Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.

Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.

Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (Article 3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (Article 3). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.

I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men."

Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).

Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation.

Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius dei debuit assumere naturam humanam abstractam ab omnibus individuis. Assumptio enim naturae humanae facta est ad communem omnium hominum salutem, unde dicitur I Tim. IV, de christo, quod est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium.

Sed natura prout est in individuis, recedit a sua communitate.

Ergo filius dei debuit humanam naturam assumere prout est ab omnibus individuis abstracta.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, in omnibus quod nobilissimum est deo est attribuendum.

Sed in unoquoque genere id quod est per se potissimum est. Ergo filius dei debuit assumere per se hominem.

Quod quidem, secundum Platonicos, est humana natura ab individuis separata.

Hanc ergo debuit filius dei assumere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, natura humana non est assumpta a filio dei prout significatur in concreto per hoc nomen homo, ut dictum est.

Sic autem significatur prout est in singularibus, ut ex dictis patet.

Ergo filius dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est ab individuis separata.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, dei verbum incarnatum neque eam quae nuda contemplatione consideratur naturam assumpsit. Non enim incarnatio hoc, sed deceptio, et fictio incarnationis.

Sed natura humana prout est a singularibus separata vel abstracta, in nuda contemplatione cogitatur, quia secundum seipsam non subsistit, ut idem Damascenus dicit.

Ergo filius dei non assumpsit humanam naturam secundum quod est a singularibus separata.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod natura hominis, vel cuiuscumque alterius rei sensibilis, praeter esse quod in singularibus habet, dupliciter potest intelligi, uno modo, quasi per seipsam esse habeat praeter materiam, sicut Platonici posuerunt; alio modo, sicut in intellectu existens, vel humano vel divino.

Per se quidem subsistere non potest, ut philosophus probat, in VII metaphys., quia ad naturam speciei rerum sensibilium pertinet materia sensibilis, quae ponitur in eius definitione; sicut carnes et ossa in definitione hominis. Unde non potest esse quod natura humana sit praeter materiam sensibilem. Si tamen esset hoc modo subsistens natura humana, non fuisset conveniens ut a verbo dei assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia assumptio ista terminatur ad personam. Hoc autem est contra rationem formae communis, ut sic in persona individuetur. Secundo, quia naturae communi non possunt attribui nisi operationes communes et universales, secundum quas homo nec meretur nec demeretur, cum tamen illa assumptio ad hoc facta sit ut filius dei in natura assumpta nobis mereretur. Tertio quia natura sic existens non est sensibilis, sed intelligibilis.

Filius autem dei assumpsit humanam naturam ut hominibus in ea visibilis appareret, secundum illud baruch III, post haec in terris visus est, et cum hominibus conversatus est.

Similiter etiam non potuit assumi natura humana a filio dei secundum quod est in intellectu divino. Quia sic nihil aliud esset quam natura divina, et per hunc modum, ab aeterno esset in filio dei humana natura. Similiter non convenit dicere quod filius dei assumpserit humanam naturam prout est in intellectu humano. Quia hoc nihil aliud esset quam si intelligeretur assumere naturam humanam. Et sic, si non assumeret eam in rerum natura, esset intellectus falsus.

Nec aliud esset quam fictio quaedam incarnationis, ut Damascenus dicit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius dei incarnatus est communis omnium salvator, non communitate generis vel speciei, quae attribuitur naturae ab individuis separatae, sed communitate causae, prout filius dei incarnatus est universalis causa salutis humanae.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod per se homo non invenitur in rerum natura ita quod sit praeter singularia, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Quamvis quidam dicant quod Plato non intellexit hominem separatum esse nisi in intellectu divino.

Et sic non oportuit quod assumeretur a verbo, cum ab aeterno sibi affuerit.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod natura humana, quamvis non sit assumpta in concreto ut suppositum praeintelligatur assumptioni, sic tamen assumpta est in individuo, quia assumpta est ut sit in individuo.