Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life (Mt. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be established for soldiering.

Objection 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (Article 2, Objection 2). Therefore it is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for soldiering.

Objection 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we have said above (Question 187, Article 6). Now according to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to penitents. for it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance." Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for soldiering.

Objection 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men may please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), a religious order may be established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that "he fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary."

Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner."

Reply to Objection 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the passage quoted , " . . . thy goods, ask them not again." If, however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom says, "it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God."

Reply to Objection 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap. 1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows." Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God's service.

Reply to Objection 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.

Reply to Objection 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of the Church.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla religio ordinari possit ad militandum. Omnis enim religio pertinet ad statum perfectionis. Sed ad perfectionem vitae christianae pertinet quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, ego dico vobis, non resistere malo, sed si quis percusserit te in unam maxillam, praebe ei et alteram, quod repugnat officio militari.

Ergo nulla religio potest institui ad militandum.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, gravior est compugnatio corporalium praeliorum quam concertationes verborum quae in advocationibus fiunt. Sed religiosis interdicitur officio advocationis uti, ut patet in decretali de postulando supra inducta.

Ergo videtur quod multo minus aliqua religio possit institui ad militandum.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, status religionis est status poenitentiae, ut supra dictum est.

Sed poenitentibus, secundum iura, interdicitur militia, dicitur enim in decretis, de poenit., dist. V, contrarium omnino est ecclesiasticis regulis, post poenitentiae actionem, redire ad militiam saecularem.

Ergo nulla religio congrue institui potest ad militandum.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, nulla religio institui potest ad aliquid iniustum.

Sed sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro etymol., iustum bellum est quod ex edicto imperiali geritur.

Cum igitur religiosi sint quaedam privatae personae, videtur quod non liceat eis bellum gerere.

Et ita ad hoc non potest institui aliqua religio.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, ad bonifacium, noli existimare neminem deo placere posse qui armis bellicis ministrat. In his erat sanctus David, cui dominus magnum testimonium perhibuit.

Sed ad hoc sunt institutae religiones ut homines deo placeant.

Ergo nihil prohibet aliquam religionem institui ad militandum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio institui potest non solum ad opera contemplativae vitae, sed etiam ad opera vitae activae, inquantum pertinent ad subventionem proximorum et obsequium dei, non autem inquantum pertinent ad aliquid mundanum tenendum. Potest autem officium militare ordinari ad subventionem proximorum, non solum quantum ad privatas personas, sed etiam quantum ad totius reipublicae defensionem, unde de Iuda Machabaeo dicitur, I machab. III, quod praeliabatur praelium Israel cum laetitia, et dilatavit gloriam populo suo.

Ordinari etiam potest ad conservationem divini cultus, unde ibidem subditur Iudam dixisse, nos pugnabimus pro animabus nostris et legibus nostris; et infra, XIII, dicit simon, vos scitis quanta ego et fratres mei et domus patris mei fecimus pro legibus et pro sanctis praelia.

Unde convenienter institui potest aliqua religio ad militandum, non quidem propter aliquid mundanum, sed propter defensionem divini cultus et publicae salutis; vel etiam pauperum et oppressorum, secundum illud Psalmi, eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquis potest non resistere malo dupliciter. Uno modo, condonando propriam iniuriam. Et sic potest ad perfectionem pertinere, quando ita fieri expedit ad salutem aliorum. Alio modo, tolerando patienter iniurias aliorum. Et hoc ad imperfectionem pertinet, vel etiam ad vitium, si aliquis potest convenienter iniurianti resistere.

Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de offic., fortitudo quae bello tuetur a barbaris patriam, vel domi defendit infirmos, vel a latronibus socios, plena iustitia est.

Sicut etiam ibidem dicit dominus, quae tua sunt, ne repetas, et tamen, si aliquis non repeteret ea quae sunt aliorum, si ad eum pertineat, peccaret. Homo enim laudabiliter donat sua, non autem aliena. Et multo minus ea quae sunt dei, non sunt negligenda, quia, ut chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., iniurias dei dissimulare nimis est impium.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod exercere advocationis officium propter aliquid mundanum, repugnat omni religioni, non autem si hoc aliquis exerceat, secundum dispositionem sui praelati, pro monasterio suo, ut in eadem decretali subditur. Neque etiam pro defensione pauperum aut viduarum, unde in decretis, dist. Lxxxviii, dicitur, decrevit sancta synodus nullum deinceps clericum aut possessiones conducere, aut negotiis saecularibus se permiscere, nisi propter curam pupillorum, etc..

Et similiter militare propter aliquid mundanum est omni religioni contrarium, non autem militare propter obsequium dei.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod militia saecularis interdicitur poenitentibus, sed militia quae est propter dei obsequium, imponitur alicui in poenitentiam; sicut patet de his quibus iniungitur ut militent in subsidium terrae sanctae.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod religio non sic instituitur ad militandum quod religiosis propria auctoritate liceat bella gerere, sed solum auctoritate principum vel ecclesiae.