Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one's neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse:

"Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri,

Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit." For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than as shown in other sins.

Objection 2: Further, Rabanus says: "God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized." Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard: "Forgive us our trespasses ." Therefore they too return through ingratitude; and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those sins mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Whatever sins I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace." Now innocence is a greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii ): "It is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance": so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to apply to the others.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), sins pardoned through Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above (Question 85, Articles 2,5) in man's detestation of his past sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance. Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to Ps. 31:5: "I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin": and against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.

Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.

Reply to Objection 1: This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him, wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.

Reply to Objection 3: A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck (cf. Question 84, Article 6). Secondly, a favor may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater.

Articulus 2

Argumentum 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata dimissa non redeant per ingratitudinem quae specialiter est secundum quatuor genera peccatorum, scilicet secundum odium fraternum, apostasiam a fide, contemptum confessionis, et dolorem de poenitentia habita, secundum quod quidam metrice dixerunt, fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque fateri, poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit.

Tanto enim est maior ingratitudo quanto gravius est peccatum quod quis contra deum committit post beneficium remissionis peccatorum. Sed quaedam alia peccata sunt his graviora, sicut blasphemia contra deum, et peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Ergo videtur quod peccata dimissa non redeant magis secundum ingratitudinem commissam secundum haec peccata, quam secundum alia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, Rabanus dicit, nequam servum tradidit deus tortoribus quoadusque redderet universum debitum, quia non solum peccata quae post baptismum homo egit reputabuntur ei ad poenam, sed originalia, quae ei sunt dimissa in baptismo.

Sed etiam inter debita peccata venialia computantur, pro quibus dicimus, dimitte nobis debita nostra.

Ergo ipsa etiam redeunt per ingratitudinem. Et pari ratione videtur quod per peccata venialia redeant peccata prius dimissa, et non solum per praedicta peccata.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, tanto est maior ingratitudo quanto post maius beneficium acceptum aliquis peccat. Sed beneficium dei est etiam ipsa innocentia, qua peccatum vitamus, dicit enim Augustinus, in II confess., gratiae tuae deputo quaecumque peccata non feci.

Maius autem donum est innocentia quam etiam remissio omnium peccatorum. Ergo non minus est ingratus deo qui primo peccat post innocentiam, quam qui peccat post poenitentiam. Et ita videtur quod per ingratitudinem quae fit secundum peccata praedicta, non maxime redeant peccata dimissa.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVIII Moral., ex dictis evangelicis constat quia, si quod in nos delinquitur ex corde non dimittimus, et illud rursus exigetur quod nobis iam per poenitentiam dimissum fuisse gaudebamus.

Et ita propter odium fraternum specialiter peccata dimissa redeunt per ingratitudinem. Et eadem ratio videtur de aliis.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccata dimissa per poenitentiam redire dicuntur inquantum reatus eorum, ratione ingratitudinis, virtualiter continetur in peccato sequenti. Ingratitudo autem potest committi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod aliquid fit contra beneficium. Et hoc modo per omne peccatum mortale quo deum offendit, redditur homo ingratus deo, qui peccata remisit. Et sic per quodlibet peccatum mortale sequens redeunt peccata prius dimissa, ratione ingratitudinis.

Alio modo committitur ingratitudo non solum faciendo contra ipsum beneficium, sed etiam faciendo contra formam beneficii praestiti.

Quae quidem forma, si attendatur ex parte benefactoris, est remissio debitorum. Unde contra hanc formam facit qui fratri petenti veniam non remittit, sed odium tenet. Si autem attendatur ex parte poenitentis, qui recipit hoc beneficium, invenitur duplex motus liberi arbitrii. Quorum primus est motus liberi arbitrii in deum, qui est actus fidei formatae, et contra hoc facit homo apostatando a fide, secundus autem, motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, qui est actus poenitentiae. Ad quam primo pertinet, ut supra dictum est, quod homo detestetur peccata praeterita, et contra hoc facit ille qui dolet se poenituisse.

Secundo pertinet ad actum poenitentiae ut poenitens proponat se subiicere clavibus ecclesiae per confessionem, secundum illud Psalmi, dixi, confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam domino, et ut remisisti impietatem peccati mei.

Et contra hoc facit ille qui contemnit confiteri, secundum quod proposuerat. Et ideo dicitur quod specialiter ingratitudo horum peccatorum facit redire peccata prius dimissa.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc non dicitur specialiter de istis peccatis quia sint ceteris graviora, sed quia directius opponuntur beneficio remissionis peccatorum.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam peccata venialia et peccatum originale redeunt modo praedicto, sicut et peccata mortalia, inquantum contemnitur dei beneficium quo haec peccata sunt remissa. Non tamen per peccatum veniale aliquis incurrit ingratitudinem, quia homo, peccando venialiter, non facit contra deum, sed praeter ipsum. Et ideo per peccata venialia nullo modo peccata dimissa redeunt.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod beneficium aliquod habet pensari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex quantitate ipsius beneficii. Et secundum hoc, innocentia est maius dei beneficium quam poenitentia, quae dicitur secunda tabula post naufragium.

Alio modo potest pensari beneficium ex parte recipientis, qui minus est dignus, et sic magis sibi fit gratia. Unde et ipse magis est ingratus si contemnat. Et hoc modo beneficium remissionis culpae est maius, inquantum praestatur totaliter indigno.

Et ideo ex hoc sequitur maior ingratitudo.