Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father." Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.

Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word.

Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible.

On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the knowledge of all things."

I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, "because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature.

Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above (Question 9, Article 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.

He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "Now I have made thee know." But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge---which is greater---much more is it given to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.

Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the 1, Question 14, Article 9. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima christi in verbo non cognoscat omnia.

Dicitur enim marci XIII, de die autem illa nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo neque filius, nisi pater.

Non igitur omnia scit in verbo.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quanto aliquis perfectius cognoscit aliquod principium, tanto plura in illo principio cognoscit. Sed deus perfectius videt essentiam suam quam anima christi. Ergo plura cognoscit in verbo quam anima christi. Non ergo anima christi in verbo cognoscit omnia.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum quantitatem scibilium. Si ergo anima christi sciret in verbo omnia quae scit verbum, sequeretur quod scientia animae christi aequaretur scientiae divinae, creatum videlicet increato. Quod est impossibile.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod, super illud Apoc. V, dignus est agnus qui occisus est accipere divinitatem et scientiam, Glossa dicit, idest, omnium cognitionem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an christus cognoscat omnia in verbo, dicendum est quod ly omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie, ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quodcumque tempus. Et sic dicendum est quod anima christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Unusquisque enim intellectus creatus in verbo cognoscit, non quidem omnia simpliciter, sed tanto plura quanto perfectius videt verbum, nulli tamen intellectui beato deest quin cognoscat in verbo omnia quae ad ipsum spectant. Ad christum autem, et ad eius dignitatem, spectant quodammodo omnia, inquantum ei subiecta sunt omnia. Ipse est etiam omnium iudex constitutus a deo, quia filius hominis est, ut dicitur Ioan. V.

Et ideo anima christi in verbo cognoscit omnia existentia secundum quodcumque tempus, et etiam hominum cogitatus, quorum est iudex, ita quod de eo dicitur, Ioan. II, ipse enim sciebat quid esset in homine; quod potest intelligi non solum quantum ad scientiam divinam, sed etiam quantum ad scientiam animae eius quam habet in verbo.

Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum quodcumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non omnia cognoscit in verbo anima christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cognitionem eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima christi in verbo. Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum intellexerunt Arius et eunomius, non quantum ad scientiam animae, quam in christo non ponebant, ut supra dictum est, sed quantum ad divinam cognitionem filii, quem ponebant esse minorem patre quantum ad scientiam. Sed istud stare non potest.

Quia per verbum dei facta sunt omnia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et, inter alia, facta sunt etiam per ipsum omnia tempora. Nihil autem per ipsum factum est quod ab eo ignoretur.

Dicitur ergo nescire diem et horam iudicii, quia non facit scire, interrogatus enim ab apostolis super hoc, Act. I, hoc eis noluit revelare.

Sicut e contrario legitur Gen. XXII, nunc cognovi quod timeas deum, idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Dicitur autem pater scire, eo quod huiusmodi cognitionem tradidit filio.

Unde in hoc ipso quod dicitur, nisi pater, datur intelligi quod filius cognoscat, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, sed etiam quantum ad humanam.

Quia, ut chrysostomus argumentatur, si christo homini datum est ut sciat qualiter oporteat iudicare, quod est maius; multo magis datum est ei scire quod est minus, scilicet tempus iudicii.

Origenes tamen hoc exponit de christo secundum corpus eius, quod est ecclesia, quae hoc ipsum tempus ignorat.

Quidam autem dicunt hoc esse intelligendum de filio dei adoptivo, non de naturali.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod deus perfectius cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, quae dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo habitum est.

Scit ergo anima christi omnia quae deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae. Et ita plura scit deus in seipso quam anima christi.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas scientiae non solum attenditur secundum numerum scibilium, sed etiam secundum claritatem cognitionis. Quamvis igitur scientia animae christi quam habet in verbo, parificetur scientiae visionis quam deus habet in seipso quantum ad numerum scibilium; scientia tamen dei excedit in infinitum, quantum ad claritatem cognitionis, scientiam animae christi. Quia lumen increatum divini intellectus in infinitum excedit lumen creatum quodcumque receptum in anima christi, non solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam quantum ad numerum scibilium, ut dictum est.