Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.

Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the Divine.

Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from Question 2, Article 2. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge.

I answer that, As said above (Question 5), the Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above (Question 5). And hence the Sixth Council condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation.

Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9.

Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above (Question 3, Articles 1,6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in christo non fuerit aliqua scientia praeter divinam. Ad hoc enim necessaria est scientia ut per eam aliqua cognoscantur. Sed christus per scientiam divinam cognoscebat omnia. Superfluum igitur fuisset quod in eo esset quaedam alia scientia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, lux minor per maiorem offuscatur. Sed omnis scientia creata comparatur ad scientiam dei increatam sicut lux minor ad maiorem. Ergo in christo non refulsit alia scientia quam divina.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, unio humanae naturae ad divinam facta est in persona, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Ponitur autem in christo, secundum quosdam, quaedam scientia unionis, per quam scilicet christus ea quae ad mysterium incarnationis pertinent plenius scivit quam aliquis alius. Cum ergo unio personalis contineat duas naturas, videtur quod in christo non sint duae scientiae, sed una tantum scientia pertinens ad utramque naturam.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de incarnatione, deus in carne perfectionem humanae naturae assumpsit, suscepit sensum hominis, sed non sensum carnis inflatum.

Sed ad sensum hominis pertinet scientia creata. Ergo in eo fuit alia scientia praeter divinam.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, filius dei humanam naturam integram assumpsit, idest, non corpus solum, sed etiam animam; non solum sensitivam, sed etiam rationalem. Et ideo oportuit quod haberet scientiam creatam, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter animae perfectionem. Anima enim, secundum se considerata, est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda, est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; et tamen possibile est in ea scribi, propter intellectum possibilem, in quo est omnia fieri, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Quod autem est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Non autem fuit conveniens ut filius dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam, utpote qua mediante, totum humanum genus erat ad perfectum reducendum. Et ideo oportuit quod anima christi esset perfecta per aliquam scientiam, quae esset proprie perfectio eius. Et ideo oportuit in christo esse aliquam scientiam praeter scientiam divinam. Alioquin anima christi esset imperfectior omnibus animabus aliorum hominum.

Secundo quia, cum quaelibet res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo, frustra haberet christus animam intellectualem, si non intelligeret secundum illam. Quod pertinet ad scientiam creatam. Tertio, quia aliqua scientia creata pertinet ad animae humanae naturam, scilicet illa per quam naturaliter cognoscimus prima principia, scientiam enim hic large accipimus pro qualibet cognitione intellectus humani. Nihil autem naturalium christo defuit, quia totam humanam naturam suscepit, ut supra dictum est.

Et ideo in sexta synodo damnata est positio negantium in christo duas esse scientias, vel duas sapientias.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod christus cognovit omnia per scientiam divinam operatione increata, quae est ipsa dei essentia, dei enim intelligere est sua substantia, ut probatur in XII metaphys..

Unde hic actus non potuit esse animae humanae christi, cum sit alterius naturae. Si igitur non fuisset in anima christi alia scientia praeter divinam, nihil cognovisset. Et ita frustra fuisset assumpta, cum res sit propter suam operationem.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, si duo lumina accipiantur eiusdem ordinis, minus offuscatur per maius, sicut lumen solis offuscat lumen candelae, quorum utrumque accipitur in ordine illuminantis.

Sed si accipiatur maius in ordine illuminantis et minus in ordine illuminati, minus lumen non offuscatur per maius, sed magis augetur, sicut lumen aeris per lumen solis. Et hoc modo lumen scientiae non offuscatur, sed clarescit in anima christi per lumen scientiae divinae, quae est lux vera illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex parte unitorum, ponitur scientia in christo et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad humanam, ita quod per unionem, secundum quam est eadem hypostasis dei et hominis, id quod est dei attribuitur homini, et id quod est hominis attribuitur deo, ut supra dictum est.

Sed ex parte ipsius unionis non potest poni in christo aliqua scientia. Nam unio illa est ad esse personale, scientia autem non convenit personae nisi ratione alicuius naturae.