Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (Article 1) that it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.

Objection 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above (Article 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (1, Question 40, Article 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above (1, Question 30, Article 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): "No word shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.

I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature assuming.

Reply to Objection 1: Because in God "what is," and "whereby it is," are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality.

Reply to Objection 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word.

Reply to Objection 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura non possit assumere.

Dictum est enim quod naturae convenit assumere ratione personae. Sed quod convenit alicui ratione alicuius, remoto eo, non potest ei convenire, sicut corpus, quod est visibile ratione coloris, sine colore videri non potest. Ergo, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura assumere non potest.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, assumptio importat terminum unionis, ut dictum est.

Sed unio non potest fieri in natura, sed solum in persona. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, natura divina non potest assumere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, in prima parte dictum est quod in divinis, abstracta personalitate, nihil manet. Sed assumens est aliquid. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, non potest divina natura assumere.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod in divinis personalitas dicitur proprietas personalis, quae est triplex, scilicet paternitas, processio et filiatio, ut in prima parte dictum est.

Sed, remotis his per intellectum, adhuc remanet dei omnipotentia, per quam est facta incarnatio, sicut Angelus dixit, Luc. I, non erit impossibile apud deum omne verbum.

Ergo videtur quod, etiam remota personalitate, natura divina possit assumere.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter se habet ad divina uno modo, ut cognoscat deum sicuti est. Et sic impossibile est quod circumscribatur per intellectum aliquid a deo quod aliud remaneat, quia totum quod est in deo est unum, salva distinctione personarum; quarum tamen una tollitur, sublata alia, quia distinguuntur solum relationibus, quas oportet esse simul. Alio modo se habet intellectus ad divina, non quidem quasi cognoscens deum ut est, sed per modum suum, scilicet multipliciter et divisim id quod in deo est unum. Et per hunc modum potest intellectus noster intelligere bonitatem et sapientiam divinam, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur essentialia attributa, non intellecta paternitate vel filiatione, quae dicuntur personalitates. Et secundum hoc, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, possumus adhuc intelligere naturam assumentem.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia in divinis idem est quo est et quod est, quidquid eorum quae attribuuntur deo in abstracto secundum se consideretur, aliis circumscriptis, erit aliquid subsistens, et per consequens persona, cum sit in natura intellectuali. Sicut igitur nunc, positis proprietatibus personalibus in deo, dicimus tres personas, ita, exclusis per intellectum proprietatibus personalibus, remanebit in consideratione nostra natura divina ut subsistens, et ut persona.

Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod assumat naturam humanam ratione suae subsistentiae vel personalitatis.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etiam circumscriptis per intellectum personalitatibus trium personarum, remanebit in intellectu una personalitas dei, ut Iudaei intelligunt, ad quam poterit terminari assumptio, sicut nunc dicimus eam terminari ad personam verbi.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, dicitur nihil remanere per modum resolutionis, quasi aliud sit quod subiicitur relationi, et aliud ipsa relatio, quia quidquid consideratur in deo, consideratur ut suppositum subsistens.

Potest tamen aliquid eorum quae dicuntur de deo intelligi sine alio, non per modum resolutionis, sed per modum iam dictum.