Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color. Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He did not know separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know singulars.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that "the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him ," under which are included all that may be known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge , the knowledge of all practical things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ had the knowledge of all things.

I answer that, As was said above (Question 9, Article 1), it was fitting that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man's active intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above (Question 10).

Reply to Objection 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know separate substances by itself, as was said in the 1, Question 89, Articles 1,2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in the same way that a separated soul could.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things---present, past, and future.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum hanc scientiam christus non cognoverit omnia. Haec enim scientia indita est christo ad perfectionem potentiae intellectus eius. Sed intellectus possibilis animae humanae non videtur esse in potentia ad omnia simpliciter, sed ad illa sola in quae potest reduci in actum per intellectum agentem, qui est proprium activum ipsius, quae quidem sunt cognoscibilia secundum rationem naturalem. Ergo secundum hanc scientiam non cognovit ea quae naturalem rationem excedunt.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, phantasmata se habent ad intellectum humanum sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Sed non pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis visivae cognoscere ea quae sunt omnino absque colore.

Ergo neque ad perfectionem intellectus humani pertinet cognoscere ea quorum non possunt esse phantasmata, sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Sic igitur, cum huiusmodi scientia fuerit in christo ad perfectionem animae intellectivae ipsius, videtur quod per huiusmodi scientiam non cognoverit substantias separatas.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, ad perfectionem intellectus non pertinet cognoscere singularia. Videtur igitur quod per huiusmodi scientiam anima christi non cognoverit singularia.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, quod replebit eum spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, scientiae et consilii, sub quibus comprehenduntur omnia cognoscibilia. Nam ad sapientiam pertinet cognitio divinorum omnium; ad intellectum autem pertinet cognitio omnium immaterialium; ad scientiam autem pertinet cognitio omnium conclusionum; ad consilium autem cognitio omnium agibilium. Ergo videtur quod christus, secundum scientiam sibi inditam per spiritum sanctum, habuerit omnium cognitionem.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut prius dictum est, conveniens fuit ut anima christo per omnia esset perfecta, per hoc quod omnis eius potentialitas sit reducta ad actum. Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva, una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura.

Utraque autem potentia animae christi fuit reducta in actum secundum hanc scientiam divinitus inditam. Et ideo secundum eam anima christi primo quidem cognovit quaecumque ab homine cognosci possunt per virtutem luminis intellectus agentis, sicut sunt quaecumque pertinent ad scientias humanas. Secundo vero per hanc scientiam cognovit christus omnia illa quae per revelationem divinam hominibus innotescunt, sive pertineant ad donum sapientiae, sive ad donum prophetiae, sive ad quodcumque donum spiritus sancti. Omnia enim ista abundantius et plenius ceteris cognovit anima christi. Ipsam tamen dei essentiam per hanc scientiam non cognovit, sed solum per primam, de qua supra dictum est.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de actione naturali animae intellectivae, quae scilicet est per comparationem ad agens naturale, quod est intellectus agens.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod anima humana in statu huius vitae, quando quodammodo est ad corpus obligata, ut sine phantasmate intelligere non possit, non potest intelligere substantias separatas. Sed post statum huius vitae, anima separata poterit aliqualiter substantias separatas per seipsam cognoscere, ut in prima parte dictum est.

Et hoc praecipue manifestum est circa animas beatorum. Christus autem, ante passionem, non solum fuit viator, sed etiam comprehensor. Unde anima eius poterat cognoscere substantias separatas, per modum quo cognoscit anima separata.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio singularium non pertinet ad perfectionem animae intellectivae secundum cognitionem speculativam, pertinet tamen ad perfectionem eius secundum cognitionem practicam, quae non perficitur absque cognitione singularium, in quibus est operatio, ut dicitur in VI ethic..

Unde ad prudentiam requiritur memoria praeteritorum, cognitio praesentium, et providentia futurorum, ut tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica.

Quia igitur christus habuit plenitudinem prudentiae, secundum donum consilii, consequens est quod cognovit omnia singularia praeterita, praesentia et futura.