Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God." For it is written (Rm. 1:2,3): "Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh." Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was this assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this assumption this is true: "God was made man." Therefore, in like manner, this is true: "Man was made God."

Objection 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it." Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that "Man was made God."

Objection 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word "man" signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which the making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is truer than "God was made man."

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not say that man was deified, but that God was humanized." Now to be made God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made God."

I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said (Articles 8,9). And in the same sense this is false: "God was made man." But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word "made" determines the composition, with this meaning: "Man was made God, i.e. it was brought about that Man is God." And in this sense both are true, viz. that "Man was made God" and that "God was made Man." But this is not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that "man" has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although "this man" was not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle "made" attaches making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Question 2, Articles 2,3), this proposition is false, because, when it is said, "Man was made God," "man" has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God, and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who" which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed of David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God---and it is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning---that the "Son of God was made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say "the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God."

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is the same as to be made God.

Reply to Objection 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e. for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally, i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was made God," the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that "God was made Man," the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: "God was made Man," and this is false: "Man was made God"; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: "This man was made white today," and this would be false; "This white thing was made man today." Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making, e.g. if it were said that "human nature was made the Son of God's."

Articulus 7

Argumentum 1

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit vera, homo factus est deus.

Dicitur enim Rom. I, quod ante promiserat per prophetas suos in Scripturis sanctis de filio suo, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem.

Sed christus secundum quod homo est ex semine David secundum carnem. Ergo homo factus est filius dei.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., talis erat illa susceptio quae deum hominem faceret, et hominem deum.

Sed ratione illius susceptionis haec est vera, deus factus est homo. Ergo similiter haec est vera, homo factus est deus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad chelidonium, deus quidem humanatus est, homo autem deificatus, vel quomodolibet aliter nominaverit.

Sed deus ea ratione dicitur humanatus, quia est homo factus.

Ergo homo ea ratione dicitur deificatus, quia est factus deus.

Et ita haec est vera, homo factus est deus.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, cum dicitur, deus factus est homo, subiectum factionis vel unitionis non est deus, sed humana natura, quam significat hoc nomen homo. Sed illud videtur esse subiectum factionis cui factio attribuitur. Ergo haec magis est vera, homo factus est deus, quam ista, deus factus est homo.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, non hominem deificatum dicimus, sed deum humanatum.

Idem autem est fieri deum quod deificari.

Ergo haec est falsa, homo factus est deus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod propositio ista, homo factus est deus, tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod hoc participium factus determinet absolute vel subiectum, vel praedicatum. Et in hoc sensu est falsa, quia neque homo ille de quo praedicatur est factus, neque deus est factus, ut infra dicetur.

Et sub eodem sensu haec est falsa, deus factus est homo. Sed sub hoc sensu non quaeritur hic de istis propositionibus. Alio modo potest intelligi ut ly factus determinet compositionem, ut sit sensus, homo factus est deus, idest, factum est ut homo sit deus.

Et sub hoc sensu utraque est vera, et, homo factus est deus, et, deus factus est homo. Sed hic non est proprius sensus harum locutionum, nisi forte intelligatur quod ly homo non habeat personalem suppositionem, sed simplicem. Licet enim hic homo non sit factus deus, quia hoc suppositum, persona filii dei, ab aeterno fuit deus, tamen homo, communiter loquendo, non semper fuit deus. Tertio modo, proprie intelligitur, secundum quod hoc participium factus ponit fieri circa hominem in respectu ad deum sicut ad terminum factionis. Et in hoc sensu, supposito quod in christo sit eadem persona et hypostasis et suppositum dei et hominis, ut supra ostensum est, ista propositio falsa est. Quia cum dicitur, homo factus est deus, ly homo habet personalem suppositionem, non enim esse deum verificatur de homine ratione humanae naturae, sed ratione sui suppositi. Suppositum autem illud humanae naturae de quo verificatur esse deum, est idem quod hypostasis seu persona filii dei, quae semper fuit deus. Unde non potest dici quod iste homo incoepit esse deus, vel quod fiat deus, aut quod factus sit deus.

Si vero esset alia persona vel hypostasis dei et hominis, ita quod esse deum praedicaretur de homine, et e converso per quandam coniunctionem suppositorum, vel dignitatis personalis, vel affectionis, vel inhabitationis, ut Nestoriani dixerunt, tunc pari ratione posset dici quod homo factus est deus, idest coniunctus deo, sicut et quod deus factus est homo, idest coniunctus homini.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in verbis illis apostoli hoc relativum qui, quod refert pro persona filii, non debet intelligi ex parte praedicati, quasi aliquis existens ex semine David secundum carnem sit factus filius dei, in quo sensu obiectio procedebat, sed debet intelligi ex parte subiecti, ut sit sensus quod filius dei factus est ei, (scilicet ad honorem patris, ut Glossa exponit) existens ex semine David secundum carnem; ac si diceret, filius dei habens carnem ex semine David ad honorem dei.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum in illo sensu, secundum quod ex illa susceptione incarnationis factum est ut homo esset deus et deus esset homo.

In quo sensu ambae locutiones sunt verae, ut dictum est.

Ad 3

Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium, nam deificari idem est quod fieri deum.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod terminus in subiecto positus tenetur materialiter, idest pro supposito, positus vero in praedicato, tenetur formaliter, idest pro natura significata. Et ideo cum dicitur, homo factus est deus, ipsum fieri non attribuitur humanae naturae, sed supposito humanae naturae, quod est ab aeterno deus, et ideo non convenit ei fieri deum. Cum autem dicitur, deus factus est homo, factio intelligitur terminari ad ipsam humanam naturam. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, haec est vera, deus factus est homo, sed haec est falsa, homo factus est deus. Sicut, si socrates, cum prius fuerit homo, postea factus est albus, demonstrato socrate, haec est vera, hic homo hodie factus est albus; haec tamen est falsa, hoc album hodie factum est homo. Si tamen ex parte subiecti poneretur aliquod nomen significans naturam humanam in abstracto, posset hoc modo significari ut subiectum factionis, puta si dicatur quod natura humana facta est filii dei.