Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ's Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest.

Objection 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam's pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ's in the Passion.

Objection 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest of all.

Objection 5: Further, the victim's innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ's Passion was not the greatest.

Objection 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ's conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man's salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains.

On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ's Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow."

I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by Christ (Question 15, Articles 5,6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed "sadness." And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (Article 5) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts---to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): "The words of my sins." Secondly, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.

The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness.

Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).

Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.

From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain was the very greatest.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced---namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the 1.2, Question 64, Article 2, moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)---namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation." And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ's case, as stated above (cf. Question 14, Article 1, ad 2; Question 45, Article 2).

Reply to Objection 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul. But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned. so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ's.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our sorrows." But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: "I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies."

Reply to Objection 5: The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime. whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according to Is. 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart."

Reply to Objection 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.

Articulus 6

Argumentum 1

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor passionis christi non fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus. Dolor enim patientis augetur secundum gravitatem et diuturnitatem passionis. Sed quidam martyres graviores passiones et diuturniores sustinuerunt quam christus, sicut patet de Laurentio, qui est assatus in craticula; et de vincentio, cuius carnes sunt ungulis ferreis laceratae. Ergo videtur quod dolor christi patientis non fuerit maximus.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, virtus mentis est mitigativa doloris, in tantum quod stoici posuerunt tristitiam in animo sapientis non cadere.

Et Aristoteles posuit quod virtus moralis medium tenet in passionibus.

Sed in christo fuit perfectissima virtus mentis. Ergo videtur quod in christo fuerit minimus dolor.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quanto aliquod patiens est magis sensibile, tanto maior sequitur dolor passionis. Sed anima est sensibilior quam corpus, cum corpus sentiat ex anima. Adam etiam in statu innocentiae videtur corpus sensibilius habuisse quam christus, qui assumpsit corpus humanum cum naturalibus defectibus. Ergo videtur quod dolor animae patientis in Purgatorio vel in inferno, vel etiam dolor Adae si passus fuisset, maior fuisset quam dolor passionis christi.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, maioris boni amissio causat maiorem dolorem. Sed peccator peccando amittit maius bonum quam christus patiendo, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita naturae. Christus etiam, qui amisit vitam post triduum resurrecturus, minus aliquid videtur amisisse quam illi qui amittunt vitam permansuri in morte. Ergo videtur quod dolor christi non fuerit maximus dolor.

Argumentum 5

Praeterea, innocentia patientis diminuit dolorem passionis. Sed christus innocenter est passus, secundum illud Ierem. XI, ego autem quasi agnus mansuetus qui portatur ad victimam.

Ergo videtur quod dolor passionis christi non fuerit maximus.

Argumentum 6

Praeterea, in his quae christi sunt, nihil fuit superfluum. Sed minimus dolor christi suffecisset ad finem salutis humanae, habuisset enim infinitam virtutem ex persona divina. Ergo superfluum fuisset assumere maximum dolorem.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod habetur Thren. I ex persona christi, attendite, et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de defectibus assumptis a christo ageretur, in christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae. Quod quidem contingit propter quatuor.

Primo quidem, propter causas doloris. Nam doloris sensibilis causa fuit laesio corporalis. Quae acerbitatem habuit, tum propter generalitatem passionis, de qua dictum est, tum etiam ex genere passionis. Quia mors confixorum in cruce est acerbissima, quia configuntur in locis nervosis et maxime sensibilibus, scilicet in manibus et pedibus; et ipsum pondus corporis pendentis continue auget dolorem; et cum hoc etiam est doloris diuturnitas, quia non statim moriuntur, sicut hi qui sunt gladio interfecti. Doloris autem interioris causa fuit, primo quidem, omnia peccata humani generis, pro quibus satisfaciebat patiendo, unde ea quasi sibi adscribit, dicens in Psalmo, verba delictorum meorum.

Secundo, specialiter casus Iudaeorum et aliorum in eius mortem delinquentium, et praecipue discipulorum, qui scandalum passi fuerant in christi passione. Tertio etiam amissio vitae corporalis, quae naturaliter est horribilis humanae naturae.

Secundo potest magnitudo considerari ex perceptibilitate patientis. Nam et secundum corpus erat optime complexionatus, cum corpus eius fuerit formatum miraculose operatione spiritus sancti, sicut et alia quae per miracula facta sunt, sunt aliis potiora, ut chrysostomus dicit de vino in quod christus aquam convertit in nuptiis.

Et ideo in eo maxime viguit sensus tactus, ex cuius perceptione sequitur dolor. Anima etiam, secundum vires interiores, efficacissime apprehendit omnes causas tristitiae.

Tertio magnitudo doloris christi patientis potest considerari ex doloris puritate. Nam in aliis patientibus mitigatur tristitia interior, et etiam dolor exterior, ex aliqua consideratione rationis, per quandam derivationem seu redundantiam a superioribus viribus ad inferiores. Quod in christo patiente non fuit, unicuique enim virium permisit agere quod est sibi proprium, sicut Damascenus dicit.

Quarto potest considerari magnitudo doloris christi patientis ex hoc quod passio illa et dolor a christo fuerunt assumpta voluntarie, propter finem liberationis hominum a peccato. Et ideo tantam quantitatem doloris assumpsit quae esset proportionata magnitudini fructus qui inde sequebatur. Ex his igitur omnibus causis simul consideratis manifeste apparet quod dolor christi fuit maximus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex uno tantum praedictorum, scilicet ex laesione corporali, quae est causa sensibilis doloris. Sed ex aliis causis multo magis dolor christi patientis augetur, ut dictum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus moralis aliter mitigat tristitiam interiorem, et aliter exteriorem dolorem sensibilem.

Tristitiam enim interiorem diminuit directe, in ea medium constituendo sicut in propria materia. Medium autem in passionibus virtus moralis constituit, ut in secunda parte habitum est, non secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum quantitatem proportionis, ut scilicet passio non excedat regulam rationis. Et quia stoici reputabant quod nulla tristitia esset ad aliquid utilis, ideo credebant quod totaliter a ratione discordaret, et per consequens quod totaliter esset sapienti vitanda. Sed secundum rei veritatem, tristitia aliqua laudabilis est, ut Augustinus probat, in XIV de CIV. Dei, quando scilicet procedit ex sancto amore, ut puta cum aliquis tristatur de peccatis propriis vel alienis.

Assumitur etiam ut utilis ad finem satisfactionis pro peccato, secundum illud II Cor. VII, quae secundum deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur.

Et ideo christus, ut satisfaceret pro peccatis omnium hominum, assumpsit tristitiam maximam quantitate absoluta, non tamen excedentem regulam rationis. Dolorem autem exteriorem sensus virtus moralis directe non minuit, quia talis dolor non obedit rationi, sed sequitur corporis naturam. Diminuit tamen ipsum indirecte per redundantiam a superioribus viribus in inferiores. Quod in christo non fuit, ut dictum est.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor animae separatae patientis pertinet ad statum futurae damnationis, qui excedit omne malum huius vitae, sicut sanctorum gloria excedit omne bonum praesentis vitae. Unde, cum diximus christi dolorem esse maximum, non comparamus ipsum dolori animae separatae. Corpus autem Adae pati non poterat, nisi peccaret et sic fieret mortale et passibile. Et minus doleret patiens quam corpus christi, propter rationes praedictas. Ex quibus etiam apparet quod etiam si, per impossibile, ponatur quod Adam in statu innocentiae passus fuisset, minor fuisset eius dolor quam christi.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod christus non solum doluit pro amissione vitae corporalis propriae, sed etiam pro peccatis omnium aliorum. Qui dolor in christo excessit omnem dolorem cuiuslibet contriti. Tum quia ex maiori sapientia et caritate processit, ex quibus dolor contritionis augetur. Tum etiam quia pro omnium peccatis simul doluit, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit.

Vita autem corporalis christi fuit tantae dignitatis, et praecipue propter divinitatem unitam, quod de eius amissione etiam ad horam, magis esset dolendum quam de amissione alterius hominis per quantumcumque tempus.

Unde et philosophus dicit, in III ethic., quod virtuosus plus diligit vitam suam quanto scit eam esse meliorem, et tamen eam exponit propter bonum virtutis.

Et similiter christus vitam suam maxime dilectam exposuit propter bonum caritatis, secundum illud Ierem. XII, dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum eius.

Ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod innocentia patientis minuit dolorem passionis quantum ad numerum, quia, dum nocens patitur, dolet non solum de poena, sed etiam de culpa; innocens autem solum de poena.

Qui tamen dolor in eo augetur ex innocentia, inquantum apprehendit nocumentum illatum ut magis indebitum. Unde etiam et alii magis sunt reprehensibiles si eis non compatiuntur, secundum illud Isaiae LVII, iustus autem perit, et non est qui recogitet in corde suo.

Ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare, non sola potestate, sed etiam iustitia. Et ideo non solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita, sed etiam quantum dolor eius sufficeret secundum naturam humanam, ad tantam satisfactionem.