Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant of his creation, as was shown in the 1, Question 63, Article 5. Therefore neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its creation---that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.

Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the 1.2, Question 109, Article 5; 1.2, Question 114, Article 2. Therefore it seems that the use of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His conception, was not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Augustine says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul of Christ." But increase of merit would have been possible had He not merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ merited in the first instant of His conception.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of, not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church. The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself, than that which is by another" . Since, therefore, the sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement, indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit in the first instant of His conception.

Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside nature is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which is beside nature is an exception to nature." Therefore the free-will of a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature be unimpaired.

Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness, said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion xl).

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality, which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not, indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so that it was due to Him from more causes than before.

Articulus 3

Argumentum 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri non potuerit. Sicut enim se habet liberum arbitrium ad merendum, ita ad demerendum. Sed diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis non potuit peccare, ut in prima parte habitum est.

Ergo neque anima christi in primo instanti suae creationis, quod fuit primum instans conceptionis christi, potuit mereri.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, illud quod homo habet in primo instanti suae conceptionis, videtur ei esse naturale, quia hoc est ad quod terminatur sua generatio naturalis. Sed naturalibus non meremur, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in secunda parte.

Ergo videtur quod usus liberi arbitrii quem christus habuit secundum hominem in primo instanti suae conceptionis, non fuerit meritorius.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, illud quod semel aliquis meruit, iam facit quodammodo suum, et ita non videtur quod iterum possit illud idem mereri, quia nullus meretur quod suum est. Si ergo christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit, sequitur quod postea nihil meruerit. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Exod., non habuit omnino christus, iuxta animae meritum, quo potuisset proficere.

Potuisset autem proficere in merito si in primo instanti suae conceptionis non meruisset. Ergo in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit christus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, christus in primo instanti conceptionis suae sanctificatus fuit per gratiam.

Est autem duplex sanctificatio, una quidem adultorum, qui secundum proprium actum sanctificantur; alia autem puerorum, qui non sanctificantur secundum proprium actum fidei, sed secundum fidem parentum vel ecclesiae. Prima autem sanctificatio est perfectior quam secunda, sicut actus est perfectior quam habitus; et quod est per se, eo quod est per aliud.

Cum ergo sanctificatio christi fuerit perfectissima, quia sic sanctificatus est ut esset aliorum sanctificator; consequens est quod ipse secundum proprium motum liberi arbitrii in deum fuerit sanctificatus. Qui quidem motus liberi arbitrii est meritorius. Unde consequens est quod in primo instanti suae conceptionis christus meruerit.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liberum arbitrium non eodem modo se habet ad bonum et ad malum, nam ad bonum se habet per se et naturaliter; ad malum autem se habet per modum defectus, et praeter naturam.

Sicut autem philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, posterius est quod est praeter naturam, eo quod est secundum naturam, quia id quod est praeter naturam, est quaedam excisio ab eo quod est secundum naturam.

Et ideo liberum arbitrium creaturae in primo instanti creationis potest moveri ad bonum merendo, non autem ad malum peccando, si tamen natura sit integra.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod homo habet in principio suae creationis secundum communem naturae cursum, est homini naturale, nihil tamen prohibet quin aliqua creatura in principio suae creationis aliquod beneficium gratiae a deo consequatur. Et hoc modo anima christi in principio suae creationis consecuta est gratiam, qua posset mereri. Et ea ratione gratia illa, secundum quandam similitudinem, dicitur fuisse illi homini naturalis, ut patet per Augustinum, in enchirid..

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem esse alicuius ex diversis causis. Et secundum hoc, christus gloriam immortalitatis, quam meruit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, potuit etiam posterioribus actibus et passionibus mereri, non quidem ut esset sibi magis debita; sed ut sibi ex pluribus causis deberetur.