Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can nowise be said of God.

Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."

I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be anathema" . But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord." Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says : "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone---let him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is said."

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus it is said: "God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?"

Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.

Articulus 4

Argumentum 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae sunt humanae naturae, de deo dici non possint. Impossibile est enim opposita de eodem praedicari. Sed ea quae sunt humanae naturae, sunt contraria his quae sunt propria dei, deus enim est increatus, immutabilis et aeternus; ad humanam autem naturam pertinet ut sit creata, temporalis et mutabilis. Non ergo ea quae sunt naturae humanae, possunt dici de deo.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, attribuere deo ea quae ad defectum pertinent, videtur derogare divino honori, et ad blasphemiam pertinere. Sed ea quae sunt humanae naturae, defectum quendam continent, sicut mori, pati, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, possint dici de deo.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, assumi convenit humanae naturae.

Non autem hoc convenit deo. Non ergo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, de deo dici possunt.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod deus suscepit ea quae sunt carnis idiomata, idest proprietates, dum deus passibilis nominatur, et deus gloriae crucifixus est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod de hac quaestione diversitas fuit inter Nestorianos et catholicos.

Nestoriani enim voces quae dicuntur de christo dividere volebant hoc modo, ut ea quae pertinent ad humanam naturam, non dicerentur de deo; nec ea quae pertinent ad divinam naturam, dicerentur de homine.

Unde Nestorius dixit, si quis dei verbo passiones tentat tribuere, anathema sit.

Si qua vero nomina sunt quae pertinere possunt ad utramque naturam, de talibus praedicabant ea quae sunt utriusque naturae, sicut hoc nomen christus, vel dominus. Unde concedebant christum esse natum de virgine, et fuisse ab aeterno, non tamen concedebant vel deum natum de virgine, vel hominem ab aeterno fuisse.

Catholici vero posuerunt huiusmodi quae dicuntur de christo, sive secundum divinam naturam sive secundum humanam, dici posse tam de deo quam de homine.

Unde Cyrillus dixit, si quis duabus personis seu substantiis, idest hypostasibus, eas quae in evangelicis et apostolicis sunt conscriptionibus dividit voces, vel ea quae de christo a sanctis dicuntur, vel ab ipso christo de semetipso; et aliquas quidem ex his homini applicandas crediderit, aliquas soli verbo deputaverit, anathema sit.

Et huius ratio est quia, cum sit eadem hypostasis utriusque naturae, eadem hypostasis supponitur nomine utriusque naturae. Sive ergo dicatur homo, sive deus, supponitur hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae. Et ideo de homine dici possunt ea quae sunt divinae naturae, et de deo possunt dici ea quae sunt humanae naturae. Sciendum tamen quod in propositione in qua aliquid de aliquo praedicatur, non solum attenditur quid sit illud de quo praedicatur praedicatum, sed etiam secundum quid de illo praedicetur. Quamvis igitur non distinguantur ea quae praedicantur de christo, distinguuntur tamen quantum ad id secundum quod utrumque praedicatur. Nam ea quae sunt divinae naturae, praedicantur de christo secundum divinam naturam, ea autem quae sunt humanae naturae, praedicantur de eo secundum humanam naturam.

Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., distinguamus quod in Scripturis sonat secundum formam dei et quod secundum formam servi.

Et infra, quid propter quid, et quid secundum quid dicatur, prudens et diligens et pius lector intelligit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opposita praedicari de eodem secundum idem est impossibile, sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet. Et hoc modo opposita praedicantur de christo, non secundum idem, sed secundum diversas naturas.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, si ea quae ad defectum pertinent deo attribuantur secundum divinam naturam, esset blasphemia, quasi pertinens ad diminutionem honoris ipsius, non autem pertinet ad dei iniuriam si attribuantur ei secundum naturam assumptam.

Unde in quodam sermone ephesini Concilii dicitur, nihil putat deus iniuriam quod est occasio salutis hominibus, nihil enim abiectorum quae elegit propter nos, iniuriam facit illi naturae quae non potest esse subiecta iniuriis, propria vero facit inferiora ut salvet naturam nostram. Quando ergo quae abiecta et vilia sunt dei naturam non iniuriantur, sed salutem hominibus operantur, quomodo dicis ea quae causa nostrae salutis sunt, iniuriae occasionem deo fuisse?

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod assumi convenit humanae naturae non ratione suppositi, sed ratione sui ipsius.

Et ideo non convenit deo.