Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father." But Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration.

Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above (Question 19, Article 1), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.

Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is given to His Godhead.

On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council : "If anyone say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema."

I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety: for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger.

The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on account of its excellence, as stated in the 2.2, Question 103, Article 1. If therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue.

Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created knowledge.

But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking, several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For it is written in the chapters of Cyril : "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema."

Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored, but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and only one to Christ, but in a different way.

Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not two adorations, but two causes of adoration.

Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in him . But since Christ's soul is united to a Person of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby diminished, but rather increased, as stated above (Question 2, Article 2, ad 2).

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non eadem adoratione adoranda sit humanitas christi et eius divinitas. Divinitas enim christi est adoranda, quae est communis patri et filio, unde dicitur Ioan. V, omnes honorificent filium sicut honorificant patrem.

Sed humanitas christi non est communis ei et patri. Ergo non eadem adoratione adoranda est humanitas christi et eius divinitas.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, honor est proprie praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit, in IV ethic..

Meretur autem virtus praemium suum per actum. Cum igitur in christo sit alia operatio divinae et humanae naturae, ut supra habitum est, videtur quod alio honore sit adoranda humanitas christi, et alio eius divinitas.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, anima christi, si non esset verbo unita, esset veneranda propter excellentiam sapientiae et gratiae quam habet.

Sed nihil dignitatis est ei subtractum per hoc quod est unita verbo. Ergo natura humana est quadam propria veneratione adoranda, praeter venerationem quae exhibetur divinitati ipsius.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod in capitulis quintae synodi sic legitur, si quis in duabus naturis adorari dicit christum, ex quo duae adorationes introducuntur, sed non una adoratione deum verbum incarnatum cum propria ipsius carne adorat, sicut ab initio dei ecclesiae traditum est, talis anathema sit.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod in eo qui honoratur, duo possumus considerare, scilicet eum cui honor exhibetur, et causam honoris.

Proprie autem honor exhibetur toti rei subsistenti, non enim dicimus quod manus hominis honoretur, sed quod homo honoretur.

Et si quandoque contingat quod dicatur honorari manus vel pes alicuius, hoc non dicitur ea ratione quod huiusmodi partes secundum se honorentur, sed quia in istis partibus honoratur totum. Per quem etiam modum aliquis homo potest honorari in aliquo exteriori, puta in veste, aut in imagine, aut in nuntio.

Causa autem honoris est id ex quo ille qui honoratur habet aliquam excellentiam, nam honor est reverentia alicui exhibita propter sui excellentiam, ut in secunda parte dictum est.

Et ideo, si in uno homine sunt plures causae honoris, puta praelatio, scientia et virtus, erit quidem illius hominis unus honor ex parte eius qui honoratur, plures tamen secundum causas honoris, homo enim est qui honoratur et propter scientiam, et propter virtutem. Cum igitur in christo una sit tantum persona divinae et humanae naturae, et etiam una hypostasis et unum suppositum, est quidem una eius adoratio et unus honor ex parte eius qui adoratur, sed ex parte causae qua honoratur, possunt dici esse plures adorationes, ut scilicet alio honore honoretur propter sapientiam increatam, et propter sapientiam creatam.

Si autem ponerentur in christo plures personae seu hypostases, sequeretur quod simpliciter essent plures adorationes. Et hoc est quod in synodis reprobatur.

Dicitur enim in capitulis Cyrilli, si quis audet dicere assumptum hominem coadorari oportere deo verbo, quasi alterum alteri, et non magis una adoratione honorificat emmanuelem, secundum quod factum est caro verbum, anathema sit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in trinitate sunt tres qui honorantur, sed una est causa honoris. In mysterio autem incarnationis est e converso. Et ideo alio modo est unus honor trinitatis, et alio modo est unus honor christi.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod operatio non est quae honoratur, sed est ratio honoris. Et ideo per hoc quod in christo sunt duae operationes, non ostenditur quod sint duae adorationes, sed quod sint duae adorationis causae.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod anima christi, si non esset unita dei verbo esset id quod est principalissimum in homine illo. Et ideo sibi praecipue deberetur honor, quia homo est quod est potissimum in eo.

Sed quia anima christi est unita personae digniori, illi personae praecipue debetur honor cui anima christi unitur. Nec per hoc tamen diminuitur dignitas animae christi, sed augetur ut supra dictum est.