Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's vow of entering religion.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself to enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land; and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not necessarily to be fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation."

I answer that, As stated above (Question 88, Article 1), when we were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface : "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving of punishment!" Therefore a man is under an obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to God.

Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service, as stated above (Question 186, Article 1). Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is fulfilled.

Reply to Objection 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if "he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High."

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 88, Article 3, ad 2), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the obligation to which he has engaged himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow."

Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24, "Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is preferable to absolution from punishment.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui obligatus est voto ad religionis ingressum, non teneatur intrare.

Dicitur enim in decretis, XVII, qu. II, Consaldus presbyter, quondam infirmitatis passione pressus, monachum se fieri promisit, non tamen monasterio aut abbati se tradidit, nec promissionem scripsit, sed beneficium ecclesiae in manu advocati refutavit, ac postquam convaluit, monachum se negavit fieri.

Et postea subdit, iudicamus ut praefatus presbyter beneficium et altaria recipiat et quiete retineat.

Hoc autem non esset, si teneretur religionem intrare. Ergo videtur quod non teneatur aliquis implere votum quo se ad religionis ingressum obligavit.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, nullus tenetur facere id quod non est in sua potestate.

Sed quod aliquis religionem ingrediatur, non est in potestate ipsius, sed requiritur ad hoc assensus eorum ad quos debet transire. Ergo videtur quod non teneatur aliquis implere votum quo se ad religionis ingressum obligavit.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, per votum minus utile non potest derogari voto magis utili. Sed per impletionem voti religionis impediri posset impletio voti crucis in subsidium terrae sanctae, quod videtur esse utilius, quia per hoc votum consequitur homo remissionem peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod votum quo quis se obligavit ad religionis ingressum, non sit ex necessitate implendum.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. V, si quid vovisti deo, ne moreris reddere, displicet enim deo infidelis et stulta promissio.

Et super illud Psalmi, vovete et reddite domino deo vestro, dicit Glossa, vovere voluntati consulitur, sed post voti promissionem, redditio necessario exigitur.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de voto ageretur, votum est promissio deo facta de his quae ad deum pertinent.

Ut autem Gregorius dicit, in epistola ad bonifacium, si inter homines solent bonae fidei contractus nulla ratione dissolvi, quanto magis ista pollicitatio quam cum deo pepigit, solvi sine vindicta non poterit.

Et ideo ad implendum id quod homo vovit, ex necessitate tenetur, dummodo sit aliquid quod ad deum pertineat. Manifestum est autem quod ingressus religionis maxime ad deum pertinet, quia per hoc homo totaliter se mancipat divinis obsequiis, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Unde relinquitur quod ille qui se obligat ad religionis ingressum, teneatur religionem ingredi, secundum quod se voto obligare intendit, ita scilicet quod, si intendit se absolute obligare, tenetur quam citius poterit ingredi, legitimo impedimento cessante; si autem ad certum tempus, vel sub certa conditione, tenetur religionem ingredi tempore adveniente, vel conditione existente.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille presbyter non fecerat votum solemne, sed simplex. Unde non erat monachus effectus, ut cogi deberet de iure in monasterio remanere et ecclesiam dimittere.

Tamen in foro conscientiae esset sibi consulendum quod, omnibus dimissis, religionem intraret.

Unde extra, de voto et voti redempt., cap. Per tuas, consulitur episcopo gratianopolitano, qui post votum religionis episcopatum assumpserat, voto non impleto, ut, si suam sanare desideraret conscientiam, regimen ecclesiae resignaret, et redderet altissimo vota sua.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, ille qui se voto obligavit ad certae religionis ingressum, tenetur facere quantum in se est ut in illa religione recipiatur. Et si quidem intendit se simpliciter ad religionem obligare, si non recipitur in una religione, tenetur ire ad aliam.

Si vero intendit se obligare specialiter ad unam solum, non tenetur nisi secundum modum suae obligationis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod votum religionis, cum sit perpetuum, est maius quam votum peregrinationis terrae sanctae, quod est temporale. Et sicut Alexander III dicit, et habetur extra, de voto et voti redempt., reus fracti voti aliquatenus non habetur qui temporale obsequium in perpetuam noscitur religionis observantiam commutare.

Rationabiliter autem dici potest quod etiam per ingressum religionis aliquis consequatur remissionem omnium peccatorum.

Si enim aliquibus eleemosynis factis homo potest statim satisfacere de peccatis suis, secundum illud Dan. IV, peccata tua eleemosynis redime; multo magis in satisfactionem pro omnibus peccatis sufficit quod aliquis se totaliter divinis obsequiis mancipet per religionis ingressum, quae excedit omne genus satisfactionis, etiam publicae poenitentiae, ut habetur in decretis, XXXIII caus., qu. II, cap. Admonere; sicut etiam holocaustum excedit sacrificium, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech.. Unde in vitis patrum legitur quod eandem gratiam consequuntur religionem ingredientes quam consequuntur baptizati.

Si tamen non absolverentur per hoc ab omni reatu poenae, nihilominus ingressus religionis utilior est quam peregrinatio terrae sanctae quantum ad promotionem in bonum, quae praeponderat absolutioni a poena.