Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul.

Objection 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (Article 3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.

Objection 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul.

I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.

Reply to Objection 2: The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro christi fuit primo a verbo assumpta quam animae unita.

Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, non carnem christi sine divinitate conceptam in utero virginis antequam susciperetur a verbo.

Sed caro christi videtur prius fuisse concepta quam animae rationali unita, quia materialis dispositio prius est in via generationis quam forma completiva. Ergo prius fuit caro christi assumpta quam animae unita.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, sicut anima est pars naturae humanae, ita et corpus.

Sed anima humana non habuit aliud principium sui esse in christo quam in aliis hominibus, ut patet ex auctoritate leonis Papae supra inducta.

Ergo videtur quod nec corpus christi aliter habuit principium essendi quam in nobis. Sed in nobis ante concipitur caro quam adveniat anima rationalis. Ergo etiam ita fuit in christo. Et sic caro prius fuit a verbo assumpta quam animae unita.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, causa prima plus influit in causatum, et prius unitur ei quam causa secunda.

Sed anima christi comparatur ad verbum sicut causa secunda ad primam. Prius ergo verbum est unitum carni quam anima.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, simul dei verbi caro, simul caro animata, rationalis et intellectualis.

Non ergo unio verbi ad carnem praecessit unionem ad animam.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod caro humana est assumptibilis a verbo secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem sicut ad propriam formam. Hunc autem ordinem non habet antequam anima rationalis ei adveniat, quia simul dum aliqua materia fit propria alicuius formae, recipit illam formam; unde in eodem instanti terminatur alteratio in quo introducitur forma substantialis. Et inde est quod caro non debuit ante assumi quam esset caro humana, quod factum est anima rationali adveniente. Sicut igitur anima non est prius assumpta quam caro, quia contra naturam animae est ut prius sit quam corpori uniatur; ita caro non debuit prius assumi quam anima, quia non prius est caro humana quam habeat animam rationalem.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro humana sortitur esse per animam. Et ideo ante adventum animae non est caro humana, sed potest esse dispositio ad carnem humanam. In conceptione tamen christi spiritus sanctus, qui est agens infinitae virtutis, simul et materiam disposuit et ad perfectum perduxit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod forma actu dat speciem, materia autem, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad speciem. Et ideo contra rationem formae esset quod praeexisteret naturae speciei, quae perficitur per unionem eius ad materiam, non autem est contra naturam materiae quod praeexistat naturae speciei. Et ideo dissimilitudo quae est inter originem nostram et originem christi secundum hoc quod caro nostra prius concipitur quam animetur, non autem caro christi, est secundum id quod praecedit naturae complementum, sicut et quod nos concipimur ex semine viri, non autem christus. Sed differentia quae esset quantum ad originem animae, redundaret in diversitatem naturae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum dei per prius intelligitur unitum carni quam anima per modum communem quo est in ceteris creaturis per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, prius tamen dico, non tempore, sed natura. Prius enim intelligitur caro ut quoddam ens, quod habet a verbo, quam ut animata, quod habet ab anima. Sed unione personali prius secundum intellectum oportet quod caro uniatur animae quam verbo, quia ex unione ad animam habet quod sit unibilis verbo in persona; praesertim quia persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura.