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[EPITOME OF THE PREACHINGS OF THE JOURNEYS OF PETER BY CLEMENT.]

I, Clement, being a Roman citizen, have been able to live my early life temperately, since my thought from childhood has directed the desire in me towards both despondencies and toils. For a thought was with me (I know not whence it took its beginning) concerning death, making frequent reminders that when I die I will not exist, and no one will ever make mention of me, as infinite time brings all things to oblivion-and I shall be non-existent, not knowing those who are non-existent, not knowing, not being known, not having been, not becoming-and whether the world ever came into being, and before it came into being what then was (for if it always was, it will also always be; but if it has come into being, it will also be dissolved), and after its dissolution what then will be again, if not perhaps silence and oblivion? Or perhaps there will be something which it is not now possible to conceive. Pondering these and similar things unceasingly, I know not from where, I had a painful grief, so much that it made me grow pale and waste away; and the most terrible thing was, if ever I resolved to push away the anxiety as useless, the suffering became all the more intense for me. And I was vexed at this, not knowing that I had a good thought as a companion, which became for me the good cause of immortality, as I later learned by experience and gave thanks to God, the master of all. For by the thought that at first afflicted me, I was compelled to come to the search for and discovery of the truth of things; and then I pitied those whom at first through ignorance I was in danger of deeming happy. Being, therefore, from childhood occupied with such thoughts, for the sake of learning something certain I used to frequent the schools of the philosophers. And I saw nothing else but refutations and constructions of doctrines, and strifes and contentions, and arts of syllogisms and inventions of propositions. And at one time the doctrine prevailed (so to speak) that the soul is immortal, and at another that it is mortal. Whenever, then, the argument prevailed that it is immortal, I rejoiced; but whenever that it is mortal, I was grieved. But I was the more disheartened because I was not able to establish either doctrine firmly in my own mind. But I understood that the views on the subjects are supposed to be false or true according to their advocates, and do not appear as they are in truth. Having come to understand at last, therefore, that comprehension does not depend on the subjects being advocated, but that the opinions are pronounced according to their advocates, I became still more dizzy in these matters. Wherefore I groaned from the depth of my soul; for I was neither able to establish anything for certain, nor was I able to shake off the anxiety about such things, although I wished, as I said before; because, when I more frequently enjoined upon myself to be quiet, I know not how, the thought of such things secretly entered into me with a certain pleasure. And again, being perplexed, I would say to myself: Why do I labour in vain? since the matter is clear, that if I will not exist when I am dead, it is not fitting for me to be grieved now while I do exist. Wherefore I will reserve being grieved for that time, when, not existing, I will not be grieved. But if I am to exist at all, my grief now is superfluous. And immediately after this another thought would enter me; I would say

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[ΚΛHΜEΝΤOΣ ΤΩΝ ΠEΤΡOΥ EΠI∆HΜIΩΝ ΚHΡΥΓΜAΤΩΝ

EΠIΤOΜH.]

Ἐγὼ Κλήμης, Ῥωμαίων πολίτης ὤν, καὶ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν σω- φρόνως ζῆσαι δεδύνημαι, τῆς ἐννοίας μου ἐκ παιδὸς ἀπασχολούσης τὴν ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐπιθυμίαν εἴς τε ἀθυμίας καὶ πόνους. συνῆν γάρ μοι λογισμός (οὐκ οἶδα πόθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβών) περὶ θανάτου, πυκνὰς ποιούμενος ὑπο- μνήσεις ὅτι ἄρα θανὼν οὐκ εἰμὶ καὶ οὐδὲ μνήμην τις ποιήσει μού ποτε, τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου πάντων τὰ πάντα εἰς λήθην φέροντος-ἔσομαι δὲ οὐκ ὤν, οὐκ ὄντας εἰδώς, οὐ γινώσκων, οὐ γινωσκόμενος, οὐ γεγονώς, οὐ γινόμε- νος-καὶ ἆρά ποτε γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τί ἄρα ἦν (εἰ γὰρ ἦν αἰεί, καὶ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ γέγονεν, καὶ λυθήσεται) καὶ μετὰ λύσιν τί ἄρα ἔσται πάλιν, εἰ μὴ τάχα σιγὴ καὶ λήθη; ἢ καὶ τάχα ἔσται τι ὃ νῦν νοῆσαι οὐ δυνατόν. ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια οὐκ οἶδα πόθεν ἀπαύστως ἐνθυμούμενος ὀδυνηρὰν εἶχον λύπην τοσοῦτον ὡς ὠχριακότα με τήκεσθαι· καὶ τὸ δεινότατον, εἴ ποτε ἀπώσασθαι τὴν φροντίδα ὡς ἀνωφελῆ ἐβουλευσάμην, ἀκμαιότερόν μοι μᾶλλον τὸ πάθος ἐγίνετο. καὶ ἠχθόμην ἐπὶ τούτῳ, οὐκ εἰδὼς σύνοικον καλὴν ἔχων ἔννοιαν, ἀθανασίας ἀγαθὴν αἰτίαν μοι γενομένην, ὡς ὕστερον τῇ πείρᾳ ἐπέγνων καὶ θεῷ τῷ πάντων δε- σπότῃ ηὐχαρίστησα. ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρχὰς θλιβούσης με ἐννοίας εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ζήτησιν καὶ εὕρεσιν ἠναγκάσθην ἐλθεῖν· καὶ τότε ἐταλά- νιζον οὓς τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ ἄγνοιαν μακαρίζειν ἐκινδύνευον. ἐκ παιδὸς οὖν ἡλικίας ὢν ἐν τοιούτοις λογισμοῖς, χάριν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι βέβαιον εἰς τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐφοίτων διατριβάς. καὶ οὐθὲν ἕτερον ἑώρων ἢ δογμάτων ἀνασκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς καὶ ἔρεις καὶ φιλονεικίας καὶ συλλογισμῶν τέχνας καὶ λημμάτων ἐπινοίας. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπεκράτει (φέρε λέγειν) ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή, ὁτὲ δὲ ὅτι θνητή. εἴ ποτε οὖν ἐπεκράτει λόγος ὅτι ἀθάνατος, ἔχαιρον· ὁπότε δὲ ὅτι θνητή, ἐλυπούμην. πλεῖον δὲ ἠθύμουν ὅτι οὐδ' ὁπότερον εἰς τὸν ἐμὸν βεβαιῶσαι νοῦν ἠδυνάμην. πλὴν συνενόουν ὅτι αἱ δόξαι τῶν ὑποθέσεων παρὰ τοὺς ἐκδικοῦντας ψευδεῖς ἢ ἀληθεῖς ὑπολαμβάνονται καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἔχουσιν ἀληθείας φαίνονται. ἐπιστήσας οὖν ἤδη ποτὲ ὅτι οὐ παρὰ τὰς ἐκδικουμένας ὑποθέσεις ἡ κατάληψις γίνεται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς ἐκδικοῦντας αἱ δόξαι ἀποφαίνονται, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἰλιγγίων ἐν τοῖς πράγ- μασιν. διὸ ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς βάθους ἐστέναζον· οὔτε γάρ τι βεβαιῶσαι οἷός τ' ἤμην οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων φροντίδα ἀποσείσασθαι ἐδυνάμην, καίπερ βουλόμενος, ὡς φθάσας εἶπον· ὅτι ἐμαυτῷ πυκνότερον ἡσυχάζειν ἐπι- τάσσοντος, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως λανθανόντως μεθ' ἡδονῆς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων μοι εἰσήρχετο λογισμός. καὶ πάλιν ἀπορούμενος ἔλεγον ἐμαυτῷ· Τί ματαιο- πονῶ; σαφοῦς ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος ὅτι εἰ μὲν θανὼν οὐκ εἰμί, νῦν ὄντα με λυπεῖσθαι οὐ προσῆκεν. διὸ τηρήσω τὸ λυπεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν τότε, ὅτε οὐκ ὢν οὐ λυπηθήσομαι. εἰ δ' ἄρα εἰμί τι, νῦν ἐκ περισσοῦ μοι πρόσεστιν τὸ λυπεῖσθαι. καὶ εὐθέως μετὰ τοῦτο ἕτερός με εἰσῄει λογισμός· ἔλεγον