Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. For it has been said (Question 9, Article 1) that the highest perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since Christ knew all things, as was said Question 10, Article 2, He could not have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to Him---which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew.

Objection 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower. But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.

On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about was univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same species as ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 4), the mode of the knowledge impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it. For the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now the connatural mode of the human soul is that it should understand sometimes actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a pure power and a completed act is a habit: and extremes and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it is the connatural mode of the human soul to receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He could use it when He pleased.

Reply to Objection 1: In Christ's soul there was a twofold knowledge---each most perfect of its kind: the first exceeding the mode of human nature, as by it He saw the Essence of God, and other things in It, and this was the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge habitual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this way. But the second knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He knew things by species divinely imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now this knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus of human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be always in act.

Reply to Objection 2: Habits are reduced to act by the command of the will, since a habit is that "with which we act when we wish." Now the will is indeterminate in regard to infinite things. Yet it is not useless, even when it does not actually tend to all; provided it actually tends to everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is a habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act; provided that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to act according as the matter in hand and the time require.

Reply to Objection 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First, simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and goodness, is a good and a being; secondly, being and goodness are taken relatively, and in this way an accident is a being and a good, not that it has being and goodness, but that its subject is a being and a good. And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better or more excellent than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole goodness of habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the subject.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in christo non fuerit habitualis scientia.

Dictum est enim quod animam christi decuit maxima perfectio. Sed maior est perfectio scientiae existentis in actu quam praeexistentis in habitu. Ergo conveniens fuisse videtur quod omnia sciret in actu. Ergo non habuit habitualem scientiam.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, cum habitus ordinetur ad actum, frustra videtur esse habitualis scientia quae nunquam in actum reducitur. Cum autem christus sciverit omnia, sicut iam dictum est, non potuisset omnia illa actu considerare unum post aliud cognoscendo, quia infinita non est enumerando pertransire. Frustra ergo fuisset in eo scientia habitualis, quod est inconveniens. Habuit igitur actualem scientiam omnium quae scivit, et non habitualem.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, scientia habitualis est quaedam perfectio scientis.

Perfectio autem est nobilior perfectibili. Si igitur in anima christi fuit aliquis habitus scientiae creatus, sequeretur quod aliquid creatum esset nobilius anima christi. Non igitur in anima christi fuit scientia habitualis.

Sed Contra

Sed contra, scientia christi de qua nunc loquimur, univoca fuit scientiae nostrae, sicut et anima eius fuit unius speciei cum anima nostra. Sed scientia nostra est in genere habitus. Ergo et scientia christi fuit habitualis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, modus huius scientiae inditae animae christi fuit conveniens ipsi subiecto recipienti, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis.

Est autem hic modus connaturalis animae humanae, ut quandoque sit intellectus actu, quandoque in potentia. Medium autem inter puram potentiam et actum completum est habitus. Eiusdem autem generis est medium et extrema. Et sic patet quod modus connaturalis animae humanae est ut recipiat scientiam per modum habitus. Et ideo dicendum est quod scientia indita animae christi fuit habitualis, poterat enim ea uti quando volebat.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima christi fuit duplex cognitio, et utraque suo modo perfectissima. Una quidem excedens modum naturae humanae, qua scilicet vidit dei essentiam et alia in ipsa. Et haec fuit perfectissima simpliciter. Et talis cognitio non fuit habitualis, sed actualis respectu omnium quae hoc modo cognovit. Alia autem cognitio fuit in christo secundum modum proportionatum humanae naturae, prout scilicet cognovit res per species sibi divinitus inditas, de qua cognitione nunc loquimur.

Et haec cognitio non fuit simpliciter perfectissima, sed perfectissima in genere humanae cognitionis. Unde non oportuit quod semper esset in actu.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus reducitur in actum ad imperium voluntatis, nam habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit.

Voluntas autem se habet ad infinita indeterminate. Et tamen hoc non est frustra, licet non in omnia actualiter tendat, dummodo tendat actualiter in id quod convenit loco et tempori. Et ideo etiam habitus non est frustra, licet non omnia reducantur in actum quae habitui subiacent, dummodo reducatur in actum id quod congruit ad debitum finem voluntatis secundum exigentiam negotiorum et temporis.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum et ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, simpliciter. Et sic bonum et ens dicitur substantia, quae in suo esse et in sua bonitate subsistit. Alio modo dicitur ens et bonum secundum quid. Et hoc modo dicitur ens accidens, non quia ipsum habeat esse et bonitatem, sed quia eo subiectum est ens et bonum. Sic igitur scientia habitualis non est simpliciter melior aut dignior quam anima christi, sed secundum quid, nam tota bonitas habitualis scientiae cedit in bonitatem subiecti.