacius meritum, propter caritatem maiorem. Sed contemplatio praesentis vitae cum quadam imperfectione est, et adhuc habet quo proficiat.

Et ideo non tollit rationem merendi, sed augmentum meriti facit, propter maius exercitium caritatis divinae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrificium spiritualiter deo offertur cum aliquid ei exhibetur. Inter omnia autem bona hominis deus maxime acceptat bonum humanae animae, ut hoc sibi in sacrificium offeratur. Offerre autem debet aliquis deo, primo quidem, animam suam, secundum illud Eccli. XXX, miserere animae tuae placens deo, secundo autem, animas aliorum, secundum illud Apoc. Ult., qui audit, dicat, veni.

Quanto autem homo animam suam vel alterius propinquius deo coniungit, tanto sacrificium est deo magis acceptum. Unde magis acceptum est deo quod aliquis animam suam et aliorum applicet contemplationi, quam actioni. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod nullum sacrificium est deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum, non praefertur meritum vitae activae merito vitae contemplativae, sed ostenditur magis esse meritorium si quis offerat deo animam suam et aliorum, quam quaecumque alia exteriora dona.