Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz. the Divine.

Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.

Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect," i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will.

On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done." And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he says: "His will, He refers to the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal."

I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since "the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho .

And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations." And this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Question 5; Question 9, Article 1). Now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the 1, Questions 79,80. Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the 1, Question 19, Article 1. Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh" in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the 1, Question 105, Article 4. And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?"

Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power---which is also called will---is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the 1.2, Question 10, Articles 1,2 . And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in christo non sint duae voluntates, una divina et alia humana. Voluntas enim est primum movens et imperans in unoquoque volente. Sed in christo primum movens et imperans fuit voluntas divina, quia omnia humana in christo movebantur secundum voluntatem divinam. Ergo videtur quod in christo non fuerit nisi una voluntas, scilicet divina.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, instrumentum non movetur propria voluntate, sed voluntate moventis. Sed natura humana in christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius.

Ergo natura humana in christo non movebatur propria voluntate, sed divina.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, illud solum multiplicatur in christo quod pertinet ad naturam. Voluntas autem non videtur ad naturam pertinere, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, sunt ex necessitate; quod autem est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Ergo voluntas est una tantum in christo.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod aliqualiter velle non est naturae, sed nostrae intelligentiae scilicet personalis. Sed omnis voluntas est aliqualis voluntas, quia non est in genere quod non est in aliqua eius specie.

Ergo omnis voluntas ad personam pertinet. Sed in christo fuit tantum et est una persona. Ergo in christo est tantum una voluntas.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. XXII, pater, si vis, transfer calicem istum a me. Veruntamen non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat.

Quod inducens Ambrosius, in libro ad Gratianum imperatorem, dicit, sicut susceperat voluntatem meam, suscepit tristitiam meam.

Et, super Lucam, dicit, voluntatem suam ad hominem retulit, patris, ad divinitatem.

Voluntas enim hominis est temporalis, voluntas divinitatis aeterna.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in christo esse unam solam voluntatem, sed ad hoc ponendum diversimode moti esse videntur. Apollinaris enim non posuit animam intellectualem in christo, sed quod verbum esset loco animae, vel etiam loco intellectus. Unde, cum voluntas sit in ratione, ut philosophus dicit, in III de anima, sequebatur quod in christo non esset voluntas humana, et ita in eo non esset nisi una voluntas.

Et similiter eutyches, et omnes qui posuerunt unam naturam compositam in christo, cogebantur ponere unam voluntatem in eo.

Nestorius etiam, qui posuit unionem dei et hominis esse factam solum secundum affectum et voluntatem, posuit unam voluntatem in christo.

Postmodum vero Macarius Antiochenus patriarcha, et Cyrus Alexandrinus, et sergius Constantinopolitanus, et quidam eorum sequaces, posuerunt in christo unam voluntatem, quamvis ponerent duas naturas in christo secundum hypostasim unitas, quia opinabantur quod humana natura in christo nunquam movebatur proprio motu, sed solum secundum quod erat mota a divinitate, ut patet in epistola synodica Agathonis Papae. Et ideo in sexta synodo, apud constantinopolim celebrata, determinatum est oportere dici quod in christo sint duae voluntates, ubi sic legitur, iuxta quod olim prophetae de christo, et ipse nos erudivit, et sanctorum patrum nobis tradidit symbolum, duas voluntates naturales in eo, et duas naturales operationes praedicamus.

Et hoc necessarium fuit dici. Manifestum est enim quod filius dei assumpsit humanam naturam perfectam, ut supra ostensum est.

Ad perfectionem autem humanae naturae pertinet voluntas, quae est naturalis eius potentia, sicut et intellectus, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt.

Unde necesse est dicere quod filius dei humanam voluntatem assumpserit in natura humana. Per assumptionem autem humanae naturae nullam diminutionem passus est filius dei in his quae pertinent ad divinam naturam, cui competit voluntatem habere, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde necesse est dicere quod in christo sint duae voluntates, una scilicet divina et alia humana.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidquid fuit in humana natura christi, movebatur nutu divinae voluntatis, non tamen sequitur quod in christo non fuerit motus voluntatis proprius naturae humanae. Quia etiam aliorum sanctorum piae voluntates moventur secundum voluntatem dei, quae operatur in eis et velle et perficere, ut dicitur philipp. II.

Licet enim voluntas non possit interius moveri ab aliqua creatura, interius tamen movetur a deo, ut in prima parte dictum est.

Et sic etiam christus secundum voluntatem humanam sequebatur voluntatem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, deus meus, volui.

Unde Augustinus dicit, contra maximinum, ubi dixit filius patri, non quod ego volo, sed quod tu vis, quid te adiuvat quod tua verba subiungis, et dicis, ostendit vere suam voluntatem subiectam suo genitori, quasi nos negemus hominis voluntatem voluntati dei debere esse subiectam?

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod proprium est instrumenti quod moveatur a principali agente, diversimode tamen, secundum proprietatem naturae ipsius. Nam instrumentum inanimatum, sicut securis aut serra, movetur ab artifice per motum solum corporalem. Instrumentum vero animatum anima sensibili movetur per appetitum sensitivum, sicut equus a sessore. Instrumentum vero animatum anima rationali movetur per voluntatem eius, sicut per imperium domini movetur servus ad aliquid agendum, qui quidem servus est sicut instrumentum animatum, ut philosophus dicit, in I politic..

Sic ergo natura humana in christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis ut moveretur per propriam voluntatem.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa potentia voluntatis est naturalis, et consequitur naturam ex necessitate. Sed motus vel actus potentiae, qui etiam voluntas dicitur, quandoque quidem est naturalis et necessarius, puta respectu felicitatis; quandoque autem ex libero arbitrio rationis proveniens, et non necessarius neque naturalis; sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt.

Et tamen etiam ipsa ratio, quae est principium huius motus, est naturalis.

Et ideo, praeter voluntatem divinam, oportet in christo ponere voluntatem humanam, non solum prout est potentia naturalis, aut prout est motus naturalis, sed etiam prout est motus rationalis.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod dicitur aliqualiter velle, designatur determinatus modus volendi.

Determinatus autem modus ponitur circa ipsam rem cuius est modus.

Unde, cum voluntas pertineat ad naturam, ipsum etiam quod est aliqualiter velle, pertinet ad naturam, non secundum quod est absolute considerata, sed secundum quod est in tali hypostasi.

Unde etiam voluntas humana christi habuit quendam determinatum modum ex eo quod fuit in hypostasi divina, ut scilicet moveretur semper secundum nutum divinae voluntatis.