Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor.

Objection 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that "upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of incorruption." Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor.

Objection 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?"

I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend "; and Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend ". Now man's perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the 1.2, Question 4, Article 6. In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body "will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption," as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (Article 4; Question 14, Articles 1,2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect---as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know.

Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister "organically" to beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.

Articulus 10

Argumentum 1

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod christus non fuerit simul viator et comprehensor. Viatori enim competit moveri ad finem beatitudinis, comprehensori autem competit in fine quiescere. Sed non potest simul eidem convenire quod moveatur ad finem, et quod quiescat in fine. Ergo non potuit simul esse quod christus esset viator et comprehensor.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, moveri ad beatitudinem, aut eam obtinere, non competit homini secundum corpus, sed secundum animam.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad dioscorum, quod ad inferiorem naturam, quae est corpus, redundat ab anima non beatitudo, quae propria est fruentis et intelligentis.

Sed christus, licet haberet corpus passibile, tamen secundum mentem plene deo fruebatur. Non ergo christus fuit viator, sed purus comprehensor.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, sancti, quorum animae sunt in caelo et corpora in sepulcris, fruuntur quidem beatitudine secundum animam, quamvis eorum corpora morti subiaceant, et tamen non dicuntur viatores, sed solum comprehensores. Ergo, pari ratione, licet corpus christi fuerit mortale, quia tamen mens eius deo fruebatur, videtur quod fuerit purus comprehensor, et nullo modo viator.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XIV, quasi colonus futurus es in terra, et quasi viator declinans ad manendum.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis dicitur viator ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem, comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc quod iam beatitudinem obtinet, secundum illud I Cor. IX, sic currite ut comprehendatis; et philipp. III, sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam.

Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus resurget spirituale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione, ut dicitur I Cor. XV.

Christus autem, ante passionem, secundum mentem plene videbat deum, et sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Sed quantum ad alia deerat ei beatitudo, quia et anima eius erat passibilis, et corpus passibile et mortale, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Et ideo simul erat comprehensor, inquantum habebat beatitudinem animae propriam, et simul viator, inquantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod impossibile est moveri ad finem et quiescere in fine secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa nihil prohibet hoc, sicut aliquis homo simul est sciens quantum ad ea quae iam novit, et addiscens quantum ad ea quae nondum novit.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo principaliter et proprie consistit in anima secundum mentem, secundario tamen, et quasi instrumentaliter, requiruntur ad beatitudinem corporis bona; sicut philosophus dicit, in I ethic., quod exteriora bona organice deserviunt beatitudini.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de animabus sanctorum defunctorum et de christo, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia animae sanctorum non sunt passibiles, sicut fuit anima christi. Secundo, quia corpora non agunt aliquid per quod in beatitudinem tendant, sicut christus, secundum corporis passiones, in beatitudinem tendebat quantum ad gloriam corporis.