Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It would seem that deeds deadened by sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above (Question 88, Articles 1,2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity.

Objection 2: Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with animals who die, as stated above (Article 4). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.

Objection 3: Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.

On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, "I will restore to you the years, which the locust . . . hath eaten," a gloss says: "I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed." But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.

I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Apoc. 3:11: "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: The very works themselves of sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God's mercy, no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfills what those works deserved.

Reply to Objection 2: Deeds done in charity are not in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life: so that the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: He who, through Penance, arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.

Articulus 5

Argumentum 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera mortificata per peccatum per poenitentiam non reviviscant. Sicut enim per poenitentiam subsequentem remittuntur peccata praeterita, ita etiam per peccatum sequens mortificantur opera prius in caritate facta. Sed peccata dimissa per poenitentiam non redeunt, ut supra dictum est.

Ergo videtur quod etiam opera mortificata per caritatem non reviviscant.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, opera dicuntur mortificari ad similitudinem animalium quae moriuntur, ut dictum est.

Sed animal mortuum non potest iterum vivificari. Ergo nec opera mortificata possunt iterum per poenitentiam reviviscere.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, opera in caritate facta merentur gloriam secundum quantitatem gratiae vel caritatis. Sed quandoque per poenitentiam homo resurgit in minori gratia vel caritate. Ergo non consequetur gloriam secundum merita priorum operum. Et ita videtur quod opera mortificata per peccatum non reviviscant.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod, super illud ioel II, reddam vobis annos quos comedit locusta, dicit Glossa, non patiar perire ubertatem quam cum perturbatione animi amisistis.

Sed illa ubertas est meritum bonorum operum, quod fuit perditum per peccatum. Ergo per poenitentiam reviviscunt opera meritoria prius facta.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod opera meritoria per peccatum sequens mortificata non reviviscunt per poenitentiam sequentem, considerantes quod opera illa non remanent, ut iterum vivificari possent.

Sed hoc impedire non potest quin vivificentur. Non enim habent vim perducendi in vitam aeternam, quod pertinet ad eorum vitam, solum secundum quod actu existunt, sed etiam postquam actu esse desinunt secundum quod remanent in acceptatione divina. Sic autem remanent, quantum est de se, etiam postquam per peccatum mortificantur, quia semper deus illa opera, prout facta fuerunt, acceptabit, et sancti de eis gaudebunt, secundum illud Apoc. III, tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam.

Sed quod isti qui ea fecit non sint efficacia ad ducendum ad vitam aeternam, provenit ex impedimento peccati supervenientis, per quod ipse redditur indignus vita aeterna. Hoc autem impedimentum tollitur per poenitentiam, inquantum per eam remittuntur peccata. Unde restat quod opera prius mortificata per poenitentiam recuperant efficaciam perducendi eum qui fecit ea in vitam aeternam, quod est ea reviviscere.

Et ita patet quod opera mortificata per poenitentiam reviviscunt.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opera peccati per poenitentiam abolentur secundum se, ita scilicet quod ex eis ulterius, deo indulgente, nec macula nec reatus inducitur. Sed opera ex caritate facta non abolentur a deo, in cuius acceptatione remanent, sed impedimentum accipiunt ex parte hominis operantis. Et ideo, remoto impedimento quod est ex parte hominis, deus implet ex parte sua illud quod opera merebantur.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod opera in caritate facta non mortificantur secundum se, sicut dictum est, sed solum per impedimentum superveniens ex parte operantis. Animalia autem moriuntur secundum se, inquantum privantur principio vitae. Et ideo non est simile.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui per poenitentiam resurgit in minori caritate, consequetur quidem praemium essentiale secundum quantitatem caritatis in qua invenitur, habebit tamen gaudium maius de operibus in prima caritate factis quam de operibus quae in secunda fecit.

Quod pertinet ad praemium accidentale.