Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the "act of the body." But the soul is not, as to its every part, the "act of the body"; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, "to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only "pro-passions"; as Jerome remarks on Mt. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that "He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him." Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.

Objection 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i), "there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration." Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: "My soul is filled with evils": upon which the gloss adds: "Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a perishing people, by compassionating them." But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.

I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by heat.

So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above (Article 6). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the act of the body, still the soul's essence is the act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the 1, Question 77, Articles 6,8.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part of the proper object, according to which Christ's higher reason did not suffer.

Reply to Objection 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so that it then follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.

Articulus 7

Argumentum 1

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Anima enim patitur, patiente corpore, per accidens, inquantum est corporis actus. Sed anima non est actus corporis secundum quamlibet partem eius, nam intellectus nullius corporis actus est, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Ergo videtur quod christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, quaelibet potentia animae patitur a suo obiecto.

Sed superioris partis rationis obiectum sunt rationes aeternae, quibus inspiciendis et consulendis intendit, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin..

Ex rationibus autem aeternis nullum potuit christus pati nocumentum, cum in nullo ei contrariarentur. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit passus secundum totam animam.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, quando passio sensibilis usque ad rationem pertingit, tunc dicitur completa passio.

Quae in christo non fuit, ut Hieronymus dicit, sed solum propassio.

Unde et dionysius dicit, in epistola ad ioannem evangelistam, quod passiones sibi illatas patiebatur secundum iudicare solum.

Non ergo videtur quod christus secundum totam animam pateretur.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, passio dolorem causat. Sed in intellectu speculativo non est dolor, quia delectationi quae est ab eo quod est considerare, nulla tristitia opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, I topic..

Ergo videtur quod christus non pateretur secundum totam animam.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, ex persona christi, repleta est malis anima mea, Glossa, non vitiis, sed doloribus, quibus anima carni compatitur, vel malis, scilicet pereuntis populi, compatiendo.

Non autem fuisset anima eius his malis repleta, si non secundum totam animam passus esset. Ergo christus secundum totam animam passus est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Partes autem animae dicuntur potentiae eius. Sic ergo dicitur anima tota pati, inquantum patitur secundum suam essentiam, vel inquantum secundum omnes suas potentias patitur. Sed considerandum est quod aliqua potentia animae potest pati dupliciter. Uno modo, passione propria, quae quidem est secundum quod patitur a suo obiecto, sicut si visus patiatur ex superabundantia visibilis. Alio modo patitur aliqua potentia passione subiecti super quod fundatur, sicut visus patitur patiente sensu tactus in oculo, super quem fundatur visus; puta cum oculus pungitur, aut etiam distemperatur per calorem. Sic igitur dicendum quod, si intelligamus totam animam ratione suae essentiae, sic manifestum est totam animam christi passam esse. Nam tota essentia animae coniungitur corpori ita quod tota est in toto, et tota in qualibet parte eius.

Et ideo, corpore patiente et disposito ad separationem ab anima, tota anima patiebatur. Si vero intelligamus totam animam secundum omnes potentias eius, sic, loquendo de passionibus propriis potentiarum, patiebatur quidem secundum omnes vires inferiores, quia in singulis viribus inferioribus animae, quae circa temporalia operantur, inveniebatur aliquid quod erat causa doloris christi, sicut ex supra dictis patet.

Sed secundum hoc superior ratio non patiebatur in christo ex parte sui obiecti, scilicet dei, qui non erat animae christi causa doloris, sed delectationis et gaudii. Secundum autem illum modum passionis quo potentia aliqua dicitur pati ex parte sui subiecti, sic omnes potentiae animae christi patiebantur. Omnes enim potentiae animae christi radicantur in essentia eius, ad quam perveniebat passio, passo corpore, cuius est actus.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet intellectus, secundum quod est potentia quaedam, non sit corporis actus; essentia tamen animae est corporis actus, in qua radicatur potentia intellectiva, ut in prima parte habitum est.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de passione quae est ex parte proprii obiecti, secundum quam superior ratio in christo passa non fuit.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor tunc dicitur esse passio perfecta, per quam anima perturbatur, quando passio sensitivae partis pertingit usque ad immutandam rationem a rectitudine sui actus, ut scilicet sequatur passionem, et non habeat liberum arbitrium super eam. Sic autem passio sensitivae partis non pervenit in christo usque ad rationem, sed ex parte subiecti, ut dictum est.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non potest habere dolorem vel tristitiam ex parte sui obiecti, quod est verum absolute consideratum, quod est perfectio eius. Potest tamen ad ipsum pertinere dolor, vel causa doloris, per modum iam dictum.